THE

MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus.*

A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke.*

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THE PROBLEM OF AUTHORITY

(The Sixteenth Conference of Modern Churchmen)

By the EDITOR.

The Sixteenth Conference of Modern Churchmen was held at Girton College, Cambridge, 23rd—30th September, 1929. The Presidential Address, delivered by the Dean of St. Paul's, dealt with *Authority and the Life of the Spirit.* The papers, all of which are published in this number, together with the two Conference sermons, were as follows :—

(1) *Corporate Authority and its Sanctions.* Professor Ernest Barker, Litt.D., D.Litt., LL.D.

(2) *The State.* M. J. Oakeshott, M.A., Fellow of Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge.

(3) *The Idea of a Transcendent Order of Society.* Ven. A. L. Lilley, M.A., Canon of Hereford.

(4) *The Meaning of 'Spiritual' and 'Religious.'* Rev. J. C. Hardwick, M.A., B.Sc.

(5) *The Scope of Authority in the Sphere of Science, Ethics and Art.* Professor W. R. Sorley, Litt.D., F.B.A.

(6) *The Scope of Authority in the Sphere of Religion.* Rev. A. C. Bouquet, D.D.

(7) *The Church as a Divine Institution.* Rev. Alfred Fawkes, M.A.

(8) *A Corpus of Sacred Writings.* Professor F. C. Burkitt, D.D., F.B.A.

(9) *A System of Doctrine as revealed Truth.* Principal George Galloway, D.D.

(10) *The Idea of a National Church.* Professor J. M. Creed, B.D., Canon of Ely.

(11) *The Actual Position in England to-day.* Rev. Norman Sykes, M.A., D.Phil.

(12) *Establishment and Alternatives.* Rev. J. S. Bezzant, M.A., Fellow of Exeter College, and Vice-Principal of Ripon Hall, Oxford.

(13) *The 'Sacred' and the 'Secular.'* Rev. Geoffrey Allen, M.A., Chaplain of Ripon Hall, Oxford.

(14) *The Spirit of Christ and the Spirit of Man.* Rev. J. S. Boys-Smith, Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge.

(15) *Righteousness and Truth.* Rev. T. F. Royds, B.D.

(16) *Vision and Authority.* Ven. J. W. Hunkin, B.D., M.C., Archdeacon of Coventry.

The purpose of the papers was to assist the Conference to study the subject of Spiritual Authority in the modern State. What is meant by 'spiritual' and 'authority'? If there is such a thing as 'spiritual authority,' where is it to be found, and how is it to be exercised? What is its basis, and what its *locus*? The subject is largely a sociological one, and if no final answer can be given to some of the questions, at least it may be possible to place them in their right perspective.

According to the Conference scheme arranged by Professor Bethune-Baker, the subject was divided under five heads corresponding to the five days of the Conference. This is best explained by the following quotation from the Conference Programme.

> For the first day the subject will be *Human Society and its Order,* treated in papers (1), (2) and (3).
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> For the second day the subject will be *Authority in relation to Individual Personality and Freedom,* treated in papers (4), (5) and (6).
>
> For the third day the subject will be *The Seat of Religious Knowledge and Authority,* treated in papers (7), (8) and (9).
>
> For the fourth day the subject will be *The State in relation to Religion,* treated in papers (10), (11) and (12).
>
> On the fifth day two common antitheses, *Sacred and Secular,* and *The Spirit of Christ and the Spirit of Man,* will be considered.

The titles of the papers indicate sufficiently their contents. Although some of them will require very close attention if their arguments are to be followed, we believe that it will be found worth while to make the effort; and even if their conclusions in certain cases be ungratifying to the ecclesiastical mind, they need not on that account be of less value to a right understanding of realities. In the brief space allotted, we should desire to offer a few preliminary remarks in the hope of simplifying and co-ordinating the issues.

What is Authority?

What is authority? Authority is *the right to demand obedience.* It is that which has the right to be obeyed. This right to demand obedience is in popular phrase confused with *the power to enforce obedience.* But, strictly speaking, the power to enforce obedience is no necessary attribute of authority. Authority does not necessarily possess any coercive force or power. This is the view of Bishop Butler, as it is of Professor Sorley, but it is not the popular view of authority as held by the man in the street.

Whence comes authority? It is derived from reality. All that is real has authority, whether it be Nature viewed as a system of scientific laws, or pensonality as compact of rational and moral consciousness. But inasmuch as there are different degrees of reality, some entities being more real than others, so there are different degrees of authority. As evolutionists we shall be conscious of a graduated scale of reality, just as the mineralogist in his investigations is conscious of Mohr's scale of hardness.

The lower forms of reality will correspond with the lower grades in the evolutionary process, and the higher forms of reality will correspond with the higher grades in the evolutionary process. Hence spirit (according to Mr. Hardwick's definition), the free activity of the rational and moral consciousness, being the highest as it is in this mundane sphere the latest product of the cosmic evolutionary process, will be more real than biological life, and biological life will be more real than electrical forces and physical masses. Hence the rational and moral consciousness, as it is the most real entity, will be possessed of the highest authority. We may, for reasons which we cannot go into here, believe that the rational and moral consciousness in man is not the only form in which it exists in the Universe. Indeed, its existence in man, combined with the evidence of its existence in the method of the creative activity, may compel us to believe that rational and moral consciousness exists also outside man as the *fons et origo* of the creative process, its director and its consummator—in other words, its rational and moral Creator. And, although the drawing of this inference will add greatly to the force of our conviction of the supreme authority of the rational and moral consciousness, yet the failure or inability to draw this inference will not invalidate the conviction. For if not as theologians, yet as scientists, we are compelled to hold that the rational and moral consciousness is the supreme authority in the cosmic sphere.

When considering and affirming the authority of the rational and moral consciousness, we must ever bear in mind that that consciousness is itself in the cosmic sphere the subject of evolution, and so its decisions are ever open to revision and restatement as the evolutionary process advances.

The relation of the authority of the rational and moral consciousness in the individual to that of the society or community in which he lives furnishes human history with a series of heroic conflicts: for it is the individual, in obedience to the demands of his rational and moral consciousness, who has revolted repeatedly against the static or at least less active consciousness of his community, and demanded from it a revision of its rational and moral standards. The individual is by no means always right as against his community: yet it is probably correct to say that it is the individual, be he prophet, sage, or scientist, who has invariably been the cause of progressive revision of the rational and moral standards of human societies, and not the societies as a whole who have inspired it. *Athanasius contra mundum* is but symbolic of what is forever going on in human history: it is the normal way by which the bounds of truth and right are enlarged in human society.

The relation of the rational and moral authority of societies to one another in the same State or community is a problem fraught with difficulty. Some will hold that the supreme rational and moral authority must be conceded to the greater society or State in which the other societies exist. For practical administrative purposes, it may be necessary that this should be so—indeed, it is necessary. Yet a progressive and judiciously administered State will not be eager to curb the smaller societies within it, still less to suppress them, unless they are manifestly anarchic or reactionary, in other words, until they become a menace to the true well-being of the State. Just as reasonable freedom for the individual within his society makes for the vitality and progress of the society, so does the reasonable freedom of societies or corporations within the State make for the vitality and progress of the State.

F. D. Maurice used to teach that there were three Divine Socities—the Family, the State, the Church. Of course, every human society which

exists for the good of humanity, be it the Royal Society, or a Quaker meeting, or a troop of Boy Scouts, is a Divine Society. Each of Maurice's three Divine Societies has its authority; and a study of modern social and political conditions indicates that it is easy for there to be a clash between them. How is the rightful sphere of the authority of each to be determined? The family can claim rational and moral authority in all which is needful for the true good of the family; the State in all things needful for the true good of the State; the Church in all things needful for the true good of the Church. If this principle be observed, there will be no clash of authority, and the true good of the whole will be found in seeking the true good of each. Each will be possessed by a perfectly good will, a will directed by the rational and moral consciousness, and in that case there will not be three wills nor thirty wills but one will. If, however, there should be a clash between the wills, their respective rights must be determined by the judiciary, and in the last resort the supreme authority must be with the State. If in such a case the rational and moral consciousness of the individual, or smaller society, does not permit obedience to the authority of the State, then such must be ready to disobey and suffer, and their sufferings will possess a high moral value if borne in the right way. But before they decide to disobey and suffer, they will do well to think long and deeply.

Church and State in England.

Professor Sorley supplied the test by which to try authority when he pointed our that the right of authority to direct depends on (1) the possession of superior insight into values, and (2) the exercise of authority in such a way as to admit of research and experiment conducted so as to secure further values in a universe where many values are still latent and others are being created. Christ's Gospel stands this test. Insight and freedom are its marks. And the authority of the Church derived from Christ stands or falls as it is true to Him. *The Christian Church cannot claim absolute authority.* Its authority is derived, and its right to demand obedience is dependent upon its loyalty to Christ. Some recent claims by Church officials seem to ignore this. They seem to confuse liberty with licence. The only freedom the Christian Church can properly claim is Christian freedom to do what is right. In the recent clash with the House of Commons over the Prayer Book it is far from clear that what the majority of Church officials, in their inadequately representative assemblies, wished to do was right. Christian freedom is not to be identified with clericalist dominance, nor with ecclesiastical independence. When the Church officials can show that what they desire to do in connection with the Communion Services is right, we have no doubt Parliament will sanction it. Parliament showed by the high standard of its debates that it was open to have its rational and moral consciousness convinced, but this the Church's official representatives failed to achieve. Because of this failure it is hardly right for the Church authorities to complain of the intolerable tyranny of Parliament, when Parliament did but exercise a right voluntarily conceded to it by the very prelates who are now complaining of the exercise of that right. To put it briefly. This is not Christian, and it is not cricket. It is as little praiseworthy to speak of Parliament as a secular or secularized assembly. Its treatment of the Prayer Book Measure was essentially Christian as evinced by the noble spirit of the debates. Christ had but one test: 'By their fruits ye shall know them.' For the Christian there is in this world nothing secular except sin.

AUTHORITY AND THE LIFE OF THE SPIRIT

By the Very Rev. W. R. Inge, D.D., C.V.O., F.B.A., Dean of St. Paul's.

THE subject of this Address, and indeed the subject or subjects of the whole Conference, recall the famous posthumous book of Auguste Sabatier, *Les Religions d'Autorité et la Religion de l'Esprit.* Sabatier's treatise is a sustained anti-Roman polemic. Most of us here probably think that though the Roman Church as a political institution may fairly be contrasted with 'the religion of the Spirit,' the classification breaks down when we consider Catholic piety, which is the soul of the institution. It is a tenable opinion that although theocratic imperialism did valuable work in the Dark Ages, when it kept alive some smouldering embers of culture in an age of chaotic savagery, it has outlived its usefulness as a factor in the higher civilization, which can no longer be 'church-directed,' as Troeltsch says. The survival-value of a corporation is no indication of its social beneficence. But it would be a very shallow judgment to call Catholicism as a living faith an unspiritual religion. It lives by the intense loyalty which it is able to evoke, and this loyalty must be accounted for. After making every allowance for the pride, arrogance, and combativeness which a monopolist institution tends to foster, the love which the Catholic feels for his Church is chiefly based on its proved spiritual value to himself. And this spiritual value depends largely on its authoritative character. There is nothing necessarily unspiritual in obedience. And so we cannot be content with the harsh antithesis, *either* authority *or* the Spirit. The authority of the Church is a spiritual authority; and the personal inspiration which has been contrasted with it speaks through the conscience with an authority no less categorical.

We may, however, suggest that the authority claimed by institutional Catholicism is not bound up with the kind of authority which it actually and legitimately exercises. It claims

a divine commission, and the tremendous power of binding or loosing offenders before the supreme tribunal. It claims absolute and universal obedience, by the right of the *imperium* with which it was invested by Him who alone had it to give. These claims are not admitted by those who are outside the Roman obedience. But there is another kind of authority, that of the teachers of an art or craft. The professor of a school of art virtually says to his students, 'Do not come here, unless you wish to learn to paint. But if you wish to be painters, you must learn the technique of the craft, and this we can teach you.' The method is authoritative; the student does what he is told because he wishes to learn what he could never find out for himself; he needs the empirical and traditional wisdom of a great profession. Precisely similar is the real authority of the Catholic Church. If a man or woman wishes to be a saint, or only to cease to be a sinner, the Church will apply therapeutic remedies, and order a course of discipline, the efficacy of which has been proved a thousand times. A certain result is guaranteed, and actually follows. You may not wish to be a devout Catholic; you may not like that type of character; but if you wish to be that kind of person, the Church will show you how it is done. The method is authoritative, and the manner is dogmatic, like that of a great physician; but the source of the authority is empirical, and the motive for submitting to it is the wish to acquire a certain type of character. The real cause of the confidence so widely placed in Roman priests is the belief that they do, in a vulgar phrase, 'deliver the goods.' There is nothing unspiritual in this kind of authority.

The comparison with the healing art is more illuminating than the comparison with the teaching of a craft, both because it is the sick soul that usually seeks professional guidance, and because, as has often been true in the history of medicine, spectacular successes are often helped out by superstition. The methods are based on sound empirical tradition; but the healer claims supernatural powers, to the great benefit of the patient, whose imagination makes the treatment more efficacious. The prevalent anti-intellectualism in philosophy justifies any system which is found to work, and this tendency is all in favour of 'the religions of authority.'

We cannot disregard this pragmatic test when we consider the place of authority in religion. But I prefer, in the short discussion which follows, to examine the idea of authority as a ground of faith from a different standpoint.

A child is disposed to believe whatever he is told; it is only experience that makes him sceptical. Mere inertia prevents most of us from questioning facts which we have accepted on authority; in no other way can we account for the vitality of the most foolish superstitions. Customary beliefs become part of our mental furniture; we accept them because we have heard someone else advocate them, and stick to them because we have made them our own. It is not pleasant to be told that our collection of old masters is mainly spurious. Whatever disturbs our ready reckoner of values is as unwelcome as a sudden depreciation of the currency. It has often been pointed out that an unquestioning acceptance of authority may have a decisive survival value in primitive societies; and in societies which are no longer primitive, such as Athens in the time of Socrates, the questioning spirit is voted a public nuisance. The fruit of the tree of knowledge always expels us from some paradise or other; even the paradise of fools is a pleasant place of residence while it remains habitable.

Professor Gwatkin defines authority as 'all weight allowed to the beliefs of persons or the teachings of institutions beyond their *reasonable* value as personal testimony.' But what is reason, and what is its relation to authority? There is a school of thinkers who oppose the two, and give the preference to authority. Lord Balfour, for instance, calls authority 'the rival and opponent of reason.' 'Authority stands for that group of non-rational causes, moral, social, and educational, which produces its results by psychic processes other than reasoning.' 'Reasoning is a force most apt to divide and disintegrate.' By authority 'the operations of reason are coerced to a fore-ordained issue.' (That is the way I used to do my sums at school; but I did not think then that I should live to see those furtive performances justified by a philosophic prime minister.) Since the appearance of the *Foundations of Belief*—in which, as is not unusual in the architecture of apologetics, the foundations are ingeniously supported by the superstructure—we have had other distinguished

writers proclaiming that religion is essentially 'irrational.' If that is not blasphemy against the Holy Spirit of truth, I do not know what is. But one need not be a Platonist to wonder why all 'psychic processes other than reasoning' should be lumped together and called 'authority.' To accept facts on authority is often the only reasonable thing to do. If I have never visited a place, I believe what travellers or guide-books tell me about it. If Professor Eddington tells me that Sirius is so many light-years distant, I accept the statement on his authority, being unable to follow his calculations. If St. Paul, or Plotinus, or Ruysbroek says that he has been caught up into the third heaven, I believe that they are trying to describe some real experience. Why should this deference to authority be called irrational?

But authority in religion almost always means a guidance which is conceived as not only external to ourselves, but infallible. It is something which we must accept without question, because *ex hypothesi* we are incapable of criticizing it. A moment's thought will convince us that the familiar antithesis of external and internal will not help us here, unless we strip the words of all their spatial associations. There can be no more absolute authority than the inner light regarded as the direct presence of the Holy Spirit in the soul. There is no essential difference between the state of mind which accepts the plenary authority of the Church, or the Bible, and that which accepts the plenary authority of individual inspiration. St. Augustine said that he could not believe the Bible if it were not guaranteed by the Catholic Church. Chillingworth said that the Bible is the religion of Protestants. A Quaker woman refused to believe in Jerusalem, because the existence of that town had not yet been revealed to her. In all three cases, the value of the authority depends on its supposed independence of our subjective judgment. We believe the testimony, whatever its source, because we recognize it as being *not* our own. This is belief on authority in its proper sense. It is the abdication of private judgment in the presence of supernatural revelation or inspiration.

We in this room are mostly agreed that the will of God is never and nowhere revealed to us in such a manner as to absolve us from the right and duty to form judgments. Infallibility is a

category which men cannot use. For what guarantee can we have that any authority is infallible? Neither the dictatorial tones in which it may be communicated, nor the prestige of the ancient tradition to which it appeals, nor the signs and wonders which are adduced in corroboration of it, can certify its inerrancy. Absolute authority is impossible, because it assumes not only absolute wisdom and goodness in him who imparts the revelation, but a corresponding absoluteness in the wisdom and goodness of him who receives it. Otherwise the recipient cannot with any certainty distinguish the voice of God from other voices. The mystics were frequently tormented by the difficulty of distinguishing authentic visions from *contrefaçons diaboliques*. They forbade themselves to examine what they took for immediate revelations; and yet if questioning is forbidden, how were they to be safe from the wiles of the devil? Of course we may cut the knot by an act of will. If authority A tells me to believe, and authority B tells me not to believe, and if I decide to follow authority A without examining the evidence, that is not exactly believing on authority; that is simply believing because I choose, which no doubt is the mental state of many 'adherents' (the word is appropriate) of this creed or that.

When a great Church proclaims *ex cathedra* that it is necessary to salvation to hold certain beliefs, we may speak of authority if we will; but the authority is not what it pretends to be. It is a proclamation of martial law. The Church gives warning that it punishes dissent and forbids criticism. Absolute obedience is demanded, as from soldiers on a campaign. In word, no doubt, the authority of conscience is said to be supreme; an immoral order need not be obeyed. But it is not for a layman to pronounce immoral any order received from a priest. If the order is really immoral, the rule of obedience excuses him who executes it; in all other cases disobedience to the authority of the Church is a deadly sin. This doctrine of obedience has caused many of the most horrible crimes in history. A Church organized as an army, and strong enough to persecute, is one of the most terrible scourges of the human race. The Catholic must learn an obedience that free men know nothing of, except on military service. Nor is this submission confined to religious matters. 'That authority,' says Newman, 'has the prerogative

of an indirect jurisdiction on subject-matters which lie beyond its own proper limits, and it most reasonably has such a jurisdiction. It could not properly defend religious truth without claiming for that truth what may be called its *pomoeria*, or, to take another illustration, without acting as we act, as a nation, in claiming as our own not only the land on which we live, but what are called British waters. The Catholic Church claims not only to judge infallibly on religious questions, but to animadvert on opinions in secular matters which bear upon religion, on matters of philosophy, of science, of literature, of history, and it demands our submission to her claim. It claims to censure books, to silence authors, and to forbid discussions. It must of course be obeyed without a word.' Newman's notion of the scope and character of authority is made abundantly clear in several passages of his writings. 'Liberalism,' he says, 'is the mistake of subjecting to human judgment those revealed doctrines which are in their nature beyond and independent of it, and of claiming to determine on intrinsic grounds the truth and value of propositions which rest for their reception simply on the external authority of the divine word.'

Newman is more opposed to human reason than Thomas Aquinas, who maintained that the being and chief attributes of God might be demonstrated by ordinary reason, apart from revelation. But the doctrines of the Trinity, and of the creation of the world, must be believed 'by faith alone.' The Nominalists, in opposition to Aquinas, cut authority loose from its moorings in reason, and made it a wholly independent source of belief. Since the attacks of Kant on the traditional arguments for the existence of God, orthodox controversialists have been shy of making any concessions to rationalism. But the principle of authority is really weakened by giving it an independent coercive jurisdiction. For, as Alan of Lille said, 'authority has a nose of wax; it can be twisted either way.' The Papacy, now grown completely autocratic, refuses to be fettered by the dead hand. It no longer follows tradition; it creates it, under the pretence of interpreting it. This change makes authority relative instead of absolute, progressive instead of static; and the flank of orthodoxy is exposed to the attacks of Modernism.

That Newman's idea of authority is still held in the Roman

Church is proved by the candid declaration of Hilaire Belloc. 'Faith is the acceptance of a truth and the refusal to entertain the opposite to that truth although proof is absent. Harnack uttered a profound truth in what he intended for a sneer when he said that men either had their own religion or somebody else's religion. The religion of a Catholic is essentially an acceptance of the religion of others, which others are the apostolic clergy, the conciliar decrees, and all that proceeds from the authoritative voice of the Church.' Contrast with this the aphorism of Benjamin Whichcote, the Cambridge Platonist. 'I will not make a religion for God, nor will I suffer any man to make a religion for me.' Or, without going outside the Roman obedience, let us recall the noble words of the *Theologia Germanica*: 'Although it be good and profitable that we should ask and learn and know what good and holy men have wrought and suffered . . . yet were it a thousand times better that we should in ourselves learn and perceive and understand who we are, how and what our life is, what God is and is doing in us, what He will have from us, and to what ends He will or will not make use of us.'

The other two religions of authority, within Christianity, rest on the inspiration of Scripture and on the inner light. Belief in verbal inspiration is not a necessary part of Protestantism: it is, on the contrary, a contradiction of that individual freedom of conscience which is of the essence of the Reformed faith. It was imposed on the Reformers by the exigencies of the war against Catholicism, and among educated Protestants it is now almost dead. Nevertheless, in the lower intellectual strata there has been a real recrudescence of what the Americans call fundamentalism, not only in the southern states of the American Union, but in this country. Many persons who have begun to be interested in Liberal theology have felt that their feet are on a slippery slope, and in panic have scrambled back to the top of the bank. We have to note these facts, which are not without significance in the present position of religious belief.

There is, however, a more limited belief in the authority of Scripture, which must be briefly considered separately. Our Lord, we are told, taught with authority; and that authority lives for us in the pages of the Four Gospels. He is represented

to us as claiming absolute obedience, trust, and confidence, insomuch that, speaking with sovereign authority, He declared, 'It was said to them of old time . . . but I say unto you.' He taught and acted with authority in the fullest sense of the word. What should be our attitude to this claim?

Personally, I attach the greatest importance to what the New Testament teaches about the office and work of the Holy Spirit as a real continuance of the Incarnation under another mode. The *testimonium Spiritus Sancti*, it seems to me, guarantees the paramount authority of the earthly Christ, not necessarily confirming every part of the Synoptic narrative, still less every detail of that interpretation of His life and work which the author of the Fourth Gospel compiled for posterity, but obliging us to answer with confidence the question, 'Will ye also go away?' 'Lord, to whom should we go? Thou hast the words of eternal life.' At this point, if at no other, the Christian revelation is anchored to past history. Nevertheless, it is a living Christ, and a progressive revelation of His Spirit, to which, as Christians, we pay the tribute of implicit confidence and complete obedience.

This brings us back to the third religion of authority, which rests on individual inspiration. That we are not left to ourselves in our struggle with evil is the conviction of all religious people. Prayer is not merely a soliloquy, or a moral dumb-bell exercise. We have the privilege of access to God, who hears and answers our petitions. We have the promise of Christ that the Spirit of God—His own Spirit—will teach us all things, and guide us into all truth, as we are able to receive it. The Christian who has practised the presence of God, and has endeavoured to keep his heart pure in order to earn the promise made to the pure in heart, has within him a certainty that nothing can shake, that these promises are fulfilled. This communion with God, which it is the fashion to call religious experience, is the primary ground of faith. Not that it is, or can be, ours to start with, or that it can ever be perfected in this life. What is granted to us is only an earnest, an instalment, of the Spirit. It is not constant; it is often dim and obscure; at times it seems to be withdrawn altogether; but it is a genuine first-hand experience which we could hardly explain away if we wished to do so. It some-

times comes to us through the rites and sacraments of the Church; but by no means always. The Quakers, who do not use sacraments, seem to enter into communion with God as easily and frequently as the Catholics. This is what makes sacerdotalist claims quite untenable. The Spirit has not bound Himself by any forms, and no institution has any monopoly of His most precious gifts.

We have to consider whether this belief in the inner light is open to the same objections as belief in an infallible Church or an infallible Book. And first we must ask whether this guidance is given only to individuals, or, as Catholics claim, to the hierarchy as representing the Church. Our knowledge of secular institutions makes us reluctant to admit that the deliberations of a Senate, or of the *consilium* of an autocrat, are likely to be on a higher level of morality than the conscience of a good man acting alone. And when we consider the historical record of any great Church as a political or institutional entity, it is difficult to find traces of wisdom or of high-mindedness which surpass the measure of unaided human intelligence and virtue. Some might think that this statement is much too mild. I do not believe in the doctrine of a 'general will,' distinct from and superior to the wills of the individuals who compose the nation or the corporation; and I attach no sanctity to the general will of the Church, as expressed by the authoritative pronouncements of the hierarchy. It is theoretically possible for a Church, like an individual, to gain the whole world and lose its own soul.

On the other hand, we must beware of the wilfulness and arrogance of being so sure that we have the mind of Christ, or the gifts of the Spirit, as to disregard the equally firm and sincere convictions of others. The prevailing opinion of the society to which we belong is certainly not infallible, but it is seldom contemptible. The duty of private judgment does not mean the right to pay no attention to the judgments of others. Originality does not mean thinking differently from other people; it only means thinking for ourselves. 'The dissidence of dissent, and the Protestantism of the Protestant religion,' is no ideal for us. It is not given to many to be prophets who can say confidently, 'Thus saith the Lord.' The consciousness that the Holy Spirit has deigned to visit our souls ought to make us humble, not arro-

gant. The right temper is expressed in simple language by John Saltmarsh, a Yorkshire mystic of the seventeenth century. 'The light and glory of Christ hath dawned upon me. I have seen the morning star of righteousness, the brightness of the glory, in my heart, that heart of mine that once lived in the region and shadow of death. You may single out something of the Lord's from what is mine, and discern some beams of God among many things of the man. I know the candle of the Lord cannot shine anywhere with more snuff than in me. However, since the Lord hath lighted it, I dare not but let it shine, or rather glimmer, before men.'

Some of the early Quakers were so anxious to distinguish between the divine and the human in our inner lives that they were in danger of making the inner light itself external. We cannot really tell where nature leaves off and grace begins. The Spirit acts only through our own faculties. He makes intercession, not only for us, but with and in us. The prayers which He hears are inspired by Himself. As Emerson says:—

> 'Draw if thou canst the mystic line
> Severing rightly his from thine,
> Which is human, which divine.'

In the spiritual world there is no external and internal; the only boundary lines are those which are caused by discordance of nature.

We have rejected the idea that any authority in religion can be either wholly external or wholly infallible. It is not the will of God that any vital knowledge should be given to us ready-made. We must earn, by a generous venture of faith, the assurance that the venture was justified. Thus throughout life we are learners. Our Teacher is within us; but for our own good He screens us evermore from premature certainties. Lowell's 'Cathedral' will evoke an answering chord in the hearts of Modern Churchmen:

> 'O Power, more near my life than life itself,
> Invisibly sustaining, hid in light,
> Not darkness, or in darkness made by us.
> If sometimes I must hear good men debate
> Of other witness of thyself than Thou,
> My soul shall not be taken in their snare,
> To change her inward surety for their doubt
> Muffled from sight in formal robes of proof.
> I fear not thy withdrawal; more I fear

> Seeing to know Thee not, hoodwinked with dreams
> Of signs and wonders, while unnoticed Thou
> Walking Thy garden still commun'st with men,
> Missed in the commonplace of miracle.'

The province of authority, it is clear, is propaedeutic. Like a good teacher, it helps to make itself superfluous. This is true not only in the life of individuals, but in the history of western civilization. From the decay of the classical culture till the noonday of the Renaissance men inevitably looked back, and assumed that the ancients 'had more wit and wisdom than we.' But for centuries now Europe has once more been feeling its feet, and thought is progressively emancipated from the fetters of authority. The new knowledge, bringing with it almost a new ethics, demands from us the fullest recognition. It has 'made all things new.' As Christians, we are glad to confess our faith that 'other foundation can no man lay than that which is laid, even Jesus Christ.' But the buildings to be erected upon it must be of a new design, adapted to the new tasks to which the Church is called. 'We have not passed this way heretofore.' Those who look back for authoritative precedents will share the fate of Lot's wife. The deserts of theological literature are strewn with these dreary monuments.

In casting away the old trammels of sacrosanct authority, we are gaining for ourselves and for those who shall come after us a great emancipation. The sordid and often disgraceful records of ecclesiastical politics no longer concern us. The glorious Church, of which St. Paul dreamed, once more floats before our imagination, as it inspired the hopes of F. W. Robertson, of Brighton. 'There is a church larger than the limits of the church visible, larger than Jew or Christian or the apostle Peter ever dreamed, larger than our narrow hearts dare to hope for even now. The open vision is granted to all in every nation who fear God and work righteousness, to all in other words who live devoutly towards God and by love towards man.' The church of the Spirit contains all who love the Lord Jesus in uncorruptness; no man is excommunicated from it except by himself.

I know well that the word Spirit is dangerously vague, and that in using it we must be most carefully on our guard against self-deception. We may think ourselves spiritual when we are only cold and unimaginative. We must sometimes have met per-

sons whose faith is avowedly based on some external authority—a devout Catholic who leans in perfect peace of mind upon the dogmatic assurances of Holy Church, or a simple-minded Fundamentalist who ponders over the divine oracles in Old and New Testament without discrimination, or an old-fashioned Evangelical who at every crisis of his life falls on his knees and expects to receive an unmistakeable 'leading' to choose this course or that without allowing his own reason to influence him one way or the other—we must, I say, have met such people, and we must feel a real shame if we are tempted to accept a classification which would make them out less spiritually-minded than ourselves. Their inner life—we can almost see it in their faces—is deeper than ours; their resort to the mercy-seat is more spontaneous; they have a citadel apart from the provoking of all men, which is usually inaccessible to us. The very crudeness and materialism of their explicit beliefs links the seen with the unseen in their minds; the externality which they attribute to their best thoughts makes the voice of conscience more imperative. 'This is the way; walk ye in it.' Their guide speaks in no uncertain tones, while we are weighing pros and cons, and listening perplexed to a babel of voices, each claiming our moral and intellectual assent. It is no wonder if many persons end by putting themselves once for all under an authority which is not afraid to command and to threaten. We see in secular politics how insecure democracy and liberty are, and how seductive the idea of a dictatorship is to many. Exactly the same tendency is driving many to seek peace within the fold of the most dogmatic and authoritative of Churches. Within those rigid confines, as many have testified, the life of the spirit finds room to expand, till the beauty of holiness irradiates even the features of those who have made the great surrender.

And yet we know in our heart of hearts that we have chosen the better part in refusing this anodyne. To quote Emerson again:

> 'I like a church, I like a cowl,
> I love a prophet of the soul,
> And on my heart monastic aisles
> Fall like sweet strains or pensive smiles;
> Yet not for all his faith can see
> Would I that cowled churchman be.'

For the Catholic Church is a great and splendid survival, which lives now mainly to protect itself, not to leaven society. It may persuade many in all countries to take shelter within its venerable ramparts; but it has no help to give in the great social problems which are very largely moral, but problems for the new morality, not for the old. While Catholicism remains, and is proud to remain, magnificently immobile in a rapidly changing world, earnest thinkers are deliberately abandoning Christianity, including even Christian ethics, altogether. 'None of us are Christians,' wrote F. H. Bradley in 1894, 'and we all know, no matter what we say, that we ought not to be.' 'Let us have done with pretence,' said Professor Garrod more recently. 'Let us cease to call ourselves Christians when we do not follow Christ. The last sixty years have witnessed a kind of collapse of Christianity.' 'The men in whom the religious instinct is strongest,' says Mr. Lowes Dickinson, 'move further and further from the Christian postulates.' I do not agree with these judgments, but then I do not identify Christianity with the 'postulates' from which the religious mind is said to be moving away. I do see, however, that those who aim at winning the ears of the largest crowd often leave Christianity on one side as if it no longer interested intelligent people. And I observe the really fatal attempts that are made from different quarters to cope with the situation—Dr. Figgis admitting that 'the scientific temperament is opposed to any such scheme as the Christian,' and that we must choose between what he himself calls the magical view and the scientific; Royce declaring that 'the mind of Jesus did not make explicit what proved to be the most characteristic feature of Christianity,' so that 'the core of faith is not in the person or sayings of the Founder'—the core of faith being 'loyalty to a beloved community,' a community which Royce cannot find on earth; and Schweitzer with his 'interim ethics,' as if anyone who was persuaded of the imminent dissolution of the world could frame an ethical system at all helpful for us to-day.

This widespread estrangement from the faith cannot be disregarded as the product of a diseased civilization. It indicates that a static unchangeable tradition has no message for the modern world. 'We not only can, but must be Christians,' says

Eucken, 'but only on condition that Christianity be recognized as a progressive historical movement, still in the making.' Or as Milton says in *Areopagitica*, 'If the waters of truth flow not in a perpetual progression, they sicken into a muddy pool of conformity and tradition.'

Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty; liberty and courage. Do we believe that all the gains of science—all the new knowledge about the heavens and the earth, about our own bodies and minds, about past ages and the promise of the future, are part of the same revelation to which we owe the great religious upheavals of history? Do we believe that all knowledge is sacred, and that all knowledge is one? If so, we shall not believe that God is dumb and speaks no more. We shall rather recognize an outpouring of the Spirit through new channels in our time, and we shall discern the task of the Church of the Spirit to relate all this new knowledge to the spiritual revelation of the Gospels, and to all that successive generations have added to the wealth of our great spiritual and intellectual traditions. We must count nothing that is human alien to ourselves; we must believe firmly, and act on the belief, that the Church of Christ has no 'interests' except the highest welfare of the people of Christ; we must recognize our friends in all who have the same ideals, and our enemies, not in heresy or schism, but in secularity, practical materialism, cruelty and injustice, religious bigotry, and all else that our Master hated while on earth. Our aim, so far as it concerns the world of time and place, is to build up a Christian civilization in which organized religion can be no more than one factor, and we are willing to take long views, since we are no apocalyptists or millenarians.

The religion of the Spirit has a witness to bear and a power to exert in several matters which threaten the life of civilization. We may think of the suicidal folly of war; the disintegration of the family, an institution older than humanity itself; and the grotesque distortion of values which governs the way in which money is desired, acquired, and spent. In all these matters the Church of the Spirit has allies, natural allies, in the wisest lovers of their fellow-men. And in the personal life we have the true apostolical succession of saints, heroes, and prophets, which would arouse much more interest and sympathy if it were not

encumbered with so much that our generation suspects or does not value. There will always be the conflict between the Church and the World, and not for a moment do I suggest any compromise between the standards of Christ and those of a society which organizes itself as if God did not exist. But when we see large numbers of high-minded men and women, who should be our fellow-workers, in the opposite camp, let us take thought whether the fault may not be partly with the custodians of the Christian tradition. 'Our Master called himself the Truth, not tradition,' as Tertullian says.

We need not contrast Authority and the Spirit, as if they were mutually exclusive. For our authority is the Spirit, and we look for His last word, not in the remote past, but in the unknown future. We know that there is no automatic law of progress; we know that the life of our civilization is precarious; we know that a decadent race will have a decadent religion; in a word, we know that our cause may conceivably fail here on earth. We are combatants in a battle which is not yet decided. The issue must be as God wills; but it is ours to take unto us the whole armour of God, with the sword of the Spirit, and having done all, to stand.

CORPORATE AUTHORITY AND ITS SANCTIONS

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THE title of my subject breathes Latinism. It is compact of three grave Latin words, united by the mortar of two plain English monosyllables. The argument may run most readily, and most obviously, if each of the three Latin words—*corpus*, *autoritas*, *sanctio*—is started separately on its course, and if I accordingly inquire

first, what is the body or society which is in question;

next, what is its authority, or, in other words, its right to obedience;

and, finally, what are the sanctions, or, as I should prefer to say, the rules and the considerations attached to those rules, through which that body exerts its authority.

1. The corpus or body with which we are primarily concerned is not the body politic, or State: it is the social body, or Society, or, as some prefer to say, Community. What is the nature of Society, and what picture can we make of its shape and its face which will bring its dim outline into visible form? We may say that Society is a union of persons, for the general purpose of a common life, in a definite area of space, over a permanent period of time. Society has thus three features. The first of these is universality of scope, or generality of purpose. It has not arisen for a particular end or a particular set of ends, as we may say that the State, or the Trade Union, or even the Church, has arisen. It simply exists, as a given fact of historical evolution, for all the ends which the spirit of man can attain in the medium of a common life. The second of its features is territory. A society is an area: it is domiciled in a tract of space: it embraces, or tends to embrace, all those who live in that space. The last of its features is history. It covers time

as well as space: its common life has continuity as well as contiguity. Continuity gives it tradition; and tradition gives it a closer cohesion.

Society is continuous; but its continuity does not exclude historical transformations of the shape which it takes, and these transformations appear to depend on the area which it covers. There have been times and places in which the area of the kin-group was the only recognized area of society. There was a time and place — I am thinking of ancient Greece and Italy — in which the area of the city was also the area of society. Among our early German forefathers the tribe was society, and society was the tribe. But in modern history the form of society with which we have become familiar is the nation, the people, the national community. It is difficult to define a nation, or to say what elements, whether of common blood or common language or common culture, are the essential attributes of its life. But it exists: it exists as a given and obvious fact of historical evolution: it exists as a general, territorial, historical community: it exists as the normal form which society has assumed in the area of the Western world. Nor, indeed, need we limit it to our Western world. India is struggling, through barriers of difference of blood and language and caste, to constitute itself a single society of the national type. China is engaged in a similar struggle. Russia, indeed, dreams of an international organization of society on a Socialist basis; but even Russia bears on her arms, under the emblems of the sickle and the hammer, 'gold upon a red field and in the rays of the sun,' not only the inscription 'Workers of all Countries Unite,' but also that of 'Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic.'

Assuming, therefore, the nation as the normal form of modern Society, what shall we say of its relation to the State? It is a question which we must face here and now, even if the State as such belongs to the province of another contributor; for the relation, and the distinction, between society and the State is cardinal to any understanding of the nature of society. Under modern conditions, with the increasing formation of national States, we must admit that society, in its modern form of the nation, tends increasingly to be co-extensive with the State. The same persons constitute both: the same persons are denoted by

both. But if the members are the same, the bodies are different. The nation is not the State, and the State is not the nation. The nation is the general and given society for all the purposes which a common life can foster—economic, religious, ethical, cultural: the State is a particular and constructed association (composed, it is true, of the same members, but composed of those members in the particular aspect in which they are citizens) for the particular purpose of legal regulation of such areas of the common life as admit such regulation. A nation has no charter and acts under no constitution: a State has a charter or constitution, and its action as a State must proceed within the area, and according to the rules, and under the limits, of that constitution or charter. A nation becomes also a State when, by a national convention, and by the constitution made thereby, it turns itself into a legal association for the purpose of formulating and enforcing legal rules through organs erected and limited by the constitution so formed. But in becoming a State a nation does not cease to be a nation; nor does it cease, as a nation, to be something broader, more general, more spontaneous than the State which it has also become.

Society, then, even in the form of the nation, and even in the presence of the national State, is not the same as the State. We may now turn to another relation—the relation between society and its members. Here we have to note that society, national society, while it is not the same as the State, is emphatically the same as its own members. The contention becomes plainer if it is expressed in a negative form. Society is not a something over and above its own members. It is not a being distinct from, and still less a being higher than, their several beings. It is not a person, with personal ends of its own, transcending the persons and ends of its members. Society is its members: the ends of society are the ends of its members. The unity of society is not the unity of a new social person which somehow, like Leviathan, embraces and subordinates individual persons. The unity is that of a common purpose, belief and will resident in the minds of the members of the society. It resides in their minds in the form and shape of a common content of those minds; and it resides nowhere else and exists in no other form. It is as important to identify society with its members as it is to distinguish it from

the State. Some of the worst errors of our times seem to me to spring from a way of thinking which, on the one hand, supposes the nation to be something higher than its members, and, on the other hand, identifies the nation with the State, thus arming the broad spontaneous nation with the coercive power of the limited legal State, and equipping the limited legal State with the general scope of the broad spontaneous nation. I do not deny that the broad purposes of a national life, as present in the consciousness of each member, may justly overbear a particularist purpose resident in the same consciousness. On the contrary, I would instantly assert that it should. But this is something different from a proposition such as occurs in the Italian Carta di Lavoro of 1927—a proposition which divides the indivisible and unites separables. 'The Italian nation,' it is here stated, 'by its power and its permanence, is an organism with a being, purposes and means of action superior to those of the persons, individual or grouped, of whom it is composed. It is a moral, political and economic unity integrally realised in the Fascist State.' On the contrary, I should say the Italian nation is the same as the persons of whom it is composed, and it is not 'integrally realised' in any form of State—least of all in the Fascist.

There is still another point which has to be made about the corpus which we call society (or national society), and about its relations to its members. The members of the social corpus are not only individuals, acting as such : they are also groups, or, to speak more exactly, they are individuals acting in groups and as groups—individuals clustering around some particular purpose on the value of which they are all agreed, and in the pursuit of which they form a cluster or combination within the body social. Now these groups or clusters or combinations within society are in no sense beings distinct from their members, or transcending their members. The social group is its members : the ends of the social group are the ends of its members. The unity of the group is not the unity of a 'group-person' embracing and subordinating the members : it is the unity of the particular purpose, belief and will which is common to the members and forms the common content of their minds. In this sense, and to this extent, society is a group of groups; and the contained groups, like the containing group, are voluntary combinations of persons freely

and spontaneously clustering round a common mental content which is the essence of their unity. I have sometimes thought of these groups as falling into the two species of opinion-groups, such as churches, and interest-groups, such as trade unions and other forms of economic combination. But the difference between interest and opinion is perhaps not profound; and in any case the difference between the various forms of contained social groups lies beyond my present scope. I will content myself with attempting to differentiate between contained social groups in general and the containing society in which they move and have their being. Society at large, as I have said, is a 'general purposes' community, existing for all the purposes which its members can secure in the medium of a common life. The social group is an association for a particular purpose. This does not necessarily diminish the dignity of the social group. On the contrary, its purpose may be so profound, the belief of its members so fervent, and the community clustering round that belief so intimate, that a particular social group (I have in mind, as you will readily guess, a church) may live in the very core and *penetralia* of the minds of its members. But there remains a difference between the generality of society and the particularity of the social group; and it is another difference between society and the social group that the one, as a rule, is territorial and the other is scattered in space. National society has the strength of contiguity: the members of the church or the trade union, even if they meet as such in local church or lodge, or again in national synod or congress, are ordinarily separated by interstices. In continuity, and in the range of historic tradition, society and the social group may be equal; or, to speak more exactly, a church may actually transcend a nation in the deep reach of its historic roots, even if other forms of social group are of a more modern growth and a greater novelty.

But though we may thus distinguish between national society and the social groups which it contains, we must also relate the two in a living interplay. I believe that the national society colours and tinctures the social groups which it contains with the quality of its own general character; and I believe, *vice versa*, that the qualities of its social groups qualify and variegate and enrich the general character of national society. Eng-

lish society, on the one hand, gives the Church of England a quality which it would not possess if it were not coloured by the hue of that society; and, on the other hand, the Church of England contributes to English society a factor which affects its general character and colour. Society is like a texture of rich and multiple design; and the social groups which it contains, and which it colours, help to furnish the riches of its pattern. Yet I would not suggest that a group is entirely contained in a national society, or that it exhausts itself in contributing to the life of such a society. There are words such as catholic and international; and when we think of such words we are bound to reflect that social groups in one society may reach out hands to social groups in others, and that federations of similar social groups, which live and move in different national societies, may create new social factors which require a wider scheme of social thought. We may be led in this way to postulate some international society, perhaps itself federal in its scope, to serve as the *cadre* of these federations of social groups; and in this way we may add a new and culminating tier to the pyramid of our social life. But the nation is not yet transcended as the most operative and cardinal form of society; and the last dozen years, while they have promoted leagues and friendships of national societies, have also deepened and emphasized the internal operation of such societies. The society of the nation is still the pivot of our times; and because we cannot spy into the vicissitudes which revolving time may ultimately bring, we must hinge our thought on the pivot which we see.

2. It is time to turn from the corpus of society to the auctoritas of that corpus. How far has society a right to obedience over its members, and what is the basis of that right? Every society, we may say, accumulates an experience—the experience of the common life. In the course of its history this and that has befallen its members; in the course of its history this and that has been tried by its members, with this or that result. The strained essence of such experience becomes a content of the minds of the members of the society: it also becomes a guide to future action, a control over future action, a claim of obedience, in a word an authority. Fundamentally it is the experience of a society, the precipitated experience of a society, which be-

comes its authority; and in that sense I should enunciate the simple proposition that social experience is social authority. So far as that goes, authority is just a fact, the fact of precipitated experience; and it is a fact which you may recognise and follow, or fail to recognise and follow. But that is not the conclusion of the whole matter. Society not only precipitates an experience of the common life: it also accumulates or generates, as it were electrically, a feeling that the experience should, and indeed must, be followed. We may call this feeling by the name of social opinion. We all know its weight and its impulse. There is a human instinct towards conformity: there is also a human instinct towards a demand for conformity. We not only conform ourselves: we also expect others to conform, and we dislike peculiar people. This instinct for conformity, this demand for conformity, is not only a fact, like the fact of experience: it is also a will and an imperative. We have to enquire how far this will, this imperative, is an integral part of social authority. Is social authority an amalgam mixed from the experience of common life and the will or imperative of common opinion? And if so, what are the proportions of the amalgam?

A society, we have seen, is nothing which transcends the persons of which it is composed. It is indeed a unity; but it is a unity in virtue of a common content resident in the minds of persons. The fundamental fact in the world we know is the personality of individual persons, and the intrinsic value is the free development of such personality. Persons guide themselves by the experience of their own lives and the experience of the common life. They guide themselves freely so far as they apprehend freely the fruits of that double experience. It would be an ideal world in which such guidance was the only rule. But our minds have their ignorance, and our wills have their sloth. We have to be awakened, and we have to be goaded. That is where social opinion enters. It is the servant of social experience, with the function of bringing its lessons home to personal mind and will. But it is a servant. It is not an autonomous will which freely determines the 'this' or 'that' which shall be the rule. It expresses rather than commands; or it commands because it expresses. It is the pathology of social life when the will of a society, conceived as a free ultimate force freely choosing be-

ween alternatives and freely commanding according to its choice, is conceived as the social authority. The master of the common life is the experience of the common life; and the will of society is the servant of that master, as it is also the servant or ὑπηρέτης of the persons who compose the society, serving them in the function of bringing home to them the lessons of social experience.

Philosophers sometimes talk of the sovereignty of the general will of a society. I can only subscribe to such speech in a qualified and limited sense. Speaking as I have done of the sovereignty of experience, I can hardly accept the sovereignty of a general will unless I subtilise the sense and the meaning of will. If will be taken to mean not the act of willing, but the thing willed, as when we say, 'Thy will be done': if again the thing willed be regarded not as consciously willed, but rather as 'felt after' and dimly desired, as we pursue our ideals—then, and on that basis, we may find room for the sovereignty of general will. The common life of a national society, we may say, is inspired and controlled in its development by a general will—an end or purpose, or a set of ends or purposes, more or less consciously desired as the fruit of experience, and gradually developing as the experience of the nation develops; and this will in each stage, in the form it has attained at that stage, is the sovereign of the society. In this sense the general will of a national society will be the aim or purpose sought by that society as it develops the experience of its common life—the set of ideals and principles which gradually disengages itself in the growth of the national life and informs the national character, as some set of ideals and principles gradually disengages itself in the course of an individual life and informs an individual character. Such a set of national ideals and principles may even be formulated in a national declaration (witness the attempt of the German nation in the new constitution which it gave itself ten years ago), just as an individual might formulate his in a confession-book. But such formulation is unnecessary; and it may stereotype what is in its essence a moving and growing content of mind.

The problem of authority arises not only in regard to society at large: it also arises in regard to the State, which is society turned into a legal association for the regulation of those ex-

ternal relations which are patient of legal method; and it arises, too, in regard to the social groups which live in the area of society. We may say of the State and of social groups, as we have said of society at large, that in a broad sense it is experience which is the authority in virtue of which they act. The experience of civic life is the authority in the name of which the State speaks: the experience of religious life is the source of a Church's authority. But there are differences which distinguish the experience of society, and the modes by which it exerts its authority, from the experience of these other bodies and the modes by which their authority is exercised. Society cannot formulate its experiences in rules. It has no organs for the purpose of formulation: its experience is written only on 'the remembering tablets of the mind.' The State and social groups alike formulate their experience. Society, again, has no definite penalties attached to the defiance of its experience. There is indeed the penalty of social disapproval; and in early societies this often possessed a terrible efficiency. Even in modern times ostracism may be a pain, if it is not a penalty; but of modern society we may none the less say that it enforces no penalties and inflicts no banishments, whatever may be the insensible weight of the pressure of social opinion. The State has an abundance of penalties; and there are penalties which lie behind the authority which social groups may exercise over their members.

3. Here we come to the third and last of our themes — that of sanctions. In the older ecclesiastical usage a sanction meant a law or decree; and in his *Dark Ages* S. R. Maitland speaks of 'priests and other prudent men skilled in the divine law and conversant with the ecclesiastical sanctions.' In modern usage the word denotes the penalty attached to the breach of a rule, or, more widely and more positively, a consideration which tends to secure obedience to a rule. I propose to take sanction in both of its senses, and to deal both with rules and with the penalties or considerations by which their effect is secured. The rules of society, if we may speak of social rules, are, as we have seen, informal and unformulated. They take the form of custom and tradition, use and wont, mode and fashion; and even if we lift them to the conception of a general will, they remain beyond

speech and writing. The sanctions of such informal rules, if indeed we may speak of sanctions at all in such a connection, will themselves also remain informal; and while society will not leave the rules of its experience unattended by any motive for conformity, it will attach no penalties to their breach. The rules of the State are formulated rules — though we may add that these rules, and the body of law which they constitute, are not so much made by the legislature, or issue from the will of the legislature, as they are made by the courts, which garner the fruits of legal experience and state and enforce it in the form of common law. Social groups, like States, may possess a body of formulated rules—rules or articles of association, such as those which have recently been formulated by the Scottish Church, or such as a trade union may make for the regulation of its activities. Such articles of association, however, are perhaps more analogous to the written constitution of a State than they are to its formulated body of ordinary law; and in any case a social group, in this respect analogous to society itself, guides itself largely by traditional custom and unwritten experience. The State stands alone in the possession of a general and comprehensive body of formulated rules.

In the same way the State stands alone in the possession of a general and comprehensive system of sanctions, at any rate of sanctions which take the form of penalties, for the enforcement of its rules; and it stands alone in possessing a coercive power for the effective exaction of those sanctions. It is true that society possesses sanctions, in the broader and more positive sense of considerations making for obedience, which tend to enforce the authority of its tradition and custom. It possesses the sanctions of social approval and disapproval. It is true, again, that a social group possesses similar sanctions. It is even true that a social group may possess sanctions in the more negative form of penalties, and that it may impose fines or other measures of discipline upon its members. But there is a difference to be noted between the penal sanctions of social groups and the penal sanctions of the State. The former fall, as it were, conditionally: the latter fall absolutely and unconditionally. You cannot escape the sanctions of the law of the State. They are absolute: you cannot avoid them by saying that you prefer to forfeit membership ·

even if you fly, extradition brings you back to face the judgment and undergo the penalty. Power, unescapable power, stands behind the sanctions of the State. It is otherwise with the sanctions of social groups. You may incur them, indeed, but you only incur them effectively on the condition that you wish to remain a member. You may prefer to withdraw from membership; and if you do so, the condition which alone will make the sanction operative is itself *ipso facto* withdrawn. The sanction of the authority of a social group lasts as long as the will for membership lasts. It lasts no longer. We must admit, however, that if for any reason the will for membership is deep and strong, the sanctions of the social group will also be deepened and strengthened. We may cite two examples of such a case. The sanctions of the mediaeval Church were strong because the will for membership was strong; and the will for membership was strong because withdrawal from it was conceived to be withdrawal from eternal salvation, and because, even in this world, it might involve the terrors of the Inquisition backed by the secular arm and coercive power of the State. The sanctions of a modern trade union may be almost as strong, because the will for membership may be almost as strong; and the will for membership may be almost as strong because, where membership of a trade union is necessary for finding or keeping employment, withdrawal from a union may be tantamount to withdrawal from the means of earning subsistence. But one may say of both these cases that they are abnormal. One may say of both that they show the social group assuming too much the alien quality of a compulsory State, and trespassing too much on the reserved sphere of the State. Only the State, which is an association appointed to preserve by its laws the absolutely necessary legal conditions of an ordered life, can wield the absolute power of unconditional sanctions which is required for the preservation of these absolutely necessary legal conditions. The social group is the area of spontaneous life; and spontaneity must be free to express itself in freedom of withdrawal—a freedom which makes all the sanctions of such a group conditional.

4. A final word may be pardoned on the problem of conflict of authorities. There are three sorts of authorities of which we have spoken. There is the authority of society at large—the

authority of what I have called national society. There is the authority of the State—all the stronger, and the more of an inwardly apprehended mental control, when it is that of a democratically organized national State. There is the authority of the social group—religious, economic, or cultural. Under which king shall we stand if one conflicts with the other two? In our day there is a great emphasis laid on the social group. One might sometimes think that the social group was a discovery or invention of the nineteenth century, regarded as the germinative century of groups—a discovery or an invention which was destined to be the sovereign alike of the theory and the practice of the twentieth century. Social groups are as old as the middle ages: indeed, the hey-day of social groups was the middle ages; and it is not easy to say that in the middle ages all was well either with society, as a community sharing a common life, or with the State, as the guardian of order for all its citizens. I should doubt whether, in the problem of conflict of authorities, history afforded any presumption in favour of the authority of the social group.

One may feel that in the last resort the problem of conflict of authorities can only be judged in a solemn solitude by the individual and personal experience of values. It is true that from age to age men have staked themselves on a conviction of personal experience; and when their witness has ultimately carried that conviction into the general stock, they have done untold service to the general cause. But for most of us it is wise to take counsel; and for myself I should, if my mind were divided, take counsel with the experience of the general society in which I had my membership. Society, universal in its scope, takes all my life into its membership. It embraces the whole of my life in its common life; and I bring the whole of myself into its community. The State and the social group are both partial in comparison with the universality of society. The individual himself, universal as he is—for each of us is a little world, king in a nutshell of infinite space, capable of all interests and apprehensive of all values—the individual himself has not the range and the historic experience of society. Why should he not take counsel of society, even when he feels himself shut in the central keep of his being, where he seems to himself the sole guardian of his own sense of eternal values? If I had been a Quaker in 1916,

confronted with the authority of a State claiming from me military service, and thereby opposing what I regarded as the authority of my Church, I might perhaps have thought in terms of my Church and solved the conflict in that sense. But I might also have betaken myself to society, and taken society into counsel. I might have thought of the social world in which my Church had grown, by which it had been coloured, to which it stood indebted. I might have said, 'It is a time for the consultation of two universals—the universal which is me, and the universal which is society.' In that case I might have accepted the authority of the State, as more consonant with the authority of society at large; or again, I might have preferred the authority of my Church, as more consonant with the authority of what I held to be the true tradition of the society I had consulted. I am not so much concerned about the exact answer: I am rather concerned about the consultation which should precede any answer. And in the same way to-day, when many of the members of the Church of England are concerned with the conflict of authority between the assembly of their religious group and the parliament of their State, I should desire some listening to the quiet voice of society. *Verbum episcopis.* Even the highest dignitaries of the great social group called the Church may take counsel with the riches of the experience of national society before they decide in terms of the authority of religious association.

THE AUTHORITY OF THE STATE

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[T may appear tedious merely to press one or two elementary questions back to their fundamental constituents, and will certainly be called academic. Yet I think, on the whole, will save our time, for the resolution of all the important roblems in this or any subject depends upon the answers e find for a few elementary questions, and to consider nese first enables us to do once what it might otherwise be ecessary to repeat a hundred times, and then to less purpose. or example, there is no question concerning authority, its ower or *locus*, which we can so much as discuss rationally ntil we have achieved some coherent notion of what authority self is. Consequently, and because I have none but elementary ideas on the authority of the state to offer, I propose in this aper to consider three questions. First, What do we mean by uthority? secondly, What do we mean by the state; and thirdly, Where, then, is the authority of the state?

What do we mean by authority? It seems to me that, at first ght, there are three ways of answering this question. It may e suggested that it is unnecessary to go beyond what is commonly understood by the word: or if, as we shall discover, the ommon meaning be not entirely unambiguous, all we require agreement upon some definite meaning. 'When we do not now the truth,' says Pascal, 'it is well that there should be a ommon error to fix the minds of men.' Should we, however, ish to discover the truth, we shall, I think, find ourselves obged to adopt neither of these, but a third course. The common eaning, as such, will satisfy us no more than a merely agreed eaning; what we desire is a coherent and unambiguous conception of authority. We must, no doubt, start with the common eaning of the word, but we can escape its inconsistencies, not y agreeing upon some arbitrary definition, but by transforming em into a coherent whole. And that is what I propose to ttempt.

There are two points in the common view of the meaning of authority which appear to me ambiguous. Authority is conceived, in the first place, as both external and coercive. It is external in the sense that it takes the place of first-hand experience, and where such experience exists, authority is superseded and disappears; and it is coercive, not because there can be no kind of appeal from it, but merely because it does not itself attempt to explain or persuade. Thus it is said that 'authority is the form in which all truth reaches us in childhood.' A wider experience may entitle us to independent judgments, but authority, like duty, is ever at hand, and

> if through confidence misplaced
> We fail, thy saving arms, dread Power! around us cast.

Obedience, submission, implicit acceptance describe the state of mind correlative to this authority. In this sense, authority is contrasted with reason. Whenever a man adopts an opinion without himself going through the appropriate process of reasoning which would lead to that conclusion, but because it is presented to him complete by someone whom he thinks more competent than himself, his belief is said to be the work of authority. And, on the other side, whoever converses dogmatically, 'like a law-giver,' forcing opinions into the minds of his audience, speaks as an authority. 'I am confident that the dead have some kind of existence,' says Socrates with unwonted dogmatism; and Simmias, wishing to pass from authority which merely constrains opinion to reason which persuades and enlightens, asks, 'Do you mean to go away and keep this belief to yourself, or will you let us share it with you?'[1]

Now, the ambiguity of this notion of authority seems to me this, that authority cannot be both external and coercive: if it be external, then it can be coercive in only a vague, metaphorical sense. For an external 'authority' can refer solely to the historical or psychological *cause* of belief, opinion or action, never to its whole *ground*, and it would be absurd to maintain that the power which actually compels a belief belongs merely to its cause.

This distinction between the causes or antecedents which produce a belief and the grounds or reason which alone sustain

[1] *Phaedo*, 63, c. Cp. *Republic*, 345, b. and Pater. *Plato and Platonism*, ch. vii.

and justify one, is, I think, important. To believe a statement because we have been taught it, because a friend believes it or because the whole village believes it, is a common enough experience, but we are in error if we suppose that these causes, as such, are or can be the whole ground of any belief whatever. The cause of our belief that a certain man is guilty of murder may be the knowledge that he has been convicted in a court of law; the ground of this belief, however, is not the bare consciousness of the verdict, but a judgment we make about the whole body of evidence brought against him, or (failing a detailed acquaintance with that) an independent judgment, resting upon and guaranteed by our whole world of ideas, that those who have sifted the evidence are competent to arrive at a true conclusion. Or again, the ground of a belief in an historical fact is not that it is recorded by an historian, nor that it is asserted by a contemporary, nor that it is attested by an eye-witness, it is an independent judgment we make about the credibility of the fact proposed, by which we test these other, secondary witnesses and beside which they are no more than the causes of belief. Such a judgment may, indeed, involve a so-called interpretation of the 'fact,' but we should remember that it is impossible to distinguish between what has 'come' to us and our 'interpretation' of it.[2] The ground of our belief that the Duke of Clarence was drowned in a butt of Marmsey is the credibility of the incident: had it been a butt of oysters we should, no doubt, have rejected it. The cause of a belief or action may, then, be spoken of as external, but belief or action which rests solely upon such a cause lacks any ground to sustain it, and consequently falls short of the nature of a belief or action; it is a bare abstraction. A merely external authority is, then, left hanging in the air; it is a cause severed from a ground. We may derive our opinions from this 'authority,' but it is never the whole ground of these opinions, because the ground of any such opinion always contains some independent judgment about that 'authority.' We accept such an authority not on its own recommendation, but for reasons which lie outside its jurisdiction. And the correlative of this authority is a 'belief' which has a cause but no reason, or an 'action' which has a history but no justification;

[2] Cp. Hort. *The Way, the Truth, the Life*, p. 175.

and it need scarcely be remarked that such a 'belief' is utterly unrecognizable, and such an 'action' quite inconceivable. This authority refers to a mere aspect of some beliefs and actions, but has no reference whatever to any belief or action as a whole. And consequently, its coerciveness is confined to its arbitrary refusal to explain or persuade; whereas all that can be really coercive of an opinion or action is its whole ground. What compels me to believe is never the mere cause which produces the belief, but always the whole ground which sustains it. In short, this 'authority' is a vicious abstraction; if it be external, it cannot be itself coercive, and if it be not coercive I fail to understand in what sense it can be authoritative. We must look elsewhere for an unambiguous conception of authority.

Nor is the common notion of authority self-contradictory merely in this respect. For first, we ordinarily speak as if authority were a matter of *right*, and distinguish between a 'legitimate' authority and a usurpation of it, as if an authority required or could possess some external evidence of itself beyond the actual ability to coerce. Yet surely, that only can be authoritative which actually compels adhesion, and no claim or proclamation or air on the part of some person or thing can create authority where the power to sustain it is lacking. All authority is, as such, legitimate so long as it is really authoritative. And secondly, we speak of a 'limited authority,' as if a person or thing could itself be really authoritative and at the same time owe allegiance elsewhere. That which actually compels obedience cannot, as such, be limited, for whatever was supposed to limit it would itself be the only really authoritative authority.

These, then, are some of the difficulties of the common notion, which must be overcome if we are to achieve a clear conception of authority. And in attempting this, let us consider the general character of whatever is actually authoritative, for our problem is not, What is the character of that which *claims* authority? but, What is the character of that which actually *exercises* authority?

I take it that only a measure of perversity which can expect no reply will question the supposition that coerciveness is inseparable from whatever is actually authoritative; that which

loes not itself actually compel belief or action, and from the command of which there is no appeal, is not in the full sense authoritative; and conversely, that which is really coercive of belief and action is the authority upon which they rest. If this be so, it follows that authority is never external, for we are never compelled by that which remains outside ourselves. The cause of a belief or action may be external, but its whole ground (of which the cause is a mere abstraction) is never external, and it is the whole ground which, in every case, is coercive. The cause of a soldier's action may be the command of his superior, which is external, but that which compels him to obey or disobey (for the authority of the one must be that of the other) is not the external command itself, but some judgment he makes, tacitly or explicitly, about the command; and such a judgment is in no sense external. Or again, that which compels us to hold a belief which was derived from some external source—a book, a person or a tradition—is not the 'authority' of that source (for it can in itself have none), but some judgment we make about its reliability, or indeed, a reason utterly unconnected with the source of the belief. The external cause of my belief that this earth is globular was, I suppose, a nursemaid or a kindergarten mistress, but I cannot pretend that the authority which now sustains this belief for me is in any way connected with that now long-forgotten cause. The 'authority' of what is external (the 'authority,' for example, of the expert) is, then, derivative and dependent, it has no power of its own to compel obedience and is consequently spurious.

Moreover, that which actually compels belief or action cannot itself be subject to any further and greater power, for that which is itself limited and derives its power from outside itself cannot be said itself to compel. To speak of the sanction of authority is to commit a pleonasm; an authority is always its own sanction. That which is authoritative is, thus, absolute and unlimited, not in the sense of embracing every detail, but because there can be no appeal from it. The real authority of all belief and action is that which can show itself to be absolute, irresponsible, self-supporting and inescapable.

Also, that which is authoritative is always single and indivisible: for a series of reasons which really compels a belief

is the necessary foundation of that belief, and a foundation, as such, is always a unity. Thus, it is nonsense to say that the final authority of Christianity is to be found in 'history, reason and spiritual experience,' or in 'the Scriptures and human reason,'[3] for neither the Scriptures, nor history, nor spiritual experience (if it be isolated and externalized in this manner) are in themselves able to compel belief. They are the cause of many beliefs, but that upon which they depend, which itself compels and which is consequently the only true authority, is a judgment we make about their truth or value. The authority of a belief is its necessary ground, which is inconceivable except as a single whole; necessities, because we cannot distinguish between them, always constitute a unity.

In short, then, that which alone has power to coerce belief or action, and which is consequently the only final authority, is our world of ideas as a whole. It only is itself compelling and inescapable, because it is the ground of all belief and action. With a real authority there is no question whether or not we shall accept it, we have no choice in the matter, for an authority which we can escape is an imposter. An authority is not a person or institution whose experience we decide to accept and make use of where our own appears deficient, for such an 'authority' is secondary and compels not by its own but by a borrowed power; a real authority is the whole ground upon which our acceptance or rejection of anything is based. To have a belief it must be ours, and even if it were derived from some external source, that which actually compels us to hold it is the ground on which it has been accepted, that is, the whole world of ideas into which it has been fitted and in the light of which it has been understood and appropriated. The whole ground of whatever we accept or do is, then, the only real authority for its acceptance or performance. Nor is this true of adult life alone. Authority, in this sense, is not more the form in which truth reaches us in childhood than in old age: no belief was ever entertained, no action ever performed which was not based upon the authority of some ground which was more than a mere cause. And an absolute,

[3] I quote from the section on *Authority* in *Essays Catholic and Critical* (pp. 95, 119), which seems to me to have all the deficiencies usual to theological discussions of this subject.

compelling and at the same time external authority is as much a psychological curiosity as it is a logical monster. And finally, that which is really authoritative in belief or action, so far from standing in contrast to reason, *is* reason in the full sense of our world of ideas in so far as it is a coherent whole. So-called 'unreasonable' actions and 'superstitious' beliefs are not actions and beliefs which have no ground in a world of ideas (for such are impossible), but those the mere cause of which has usurped the place and name of the whole ground and are consequently random, capricious and unstable.[4]

I turn now to the second question: What do we mean by the State? It is perhaps natural that one should be most critical of one's own subject of study, and I venture to think that the prospects of political thought to-day are darker even than those of theology. For the theory of politics has fallen on evil days, its ideas are for the most part misappropriated, its words mere jargon, and it is now too far gone in decay to allow of any sudden rejuvenation. And my attempt to answer this question about the State will, I fear, be inconclusive where I have payed too great attention to the traditional prejudices of political thinking, and obscure where I have attempted to stand clear of the familiar wreckage of dead controversies which we spend our time picking over.

'It may seem curious,' says a writer on politics, 'that so great and obvious a fact as the state should be the object of quite conflicting definitions, yet such certainly is the case.'[5] And on this double assumption that the state is an 'obvious fact' and that different conceptions of it merely and necessarily conflict, rests, I think, one of the radical defects of modern political thinking. The first has fostered a perverted realism which mistakes any persistent fancy or useful fiction for a fact, the second reduces all argument to an *ignoratio elenchi*, and together they have obstructed all attempts to work out a clear and complete conception of the state. For the state is not an 'obvious fact' (in that sense there are no facts), it is a conception which we may permit ourselves to call a fact only when we have made it clear to ourselves

[4] Cp. Wittgenstein. *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, 1361, 5. 'Der Glaube au den Kausalnexus ist der Aberglaube.'

[5] MacIver, *The Modern State*, p. 3.

and complete in itself. That the literature of political thinking contains many different conceptions of the state is not, I think, remarkable: of nothing with which the human mind has ever occupied itself is there but a single conception. What is important, however, is that we should understand the relationship of these different conceptions. Some writers assume that they are bare alternatives and invite us to choose which we will,[6] but pluralism run to seed is not an engaging spectacle. Others take them to be merely conflicting,[7] but to set one against another is not the way to get the truth out of ideas. Others again imagine a complete conception of the state to be constructed from the contributions of lesser and different conceptions,[8] but this also is a relationship foreign to the nature of ideas; a complete conception was never achieved by adding together conceptions in themselves imperfect. In place of these, however, the view I wish to suggest is that a complete conception of the state is one which supersedes all others and beside which they appear neither as possible alternatives, nor as contradictions nor as contributions, but as abstractions to be surplanted. Each conception of the state, however limited, may have its use; to compare them is irrelevant, to set them against one another futile, to add them together impossible. The legal conception of the state cannot be said to be alternative to or to conflict with any other so long as it confines itself to its own province, any more than a mathematical conception of the world can be said to conflict with a moral conception. But if we are determined to arrive at a complete conception of the state, these others will afford us no assistance, they are obstacles to be overcome, abstract points of view to be superseded. And we shall discover the 'fact,' the state itself, only when we have achieved such a conception as this. It is impossible to examine all the conceptions of the state which have been devised, but in order to make what suggestions I can about the character of the state I propose now to consider a few of the more common conceptions of its nature and to show how what is less adequate yields to and is superseded by what is more adequate.

[6] Laski, *The Study of Politics.*
[7] MacIver. *Op. cit.*
[8] Barker, *The Study of Political Science.*

The state, it is said, is a piece of territory. This, geographical, conception of the state will require but little argument on my part to show its imperfection. Indeed, those who propose it usually do so in what they take to be a less categorical form, asserting that the state is *at least* a piece of territory, and thus themselves reveal the indigence of their conception. For, if the mere possession of territory, taken alone, do not give an adequate conception of the state, territory is no more than a symptom of the state's existence, and a conception which includes mere symptoms includes what it has no business to recognize. 'But,' it will be said, 'the possession of territory enters into the legal conception of the state.' Yet, what does this suggest more than that a legal conception is an adequate, arbitrary, abstract, agreed conception, and not one we can recognize beyond its own world? The legal conception of the state, like legal personality and legal responsibility, is an agreed fiction which must be superseded before we can achieve the complete fact.

The state is a collection of persons. This also falls short of the complete conception we are looking for and must consequently be superseded. Persons in some sense are necessary to the state, and some kind of relationship must exist between them before they can be spoken of as members of the state, but we have not achieved the full conception of the state until the persons it comprises are concrete and not abstract and the relationship between them concrete and not abstract. For the nature of things is correlative with the relationship which exists between them, and a mere collection is possible only to abstract mathematical units. A collection of legal 'persons' may constitute a legal 'state,' and a collection of economic 'persons' an economic state, but such states are as abstract as their constituents.

The state is the secular whole, or persons organized for secular purposes. This is an important conception because it is the theoretical belief of most Englishmen; nevertheless it is, I think, imperfect. For the constituents of a secular whole must be 'secular persons,' and since merely secular persons are as abstract as merely legal or economic persons, the whole into which they might be imagined to organize themselves is equally abstract. Were the state the mere secular whole it would be a vicious abstraction, something which results from an arbitrary

analysis of any community as we know it and exists nowhere outside that analysis. This is not a question of the so-called establishment of religion, or of the so-called 'modern' state; society as it organizes itself apart from God is an abstraction, and the state cannot be identified with this secular whole without becoming an abstraction, and a conception which ends in an abstraction requires no further evidence of its imperfection. The conception of the state as the mere secular whole is imperfect because it leads not to a fact but to a fiction. And if such a truth may be spoken of as established, this was certainly established by Dante in the *De Monarchia*.

'The state is the political machinery of government in a community,'[9] or the political whole. This I suppose is the commonest practical conception of the state; 'the state,' says a popular writer on the subject, 'is concerned with those social relations which express themselves by means of government'[10] but we have yet to discover whether it gives us a fact or an abstraction. And indeed, we need enquire only whether persons as government sees them are complete, or whether, like legal persons, they are abstract, to perceive the defects of this conception of the state. Men as governed are abstractions, for no man is merely what the government as such thinks he is; and consequently the political whole which such 'persons' constitute is an abstraction also. Governmental activity is not a self-explanatory activity; its end is always beyond the perfection of itself; it deals with an aspect of life, never with the whole of it. An aspect of almost all social relations is expressed by means of government, but no single, concrete social relationship can ever be expressed in this manner. If the state be no more than the government or the community as organized for merely political purposes, then it is a bare abstraction, a fiction and not a fact. The detailed nature and limits of government do not here concern us, all that is necessary now is that we should see clearly that the conception of the state which identifies it with the mere political whole is only less barren than that which identified it with the secular or the economic whole.

Where, then, shall we turn for a fuller conception of the

[9] G. D. H. Cole, *Self-government in Industry*, p. 71.
[10] Laski, *Authority in the Modern State*, p. 26.

state? If it is to be a concrete fact, the state must be self-subsistent, something which carries with it the explanation of itself and requires to be linked on to no more comprehensive whole in order to be understood. And it appears to me that nothing fulfils these conditions save the social whole which is correlative to individuals who are complete and living persons; or, in other words, the totality in an actual community which satisfies the whole mind of the individuals who comprise it. All that falls short of this is an abstraction which requires this to explain it. Government and law, economic, religious, intellectual and every other activity and aspect of social life find their explanation in this totality; it is to perfect this, and not merely themselves, that they exist.

I cannot now enter into all the implications of this conception of the state, and indeed I do not pretend that they are all as clear to me as I should wish, but I would like to meet three of the commonest misapprehensions concerning it. First, its opponents sometimes represent it as the apotheosis of the political *status quo*, the identification of government, or the political whole, with all that satisfies the mind of complete and concrete persons, but it is not difficult to recognize this as a total misrepresentation. The state is not the government, it is the social whole which government implies and requires for its explanation; for to explain a thing is to think of it in terms of the whole which it implies. We must forget altogether that anyone has been so foolish as to think that society as politically organized is more than an abstraction. Secondly, it is said that this view fails to distinguish between society and the state and is, therefore, at best a mere confusion, at worst pernicious logomachy. But it seems to me that if we separate the 'state' (politically organized society) from society, we have, on the one side, mere government, political organization for its own sake, which is not only (as Schopenhauer said) the apotheosis of philistinism, but a sheer abstraction which exists nowhere; and on the other side, a society without organization, which again is an abstraction and nowhere to be found in the concrete world. The separation of the state from society not merely fails to give us a clearer conception of the state and of society, but ensures that we shall have no conception of either full enough to dignify with the name of

'fact.' And thirdly, it will be asked, 'If the state is all that satisfies the whole needs of complete persons, *where*, then, is the state?' And I can reply only that the state exists in so far as such a satisfaction exists, and wherever that satisfaction is found, there is the state. The state comprises whatever affords that satisfaction, it comprises nothing which does not afford it, and is the totality or unity of conditions which fulfils the needs of complete persons. And no one who has grasped the conception will require to be shown the *locus* of a totality, or suppose it to be non-existent because he cannot designate it.

In short, the view I have been recommending is this. The state is a conception which, like all conceptions, may be called a concrete fact only when it is full enough to be complete in itself. Many conceptions of the state are defective because they result not in facts, but fictions such as society as politically, or ecclesiastically, or industrially organized. The limitations of such conceptions as these make them useful in practical life, but if we set out to construct a complete conception, these and their like must disappear. We are driven from the more abstract to the less abstract until we reach the complete. And when the gods appear, the half-gods disappear. Thus 'society as politically organized' is less abstract than 'secular society,' because the political whole more nearly supplies to our complete needs than the secular whole; the merely political man is more complete than the merely secular man. But the conception which alone achieves the realm of fact is that which views the state as the necessary totality or identity which the *prima facie* variety and difference of human life implies. All activity directed towards the satisfaction of the neds of concrete persons is state activity. Government frequently contributes to this satisfaction, law is the regulation of a certain limited aspect of it, the Church (whether or not established), the trade-union and the family are its organs. Anything less than this is an abstraction; sometimes, like the abstractions of law and economics, useful; at others, like many of the abstractions of so-called political science, serving only to obscure the truth.

This does not mean that the state is anything other than its members—that is a subject which I have not discussed and which I think it impossible to discuss until we have abandoned the

moral and legal conception of the individual as that which is isolated, for a more concrete conception which takes him to be that which is complete.

There remains now to consider the third question; where, then, is the authority of the state? The reply is, of course, implied in what I have said about the nature of authority and the character of the state, but I wish to consider two answers which have hitherto found favour among writers on politics.

The authority of the state, or the sovereign power in the state, it is said, is the government, and the voice of government is law. The final authority of the state is the legislative authority. Now, we have seen that a real authority is something which we cannot go behind, something from which there is no possibility of appeal, something irresponsible, inescapable and complete in itself, and we have now to enquire whether government and law fulfil these conditions. From one point of view, it is true, the legislative authority is absolute and irresponsible—from the point of view of the practicing lawyer and the administrator. A judge, a lawyer, or an administrator does not enquire whether a statute be just or expedient; he asks, merely, what it says. It is something to which he appeals as an absolute and inescapable authority.[11] The law, for him, can do no wrong. But this, again, is not a concrete 'fact,' it is merely a useful legal fiction. Everyone, save the actual administrator as such, may and does question the justice or expedience of the acts of the legislative authority. It is not a power from which there is no appeal, for laws can be changed and governments overthrown. It is legally irresponsible because it is the sole creator of law, but it is always responsible to another and wider tribunal—the moral and political opinions of its subjects. Government, indeed, as we all know, is sometimes not much better than the conversion of the opinions of idiots into laws; as Montaigne says, 'there is nothing so much, nor so grossly, nor so ordinarily faulty as the laws'; and no matter what its particular character be, it always draws its power from a source outside itself. So then, the point of view from which government and the law can

[11] It might be argued that the legislative authority in America occupies no such position as this, but the argument would not, of course, affect the point at issue here.

be said, as such, to embody the authority of the state is limited and abstract, and their so-called 'authority' is derivative and not absolute, a legal fiction and not a fact. Some writers on politics to-day are exerting themselves to deprive the mere legislative power of the sovereign position which they imagine it to have held in the past and think it holds, for the most part, now; but their efforts seem to me wide of the mark. For no government as such, was ever a strictly sovereign power, or had ever a more than derivative 'authority.' The nature of government excludes the possibility of it being itself the real authority which actually compels any belief or action.

Now, the traditional escape from the anomalies of this notion of the authority of the state is by means of a conception in terms of consent. 'The supreme power,' says Locke, 'remains with the people'; the authority which is behind government, which gives power to law and to which any appeal from these must be made, is the consent of the people, the will, if not of all, at least of the majority. Yet this appears to me scarcely more satisfactory than the notion it was designed to supersede. For, in the first place, consent can never create or maintain authority: authority is never authoritative because it is consented to. That which actually compels us to act or believe is something inherent in the character of the belief or action, is the necessary ground upon which it rests, and not our consent to it, which is never more than a cause. Mere consent may be given or withheld, but whatever is really authoritative is absolute and independent of our acceptance or recognition: consent itself requires an authority upon which to rest. And secondly, what is this 'people' whose will as such is supposed to be the authority behind government? It is, in fact, never more than a class in the community, a fluctuating and elusive majority, wholly without the characteristics of authority—absoluteness, self-subsistence and irresponsibility. The *volonté de tous*, as Rousseau long ago insisted, is itself in no sense authoritative. The people, as such, is never the sovereign power in the state.

Where, then, *is* the authority of the state? Where is this absolute, irresponsible, inescapable power vested, which alone (we have seen) can be called an authority? If it be vested neither in the government as such, nor in the people as such, is it not, per-

haps, a phantom which has lured us from the path of fact? This, or some varient of it, is, I suppose, the conclusion reached by the dominant faction in political thinking to-day, but that should not, I think, deter us from rejecting it: it is, in fact, no conclusion at all. For nothing is more certain than that no belief was ever entertained, no action ever performed which was not based upon some absolute and inescapable authority. And the only authority which corresponds to this description is (we have seen) the whole ground upon which a belief or action rests. If actual authority belong only to the whole ground of a belief or action, if such an authority is absolute and inescapable, and if (further) the only conception of the state which escapes the taint of abstraction is that which considers it to be the totality of necessary conditions which fulfils the needs of concrete persons, the whole ground of their actions and beliefs, then the authority of the state can reside nowhere save in the state itself as such. The authority of the state is not mere government and law, nor is it founded upon a contract or any other form of the consent of the people, but resides solely in the completeness of the satisfaction which the state itself affords to the needs of concrete persons. Apart from its completeness, the state has no authority, for that only is authoritative, in the full sense, which is itself complete. Of this authority, and of no other, can it be said: *Non est potestas super terram quae comparetur ei.*

THE IDEA OF A TRANSCENDENT ORDER

By the Rev. A. L. Lilley, Canon of Hereford, author of *Modernism*, etc.

THE theory of law was elaborated by the mediaeval theologians with their usual care and thoroughness. Its claim for consideration and inclusion in the Christian theological system had indeed come late, and its place in the system was from the first recognized as not being at the religious centre but on the circumference of necessary relations between religion and the world-order. We may expect then to find that the theory is a composite product of ideas involved in the strictly religious tradition and of more general conceptions borrowed from the Graeco-Roman culture. It will be my aim in this paper to indicate the measure of indebtedness of the theory to foreign sources and to show how its borrowings were controlled by the requirements of the strictly religious idea.

To do this it may be well to place ourselves at once *in mediis rebus* by giving a general outline of the mediaeval theory. The Schoolmen began by making the broad distinction between natural and positive law. Natural law, or the Law of Nature, was the eternal law of God as reflected in the mirror of the human reason. However dulled and even broken that mirror might be, it was yet capable of reflecting without serious or manifest deformation at least the general principles of that eternal and unchangeable law by which the Divine Wisdom directed all things to their true end. As it was by his possession of a rational soul that man was made in the image of God, he could not as a rational being divest himself of that knowledge of natural right which was a chief part of the divine image in him. The Law of Nature thus immediately given was therefore the source and the necessary norm of all positive law.

By the term positive law the Schoolmen distinguished all those laws which proceeded from the deliberate will of a legislator and were directed by that will to the just government of a particular society. Thus positive law might be either Divine or human. The law of Moses and the Law of Christ, instituted and

promulgated by God for the government of those societies which He had founded among men, the Jewish Synagogue and the Christian Church, formed the class of positive Divine Law. Positive human law, representing the work of the human legislator, comprised the three main sub-divisions of ecclesiastical law, the law of nations, and the civil laws of separate States.

With this initial distinction in mind let us consider a little more closely the relations of these different kinds of law. As the purpose of all positive law is the application of the natural and unchangeable principles of justice to the special needs and circumstances of different societies, it is evident that those principles must be conceived of as given with a generality and a certainty which will make sufficient knowledge of them accessible to all. That condition is provided for by the conception of the Law of Nature. As we have seen, the perfection of the Law of Nature is guaranteed by its identity with the eternal and immutable law of the Divine Providence in its government of the created order. Man's universal knowledge of it is guaranteed by the fact that he possesses a reasonable soul on which the Divine image is impressed. Thus all positive law, whether Divine or human, is founded on principles which are of Divine origin and are known at least in their generality to all men as capable of reason. The Law of Moses was but the definite Divine promulgation of the main principles of the Law of Nature, while the Law of Christ was that same code enlarged and deepened by a revelation of the spirit which must inform all true obedience to it. As to positive human law, it was impossible that it should escape all imperfection as proceeding from the imperfect will of the human legislator. But in so far as it actually violated the Law of Nature it became the negation of law, and had thereby forfeited all claims to obedience. Thus the court of conscience, the *forum conscientiae*, constituted a final court of revision and appeal for all decrees of the merely human legislator. Naturally it was only the fully-enlightened and instructed conscience that was regarded as having the power to make such revision or to entertain such appeals. But the significant fact is that the individual conscience as informed by the Law of Nature was regarded as possessed of that right and invested with that responsibility. And this primacy of the natural law as concretely

expressed in conscience over positive human law extended to a
its varieties, ecclesiastical and civil. Innocent III, for instanc
in one of his decretals considers the case of a man who has bee
excommunicated for doing something which in conscience h
knew he ought to do, and decides that such a man is bound t
adhere to the judgment of conscience and endure the wrongfu
excommunication, assured that the Divine judgment will corre
the errors of a human tribunal. So too all civil laws, thoug
proceeding directly from the will of the legislator and derivin
their immediate authority from his mere legislative act, had the
ultimate sanction in the assent of the governed as the witness o
natural law in the common conscience.

Now the theory which I have just outlined is unmistakabl
dated. It is an attempt to bring all possible rules for the goverr
ment of human societies within the same framework, to trac
them to a common source, and in identifying that source wit
the Law of Nature conceived as the Schoolmen conceived it
to give them all alike a religious character or at the least a chan
acter in which religion was immediately interested. Such a
attempt was neither possible nor necessary until the ordered lif
of the West, gradually emerging from the anarchy of the bar
barian invasion, gained full consciousness of itself as a singl
Christian commonwealth. The twelfth and thirteenth centurie
may be regarded as the period during which the conception o
the Christian Republic effectually controlled alike the outward
organization and the inner mind of the Western world. It was
therefore natural that the twelfth century should witness the
first large-scale attempt, in the work of Gratian, to harmonize
the frequently discordant heritage of ecclesiastical law, to be
followed by a fully-developed general theory of law in the thir-
teenth. But if the full-fledged theory emerged in the historical
moment which first required it as an adequate survey and inter-
pretation of fact, it had none the less been gradually shaping
itself in the whole growth of the Christian religion from its very
beginnings. It is the process of that development that we have
now to trace.

The most widely influential fact in the early history of Chris-
tianity was just the fact of its origin as a reforming movement
within the ancient religious tradition of Israel. All such move-

ments tend to magnify the measure of change which they effect just because their interest is centred at the point where change is desired. But in fact they take over large areas of the tradition without conscious questioning or challenge. If the change goes deep enough, as in the case of Christianity and the sixteenth century Reform, even these uncriticized portions of the inheritance will in time be modified by the requirements of the new spirit. But in the first instance they continue as the natural channels along which the rising flood of religious change is content to flow until its volume and impetuosity force their bounds. Thus it was that the earliest Christianity accommodated itself to Israel's theocratic conception of its own national constitution. For Israel nation and Church were one. The community of blood-ties, of tribal custom, of national memories, which formed it was not a mere accidental fact of nature but an eternal decree of God. Its history went back to the creation and represented the unrollment in time of the Divine purpose in time for all humanity. Through it God was exercising that immediate sovereignty over the whole human race which the rest of the race had ignored or against which it had consciously rebelled. God's covenant with man, with Adam as the first representative of the race, renewed through Seth, through Noah, through Abraham, was perpetuated and preserved in this one national unit. Its national customs and memories, circumcision and passover, were divine sacraments. Its laws had been directly given to it by God in an intangible form. Its national fortunes were immediate acts of Divine judgment, rewards for its obedience to the Divine laws, punishment of its disobedience. God was the immediate legislator, ruler, judge of this people, chosen by Him as the witness and instrument of His universal sovereignty. Here there was no distinction between natural and supernatural, temporal and eternal, secular and religious. Nature, time, the world; law, duration, history; were the modes of God's immediate relations with men, of His immediate activities towards man.

This theocratic conception Christianity inherited in its fulness and inherited without questioning. Even the admission of the Gentiles was only a God-ordained incident in the fulfilment of the ancient covenant, an incident which enlarged and renewed

it, which made it now the new covenant. It is true that this e largement of the covenant led at once to changes in the form the theocracy. It is impossible, for instance, to exaggerate t magnitude of the change wrought by the refusal of the ear Christian community to require circumcision of its Gentile co verts. It meant a decisive breach with the sacramental ac which made the Jewish nation the Church of God. But t change was facilitated by the mere fact that other sacrament acts had already been adopted by the Christian community which later theologians found the types in the Jewish rites circumcision and passover. The Church was still the continua tion and fulfilment of the Synagogue. Through the Synagogu it reached back uninterruptedly to the Divine covenant with th patriarchs. Its laws were still the laws directly delivered t Moses, not even enlarged in their content, qualitatively en riched and deepened only by the new spirit which was require and had been bestowed for their fulfilment. In short the Church like the Synagogue, was an earthly visible community of whic God was the immediate legislator, judge and ruler.

But even the Jew had not been satisfied with this earthl Kingdom of God, so imperfect in its obedience to the Divin Law, so disappointing as an instrument of the Divine righteous ness. He had dreamed therefore of a more perfect fulfilment o this purpose in a Messianic Kingdom, the rule of God throug His anointed deputy over a miraculously transformed humanity in a miraculously transformed world-order. The coming o that Kingdom would be the end of this present age, the fulfil ment of its specific function in the working out of God's plan Now it was, as we know, the claim of the disciples of Jesus that He was the Messiah, and that they as His disciples were the first fruits of the Messianic Kingdom that marked the birth of Christianity as a separate religion. It appeared in history as the fulfilment of the later eschatological dreams of Israel. The Christian Church was the heavenly kingdom. But I doubt whether we have yet at all adequately realized the difficulties which were created for Christian thought by this claim. Let us see what it involved. The Church as the heavenly Kingdom was a miraculous creation of the Divine Spirit. No possible human obedience to Divine law could qualify for admission to

it. Only the free, unmerited favour of God could bestow upon men the power and right of entrance into that Kingdom. In God's eternal and inscrutable decrees all its members indeed had been chosen before the foundation of the world. Yet no one could know with full assurance within this span of time whether he himself was one of the elect. Thus the Church as identified with the Kingdom of Heaven belonged to the heavenly invisible order. Its frontiers were drawn by the eternal decrees of God. Its membership was known to Him only. Further, law did not exist for it in any ordinary sense. For the Divine Law could not be obeyed by any save through the miraculous gift of grace, and he who really possessed that grace could not fail of obedience, and of the only kind of obedience acceptable to God, obedience motived by love of right. No obedience apart from the miraculous assistance of God possessed merit or could in any way avail to procure that assistance.

On the other hand, the Church was the visible society of the baptized, and as such it was conceived of as a theocracy after the naïve Jewish fashion. It was the society in which God's laws ran, which in His name exacted obedience to them, which recognized and fostered by its rewards and punishments the sense of individual responsibility for such obedience. In Augustine the clash of these two conceptions is felt at its acutest. For he was the first of the Fathers to develop a Church doctrine which practically identified the visible Church with the Kingdom of Heaven. Yet he was the first also by his doctrine of grace to make such a bare identification impossible. It is difficult to determine how he himself reconciled the contradictoriness of the two positions, because so much of his theological writing and thinking was occasional and reflects the influence of the controversy in which he was momentarily engaged. Thus his exaltation of the visible Church was demanded by the threat to Christian unity revealed in the puritanism of the Donatists, just as his exaggeration of the doctrine of grace was provoked by the Pelagian contention that the Fall had not so completely weakened human nature as to make it altogether incapable of obedience to the law of God.

This legacy of confusion left by the great Western Doctor has never been successfully liquidated. Here as at so many

other points of Christian theology the declaration of estate whic faith found necessary revealed the bankruptcy of thought. Bu a rough practical solution was found in regarding the visibl Church as ideally the Kingdom of Heaven, but in reality it preparatory instrument. Like its Founder, the Church had bot a Divine and a human character. It was an instrument of th Divine grace whose action was beyond all law, but it was also a instrument of human government according to law. By its pos session of the Word and Sacraments, the saving revelation o Divine Will and Power, it belonged to the invisible and etern order. By its legal system it accepted the conditions necessar to its penetration and conquest of the world-order. This con ception of the Church had entirely transformed the theocrat idea, inherited from Judaism. For Israel law was God's revel tion, and by His revealed law He ruled His chosen peopl For Augustine God's revelation was grace, the divinely-give power in virtue of which alone man was able to obey God. Fo him the Church as the beneficiary of grace, the heavenly King dom, was separated by an impassable gulf from the world an all its kingdoms. In the Church of the Middle Ages, howeve a reconciliation between grace and law had been in some so effected. The operation of grace was conceived of as in som measure conditioned by the ordinary laws of human psychology The supernatural as represented by grace was not only the fu filment of nature, but also followed the constructive lines o nature. And on the other hand some attempt had to be made and was in fact made to assign a supernatural character an effect to law. And all this was necessary because the world an its activities were no longer ranged against the Church as a riva and hostile power, but had been definitely drawn within its orbi

It is evident that a theocracy thus conceived, a Divine in strument of government working at different levels and wit different kinds of instrumentality, required a very differen theory of law from either the Jewish or the Pauline-Augustinian The theory required by such a complex fact and conception a was the mediaeval Church I have already outlined at the begin ning of this paper. It was shaped in its entirety under the in fluences of Greek or Graeco-Roman speculation, and forms on of the most interesting examples of the theological dependenc

of Christianity upon the thought of classical antiquity. And it is interesting chiefly because it represents a parallel development of experience and reflection in the two cases. The primitive Greek conception of law was, like the Jewish, that of the Divine revelation of the positive codes of each of the city states. Like Moses, Minos and Rhadamanthus, Solon, Lycurgus were recipients of a Divine revelation. And as in the case of Israel, the object of the laws was not merely to secure an outward conformity to social justice. Their supreme purpose was to educate the citizens in the principles of justice and to inspire them with a habitual love of justice. Obedience to the laws was a religious duty, and the due knowledge of them a religious education. But the situation with which the Greek thinkers were confronted was very different from that of Israel. With the multitude of city-states and the variety of their laws it was impossible to overlook their more immediate origin in the local and historical circumstances of each state. It was necessary, therefore, if the Divine character of law was to be safeguarded, to find some more original code of which the laws of separate states were but the imperfect and fragmentary transcripts. The general principles at least of such a code they thought to find in a conception of justice and its requirements which was common to all men, what came to be known as the Law of Nature. Most of the Sophists, indeed, protagonists of a political realism, denied altogether the religious or metaphysical origin of positive law. The laws of the city were the product of changing social needs and changed with those needs. But this insistence on the purely human character of positive law, in so far as it was accepted, served only to accentuate the importance of the unwritten law of nature as the authentic source of morality. The pre-Socratic thinkers also had already felt that moral weakness of positive law which afterwards obsessed the mind of Paul and Augustine—its inability to confer or create the spirit of true obedience, and therefore its essential amorality. The law could not give life, as St. Paul put it, while St. Augustine went further and found in it an active principle of evil. 'I don't know how it is,' he says, 'that a thing is never so alluring as when it is forbidden.'

When therefore Socrates, and after him Plato and Aristotle, undertook in opposition to the Sophists the defence of the

sacredness of positive law, the conditions of the problem had been altered. It was no longer possible simply to assert an immediate religious origin for the laws of any actual city. Nor was it possible to assign to them a fully moral character, the power of producing a fully moral disposition. Yet it was necessary, if their sacred character was to be preserved, to establish some real connection between them and the eternal patterns of justice laid up in the heavens. To this end both Plato and Aristotle devised their ideal cities to be mediators, as it were, of the heavenly ideas to the earthly cities on whose model they were framed. Plato, at any rate, in his ideal city, sought to represent the laws which the most perfect human legislator would frame for an actual human community. The laws even of such a city could not adequately translate the harmonies of the heavenly order. But their necessary imperfection was a guarantee that the laws of the actual city could also be inspired by the heavenly reason, and were not really law save in so far as they were thus inspired. Plato's ideal city, in short, was the almost exact analogue of the Christian Church as it was conceived in the Middle Ages, the mediator between the eternal and the actual human orders, the earthward thrust of the Kingdom of Heaven to meet and embrace as its own even the most imperfect efforts and achievements of human justice.

But it was in Stoicism that the problem of the relations between positive law and an absolute morality assumed the closest resemblance to the similar problem as presented to mediaeval Christianity. There was, for instance, the ultimate moral authority of the Stoic sage, the parallel of the mediaeval conception of the authority of conscience as informed by grace. Thus a rooted individualism characterized Christianity and Stoicism alike. But in both systems this individualism was the inspired expression of an absolute and universal morality. The Stoic sage was the ideal citizen of the universal city of God, the perfect community of gods and men whose laws he incarnated and revealed, just as the Christian saint was empowered by grace to obey, and by his obedience more perfectly to reveal, the eternal laws of the heavenly Kingdom. What was lacking in Stoicism was that concrete realization of its ideal theocracy which Christianity possessed in the visible Church. Yet Stoicism too

conceded to human law in so far as it embodied the principles of natural law a propaideutic character and value. So far all positive law could be and was a preparation for inspiration by the heavenly wisdom. And in so far as it departed from or contravened the law of nature it was not law at all, but the negation of law. That alone was law in the true sense which was an expression of the principles of natural morality. But the question still remained : How were those enactments of positive law which were not in harmony with the law of nature to be accounted for? The answer which most of the Stoic thinkers seem to have given to that question was one which was in fullest accord with Pauline and Augustinian theology. The great mass of mankind was morally stupid. It had fallen from the high estate of nature. It had forfeited in fact all sufficient knowledge of the laws which governed the ideal city of gods and men. That knowledge was now possessed only by the wise man, the Stoic sage. Through him had been mediated all such traces of the absolute morality of the Law of Nature as were still to be found in the texture of positive law. Such an answer might perhaps satisfy the moral philosopher pure and simple, but it was hardly likely to satisfy the jurist, whose concern it was to demonstrate the reasonableness of positive law, even if he happened to be a moralist as well. And with the extension of the Roman power into a universal state, it was the jurist's point of view that mattered more and more. Already in Cicero we can see the beginnings of that modification of Stoic doctrine which prepared the way for the later developments of Roman jurisprudence and its justification of the morality of positive law. Two indications of the kind of change I have in mind will be sufficient. Cicero holds that the Law of Nature is often an ideal so indefinite that it can be given practical effect only by such limitations as may look like its sheer contradiction. Thus by the Law of Nature the enjoyment of the goods of the universe is common to all, so that the possession of private property is an apparent violation of it. But as it is physically impossible for all to enjoy the same physical goods or for any to enjoy more than a certain very minute share, the law of private property actually exists to give a limited reality, the only kind of reality that is possible, to the communal rights which natural law ideally confers. Thus the imperfection of positive

law is a result not so much of man's moral as of his physical im perfection, and is necessary if the ideal perfection of natural la is to be applied at all in an imperfect and limited order such a ours. In other words, the imperfection of positive law was limitation in virtue of which it discharged a positive moral func tion and therefore possessed a positive moral character.

The second point at which the positive and realist interest of Roman jurisprudence modified the findings of Greek philo sophic speculation was of even greater importance. Positive la for the Greek thinkers was represented by the various, often con flicting, and obviously imperfect codes of small city-states. Fo the Romans it was the law of a world-state. It was difficult at al times for idealists like the Greeks to find anything to satisfy thei standard in the real world, while the practical Roman, if he wa to find the ideal at all, had to find it in the real. Thus the Roma state and the law in which its spirit was expressed became th objects of a practical deification. The ideal cities which Plat and the other Greek thinkers had imagined as concrete vehicle for the application of natural law to known human requirements were for the Roman otiose and unnecessary. He possessed such a city in his own world-state. Its laws were the fullest possibl expression in actual human circumstances of the perfect an eternal law of nature.

These were the influences under which the mediaeval theory of law was shaped. Its abiding nucleus was given in the Jewish theocratic heritage of Christianity. But that heritage was modi fied by the realism of Roman world-rule and the idealism of Greek thought. The Church became the direct heir of the world ruling consciousness of Rome. It interpreted that consciousness, as Rome had already interpreted it, with the aid of all the specu lation of the Greeks about the nature of law. The law of which it was the custodian and administrator was derived from the eternal law by which the Divine Wisdom ruled the universe. God, as the *causa exemplaris*, had impressed that law of His upon the universe and given it self-consciousness in the reason of man. There, as an immediate effect of its exemplary cause, a copy of the exemplar as faithful as man's reason was capable of receiving, it existed as the Law of Nature. For the guidance of His Church God had specially revealed the main requirements

of that law as the Law of Moses and the Law of Christ. The human legislator too was bound to conform in his prescriptions to that Law of Nature on pain of forfeiting all claim to obedience. The Church itself was a human legislator. True, it was also the custodian of a Divine legislation. And in this mixed character of its mandate lurked a certain unescapable confusion. There was, for instance, the difficulty of delimiting its Divine and human character, its function as a Divine deputy and as a responsible human legislator. What formed the purely Divine content of the law which the Church administered? Was it the Scriptural Revelation only or the combined revelation of Scripture and tradition, or also the unique authority assigned to the Scriptural interpretation of the Fathers, or again all these along with the sum of Conciliar decisions and Papal decretals? I think we may say that so far as the wider claim gained a more and more general acceptance, there was notwithstanding recognized always a hierarchical scale of values among these various elements in virtue of which the lower stages of the hierarchy approached a more definitely human character. So too the claim of infallibility made by the Church as the administrator of the Divine Law remained a somewhat indeterminate conception. All Christians, as late at least as the end of the seventeenth century, believed that the Church as the depositary of revealed truth was infallibly assisted by the Holy Spirit. Leibniz in his controversy with Bossuet made the claim to such assistance in the name and on behalf of the Reformed Churches with as firm a conviction as Bossuet himself. The only point in dispute between them and between the Churches which they represented was the seat of the infallible authority. And as to its nature, the protagonist of modern ultramontanism, Joseph de Maistre, contended that infallibility meant and could mean nothing more than the quality attaching to the decisions of a final court of appeal.

In conclusion, and speaking generally, law has always been accounted as pertaining to the more human aspects and character of the Church. By a kind of protective instinct of its character as the beneficiary and minister of the Divine grace, of the miraculous action of God upon the souls of men, it was impelled to assign a subordinate character to law. And it has in fact consistently done so.

THE MEANING OF SPIRITUAL AND RELIGIOUS

By the Rev. J. C. Hardwick, M.A., B.Sc., Author of *Science and Religion from Galileo to Bergson.*

THE great need to-day is for a descent of religion into th sphere of experience and reality from the realm of make believe and miracle. One of the means for bringing this abou would be a thorough overhaul of our religious terminology; an no term stands in such need of examination as the word 'spirit Everybody who speaks or writes about religion uses it, but onl a small proportion make any attempt to explain what the ter means. The mind of the average man is in a complete fog ove the matter. The only tangible meaning he can put on the wor is whisky, petrol, and ghosts. As for the adjective 'spiritual, the plain man knows that the clergy use it. It is, he supposes part of their musical-bank currency; all that he can make out i that it is something vague and shadowy and unreal; or possibly something rather like electricity, which can give you a bad shoc when you least expect it.

But most of all he is taught to associate it, or even identify it, with the supernatural, which for him means the miraculous And it is with this idea of the miraculous that religion is chiefly associated. And as, for one reason or another, good or bad, he can no longer believe in miracle, at least in the *present* (and it is present not past miracles which impress us most), his religion tends to become thin and remote, or to fade away altogether. The supernatural has gone, carrying the spiritual away with it. Such is, in all probability, the root cause of the present decline of religion. The position is that the only set of religious conceptions that is available for common use, is a set in which no one can any longer believe. The difficulty can hardly prove permanent. But the chief need at present is for clearer ideas about what we mean by 'spiritual,' and 'spirit.'

'Wind,' 'breath,' 'moving air,' is what the Hebrew, Greek, and Latin equivalents mean. The idea of 'spirit' goes back to this, and the Johannine text preserves this classical meaning. 'The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound

thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh, or whither it goeth: so is everyone that is born of the Spirit.' The characteristic quality of the wind, and of 'spirit,' is its apparent freedom and unaccountability; 'Thou canst not tell whence it cometh and whither it goeth.'

R. L. Nettleship, writing in a letter to a friend to explain in untechnical language what 'spirit' meant to him, says:

> 'It seems as if the notion that lies at the root of all notions of spirit is that of *freedom* in some sense, whether in that of power to dispense with means usually necessary, or of power to produce something out of material usually unproductive. Hence the mystery, or unaccountableness, which always hangs about "spirit."'[1]

For example, a spirit or ghost is something which in some way transcends or does without certain conditions which the ordinary human being cannot dispense with. It can pass through a door without having to open it, can appear without having to occupy space, and so on. Again, a magician or person endowed with 'spiritual' powers is one who can do things which are impossible for normal individuals: he can lay spells, cause rain, raise the dead, divine what is distant in space or in time, and so on. And even in more modern and civilized usage, the word has much the same meaning:

> 'A person of 'spirit,' in English, is one who rises above certain circumstances which would depress other people. A person of *Geist* in German is a person who gets something out of things which to most persons suggest nothing. And a person of *esprit*, in French, is one who does the same in the somewhat lighter things of life.'[2]

This notion of freedom from limitations is everywhere present where we have the idea of 'spirit'; and freedom from limitations is the same thing as power and scope to use it. Compare the other Johannine saying about God being 'spirit.' He is not 'in this mountain' or 'at Jerusalem,' *i.e.* He is not limited by locality. On the contrary, 'He is absolutely free activity, able to "make all things new," and "where the Spirit of the Lord is there is liberty."'

Spirit, then, seems to stand for free and unhampered activity, and activity practically without limits. You get it once more in the antithesis between 'spirit' and 'letter.' The 'spirit' of a formula is the meaning got out of it by one who sees it in many new bearings, as opposed to the meaning got out of it by one

[1] *Philosophical Remains*, p. 20. [2] *Nettleship*, op. cit., p. 21.

who sees it in the old bearing only, which has now become formal, and rigid, and restrictive of 'freedom.' 'The spirit' means freedom; 'the letter' bondage. So also with the antithesis between 'spirit' and 'flesh.' 'The spirit' stands for the spontaneous activity of the free personality, unhampered by the bondage of habit, or the burden of sin, which is 'a body of death.'

But the antithesis which seems most important to us to-day is that between 'spirit' and 'matter.' Here once more we have the contrast between freedom and its opposite. There is the activity and mobility of mind contrasted with the inactivity and immobility of matter. Even the body, living as it is, and free as compared with a lump of inanimate matter, is far less free than the mind. The range of thought is, literally, unlimited. Nothing restrains the current of the mind. 'With space the universe encloses me and engulfs me like an atom,' wrote Pascal, 'but with thought I enclose the universe.' And not only does the power of mind, the power of forming abstract concepts, give us the run of the whole of space, it also gives us the run of the whole of time. Unlike the animals, whose awareness is limited by the range of their senses, and who are confined to the narrow actual present, we can roam over 'the whole past and future, and the wide sphere of the possible.' The comprehending mind is free, absolutely free, to roam where it will; it is unbound by space-time limitations.

'Spirit,' then, seems indissolubly connected with freedom; and apart from freedom and spontaneity there can be no such thing as 'spirit.' This is why 'spirit' can only be said to begin with the higher organisms. Inanimate matter displays no freedom; its behaviour is mechanical, and therefore predictable, and can only be called behaviour at all when the term is used with some latitude. A stone, properly speaking, can hardly be said to behave. Behaviour begins with freedom, and freedom, so far as we can see, begins with life; so that apart from life there can, properly speaking, be no freedom and no spirit.

I say 'properly speaking' because there is probably an element of spontaneity, and therefore of spirit, even in inanimate matter. The mechanical is penetrated with something that is the predecessor of mind, and 'the mechanical is not opposed

o life as much as that it is simpler, more uniform, and of more outine a character.'[3]

The point to keep in mind is that the world presents to us a ieries of ascending levels, matter, life, mind, and the series is ne of increasing freedom and spontaneity, and therefore of spirit.' There is more freedom, and therefore more 'spirit' in starfish than in a stone; more in a dog than in a starfish; and nore (as a general rule) in a man than in a dog. By the time you ave reached man, with his maximum of mind and of spontaneity, you have reached the maximum of spirit. 'Pure Spirit,' ays F. H. Bradley, 'would mark the extreme most removed rom lifeless nature.'

May we then identify 'spirit' with mind as being the highest evel of existence that is known to us? But may it not be possible o conceive of a level of existence still further removed than nind from lifeless nature. Professor Alexander envisages such level, which will 'emerge' from mind as mind has 'emerged' rom organic life, and organic life from inanimate matter; and matter from electrons; and electrons from mere space-time, or whatever the crude 'stuff' of things is to be called. If we take his view, *i.e.* that mind at the human level is in travail of some new quality higher than itself, it would follow that this new quality of existence would approximate to pure 'spirit' more nearly than mind does. Nevertheless, though for good reasons t would be a mistake to identify 'mind' and 'spirit,' yet mind s admittedly the most 'spiritual' thing we know. Whether or not 'spirit' can be identified with mind, it is found in mind more undiluted, so to speak, than elsewhere; and this is enough for our present purpose.

We may now pass on to a further point; and examine a very important characteristic of mind; and *i.e.* its power not only to *understand*, but to *value*. This is of the utmost importance, for religion is closely connected with values.

Let us take a 'value,' such as beauty, and ask wherein it consists, and how it comes to exist at all. How does a thing come to be *beautiful*? Is the 'beauty' in the tree, or in the appreciative observer, or in both?

We need not go into the question of primary and secondary

[3] Alexander, *Artistic Creation and Cosmic Creation*, p. 22.

qualities, as to whether they are dependent upon the observ or not. For value is a sort of 'tertiary' quality (the phrase Professor Alexander's). The question for us to answer is: Ca you have beauty apart from a *mind* to appreciate it? We ca imagine that a landscape may look very much the same to a animal endowed with senses in any way resembling ours; b is the landscape *beautiful* to the animal? Hardly I think to th same extent, and only so far as the animal possesses a mind a distinct merely from its senses. I do not wish to suggest tha animals are without the power of discerning and appreciatin beauty (the facts seem to contradict this), but I do suggest tha they are only capable of doing so *in so far as they have minds* and the minds of the higher animals are different in degree rathe than in kind from our own.

Beauty, then, which we call a 'value,' seems to be, as i were, a product of a perceived object and mind. Mind is an in dispensable ingredient apart from which 'value' could not exist If the greenness of a tree is the product of the tree and m senses, its beauty is a product of the tree, my senses, and m mind. In short 'values' or 'tertiary qualities' are products o mind; and this is why they are entitled to be called 'spiritual,' since apart from mind, or 'spirit,' they could not exist.

This analysis of beauty applies also to the other 'values' or 'tertiary qualities,' goodness and truth. Mind is an ingredien of them all. As there can be no beauty apart from a mind to appreciate it, so there can be no goodness without a mind to value it, nor truth without a mind to know it. All our 'values' are dependent upon mind, and are products of mind. What we may call the qualitative side of existence is wholly dependent upon mind, even on the theory that material objects are indepen dent of mind, and exist, so to speak, in their own right, as the realists affirm.

Now it is with 'values,' or the qualitative side of existence, that religion is concerned. And here lies the connection between 'spirit' and religion.

Of course, each 'value' is the concern of a specific form of human activity. Art is concerned with the 'value' beauty, the recognition of it where it exists, and its creation where it does not, and in any case with its augmentation. Similarly with

Science; its business is the subjugation of things to the grasp and control of mind. The 'value' with which it is concerned is truth. Ethics is concerned with goodness, the third in our trinity of 'tertiary qualities' or values. Each sphere of human activity, Art, Science, Ethics, is concerned with the creation and augmentation of its respective spiritual value. And the impulse to indulge each of these spheres of activity, to create, to learn, and to behave, is a part of the normal human equipment. As Professor Alexander says, 'The values are but the discovered scale of the embodiment of those impulses in judgments of act, in knowledge, and in creative art.'

This involves the view that 'value is a human invention, not in the sense of an artificial product, but of an effluence of man's nature.' These values are 'spiritual,' not in the sense that they are 'supernatural,' but in the sense that they are products of mind, *i.e.* the human mind. Art, science, ethics, together with their respective values, are human products. There is nothing supernatural, or superhuman, about them. The human race is entitled to whatever credit attaches to them.

Now religion was formerly supposed to be the supernatural source of Art, of Science, and of Ethics; one looked to supernatural revelation and inspiration for true knowledge or true practice in each of these spheres. But it seems to me that this is to mistake the real function of religion. This is now generally recognized in the case of Art and Science; and it is bound to be recognized, sooner or later, in the sphere of ethics.

What then is the proper function of religion, if Art, Science, and Ethics, can exist in their own right, and are 'natural' products of human nature? If our aesthetic, scientific, and ethical values are all human, where does religion come in? Surely this is a purely humanistic position, making religion into something quite redundant—an ornamental frilling to life, nothing more.

Now this is just what I should maintain that religion has become. It claims to give us supernatural information, if not about Art, then about Science, History, and Ethics; but that information is no longer regarded as infallible. And where that information *is* true, the truth is not regarded as supernaturally given, but as acquired by natural means; discovered, not revealed. And this is precisely why religion seems redundant,

because it bases its claim on our devotion on its ability to giv us something that we feel we can get quite as well, or better, un assisted. Thus religion is not fulfilling any real function; it i at best only tightening knots that other people have tied.

Then has religion no function? And is it, like all function less things, doomed to extinction?

To my mind it has a very important and even indispensabl function. The business of religion, as I see it, is to link u human values with the nature of things, *i.e.* with reality. Reli gious faith is, in its simplest and most essential form, the belie that the nature of things is congruent with, and guarantees, thos values. The religious affirmation is a declaration that the credi of human values is secure; just as your or my personal financia credit would be secure if we had the Bank of England behind us

From the standpoint of religious faith, our 'spiritual' value may be a human product, but they do not depend upon an human whim, they are not merely a matter of taste, but, so fa as they go, they have objective validity. Thus, although value are the product of human minds, they are nevertheless guaran teed by something which emphatically is *not* the product o human minds. For the object of religious faith, *i.e.* the powe which guarantees our values, is *not* the product of the human mind. On the contrary it is itself the source of the human mind and all its works.

But religion cannot remain satisfied with making affirmations about the objectivity of values; nor can it even be satisfied with striving to increase those values. This is why religion cannot be identified with art or science, or even with ethics.

Religion exists also to establish and maintain contact be tween the individual who strives to create and increase values, and the power, *i.e.* God, which guarantees those values. The practice of religion consists in the acquirement and maintenance of this contact. It is evident that since the closest union is a union of purpose, to labour for values in the world is the surest way to approach the power that guarantees them.

It is obvious that religious faith depends upon a philoso phical assumption, *i.e.* that the source or ground or nature of things is somehow congruent with our minds, that is to say, that it is spiritual. This is not the place to produce arguments that

the religious affirmation is justified; but it is important to realize exactly what that affirmation is, and what religious faith involves.

And now for the bearings of all this upon the problem before us to-day, which is to bring down the idea of spirit from the realm of myth and fancy, and general *remoteness*, into the sphere of actual present experience, and reality.

In the first place, 'spirit' is not anything vague and shadowy; it is concrete and real. It is the world of our minds, the world in which each one of us lives, and out of which we cannot pass, any more than we can jump out of our skins. Of course, this experience varies in quality, *e.g.* I may feel envy, or I may feel pity. And this is where judgments of value come in, distinguishing between good and bad, true and untrue, beautiful and ugly. And it is in the recognition of these values, and in the creative activity which strives to increase them, that spiritual life, as contrasted with merely mental life, consists. In short 'spiritual' life' is human experience at its highest and best. The student of science experiences it, no less than the artist and the mystic, or the saint. And religious faith is the belief that all this is 'worth while,' indeed that it is the only thing worth while at all.

Does all this seem too obvious and commonplace to be the basis of religion, the most exalted thing we know? But it is the commonplace things that are the raw material of religion; and if religion is not a simple and obvious thing it is nothing. At least this point of view is not satisfied with regarding religion as it is usually regarded, *i.e.* as an appendage to life, and concerned primarily with remote and exceptional experiences and events, often of an incredible character. On the contrary, the concern of religion is with the most ordinary things, and with life as it is normally lived. It is the business of religion to invest such ordinary life, which often seems devoid of meaning, with significance and value. And as nothing can be given a meaning save in the light of something else, religion sets human life against a background which lends to it a new significance. In this sense, and because it provides a transcendent background to the drama of life, religion may be called transcendent and supernatural. But this does not mean that it is miraculous, since for religion as I have regarded it, the idea of miracle is irrelevant.

THE SCOPE OF AUTHORITY IN SCIENCE, MORALITY AND ART

By Professor W. R. Sorley, Litt.D., Hon. LL.D., F.B.A., author of *Moral Values and the Idea of God*, etc.

A FEW days ago, in conversation with an eminent theologian, I revealed the fact that I was about to write a paper on Authority; and he said that he did not know the meaning of the word. I was confident enough to answer that I did know its meaning, and that it was in no way derivative from power. Perhaps the ground of my confidence is reminiscent of Humpty Dumpty's: 'a word has got to mean what I tell it to mean—neither more nor less.' But at least I have good support for my view. I take my stand on a sentence of Bishop Butler's: 'Had it strength as it has right, had it power as it has manifest authority, it would absolutely govern the world.' He was speaking of the Conscience which in every man determines magisterially what he ought to do. But I am not concerned for the moment with the question where the Authority lies, but with its nature. It is clear that, according to this pronouncement, its nature does not consist in its power, for power is just that which it is said to lack. It is a valid or rightful claim to govern, and this validity or rightfulness is not affected by any want of power to enforce the claim. Authority is a moral notion; the presence or absence of causal efficiency is irrelevant to it; and the claim to authority can be vindicated only by a demonstration of worth or goodness. If we admit this moral meaning of authority it follows that the authority assigned to persons or institutions or to the individual conscience is a derivative authority, dependent on the values which they declare or represent. Even the authority which we ascribe to God belongs to Him not as almighty power, but as supreme value or highest good. The distinction is commonly obscured in ordinary discourse, as when we speak of the authority—not merely the power—of the State or Church; and for that reason it needs to be emphasized.

I.

When Butler gave by implication his definition of authority, he was referring to the authority—or rather the vehicle of authority—which is present to every man in conscience. More commonly, when we use the word, we are thinking of the right to rule our conduct which is claimed by some person or institution outside us. These two meanings may be distinguished as Internal and External Authority. The abrupt opposition of internal and external may need modification, but the difference has to be borne in mind. It is a common complaint against the present age that it has thrown off all authority; it is sometimes the boast of the age that it has burst the shackles of authority. What does this mean? Is it only external authority that is discarded, or internal authority as well? Clearly, it is one thing to deny any rule of life save the desire of the moment, and quite another thing to seek to replace the authority of the institution by the authority of the spirit. But there is often confusion of thought on the subject. Authority is so much bound up with external control that, when the latter is denied, there seems to be nothing left. Sometimes the view is put forward wittingly. It has even received a measure of support from certain philosophers, such as the Thrasymachus of Plato's *Republic* and, in modern times, Mandeville and Nietzsche. The theory, however, overlooks the fact that principle is as much a part of human nature as passion, and just that part of it which distinguishes man from the animals. Not many remarks need be made upon it here.

If it has any rule of life it will be, Think as you like, do as you like, admire as you like; or, if you so prefer, don't think or act or admire at all. But this is not the way of man's life. The man of science looks for truth; it is authoritative for his thinking; he has not any instinct of rebellion against it. Those who are indifferent to its claims fall below the level of man as rational. The moralist, and the ordinary citizen also, seek what is good or seems to them good, and acknowledge its authority when seen. Not every one is a seeker after moral principles or a consistent observer of them, but every one will on occasion draw the moral line somewhere. A character in one of Stevenson's stories is made to say, at a crisis in his life, 'Right and wrong are but figments and the shadow of a word; but for all that, there

are certain things that I cannot do, and there are certain othe that I will not stand.' The young man had the rudiments of conscience; and probably every one, like him, admits its autho ity at some point. Art perhaps may lay claim to a greater lat tude than either science or morals. But here also there are limi ing or guiding principles, and, though the critics may not b agreed about their formulation, the claim to self-expression o any kind, if pushed to an extreme, would obliterate the di tinction between the artist, the bungler, and the idiot.

Man can be a law to himself only if he has a law in himse —if he has himself a capacity for discriminating between di ferent statements about reality, different tendencies to actio and different modes of self-expression. Without this he mu fall under external control, and almost any kind of control wi be better than none. The most absolute claim for politic authority—that made by Hobbes—was based upon the anarch of individual passions. This theory is undermined if it be ac mitted that the individual consciousness is possessed of stan dards or ideals of truth, goodness, and beauty, and that thes are authoritative for man in his pursuit of knowledge, in h conduct, and in artistic creation. And then the question wi arise how this individual system, which contains authority withi it, is related to the persons or institutions in the social environ ment which claim authority over it.

II.

On what grounds may one man or an organization of me exercise control over the thinking or conduct or artistic creatio and appreciation of other men? It is an exercise of authority and authority, as I have urged, means the right to direct an not merely power to enforce a claim. Further, this right t direct depends upon insight into values: the possessor c authority must have an insight superior to that of those ove whom control is exercised. If this superior insight is possesse by certain persons or institutions, then control by them may lea men to accept true doctrine, to do what they ought to do, and t admire the right things. Even so, however, something will b lacking. A man's worth is not exhausted by his correct opinion and the propriety of his conduct. It may be better for him t find out things for himself—even although what he finds out i

chiefly his own mistakes. So there are two conditions which the claimant to authority must satisfy: (1) He must have superior insight into values, and (2) he must not, in the exercise of his authority, unduly restrict the values which come from free enquiry and experiment. The former of these conditions can never be more than matter of probability, though the probability may often be great enough for all practical purposes. The latter condition is a question of degree. Life in a community of any kind requires some measure of control and submission as between different men, and the question how much? may have a different answer according to the department of activity referred to and to the special circumstances of each case.

In science and in knowledge generally authority has a place. Science is a social product, due to the co-operation of many minds and not to the unaided effort of each individual. The field of enquiry is divided among the labourers, and each is in some measure dependent on the findings of others. If Clifford's paradox — for paradox it is, though it may seem a platitude — were accepted and no one had a right to believe what he had not seen or proved for himself, every scientific worker would be set the impossible task of testing every fact and every theorem in related branches of knowledge upon which his own enquiry might depend; and science itself would be rendered almost barren of practical applications. Different faculties are required by the inventor from those which lead to advances in pure science. They are not usually possessed by the same person; and, if they were, time would fail him for both the discovery of truth and its application to practical affairs. The master mariner, for instance, may trust to the Nautical Almanac without having made the calculations—without being capable of making the calculations—on which its results depend; and he risks his own life and that of his passengers on his belief in their truth. He may defend his belief by two reasons. In the first place, a number of experts have agreed in the calculations, and he thinks it improbable that they would all have made any serious error, and in the second place the tables in the Almanac have been found to work in the past. But the former of these reasons is itself an appeal to authority, and the latter implies a belief in the uniformity of nature which he would be puzzled to justify if it were called in question. We might compare, as Lord Balfour has

done, the beliefs which a man accepts on authority with thos which he has proved for himself and find that, in number at an rate, the former far exceed the latter. And a man of modes pretensions is often more confident regarding the former; h may trust the expert more than he does his own reasoning powers But I do not think that this comparison carries us very far. Th last word, it would seem, is not with authority. While we trus the expert we are aware of his fallibility, and are not unduly sur prised when his conclusions are called in question by others— provided they also are experts. This is why we may laugh a the villagers who voted that the earth was flat, but listen wit respect to Einstein when he upsets the cosmic theory of Newton We were all Newtonians, born and bred; now we are all on th fair way to become Einsteinians. Now, as then, we depend upo authority for our opinion—if we are not ourselves skilled mathe maticians. But we have reasons for selecting our authority. W know who the experts are who have devoted their trained intelli gence to the question, and we follow their opinion. Or at leas we know that mathematicians in general recognize certain o their number as experts on this question, and it is the opinion o these experts that we follow. Failing this measure of knowledg we may trust our own common-sense and say that the earth is a flat as the Eastern Counties appear to the motorist or, witl greater wisdom, we may abstain from having any opinio about the matter. But we cannot always suspend judgment, an common-sense is not enough—as the motorist admits when h calls in a mechanic to mend a defective engine, or the navigato when he consults the Nautical Almanac. Nevertheless, in thi appeal to authority we are indirectly appealing to reason, for w have reasons for believing that the authority we admit is th authority of reason. Always, it must be admitted, this authorit comes to us through fallible media and at second or third hand— our own judgment, the judgment of others, and our judgment o the judgment of others. It is our business to take all means ope to us to reduce the chances of error. It may be admitted that the can never be eliminated completely and that, even in science probability remains the guide of life; but the probability may b made to approximate to certainty.

The question of the scope of authority in science is no almost entirely an academic question: however it is decided i

will not affect the extension or dissemination of knowledge. The Royal Society does not formulate a creed, nor do governments or churches any longer attempt to direct or deflect the course of science. But the question was not always so purely academic; men of science had to struggle for the right of free inquiry and free expression of opinion, and they often suffered in the struggle. Nor can one predict the future; but for the present, and in western Europe, the freedom of science from external control is secure.

In the ethical region the problem is not altogether the same as in science or in art. These latter departments are the special concern of a limited number of people only, though sometimes they have widespread effects; but ethics has to do with all men and all their important activities. Men cannot live together in a community without some common agreement as to what things may be done and what may not be done. There cannot be the same latitude of permissible conduct as there may be in opinion and in artistic effort. Social life requires standards and rules for conduct and the organization of varied activities towards a common end. To see to the observance of the rules and to organize common activity, it is necessary that there should be a centre of direction and control of the members of the group. How this directing and controlling agency is to be constituted is another question. But some control is needed to secure the values of social life; and it is justified because it is the condition of their attainment. This just control makes its possessor what we have agreed to call a vehicle of authority.

Two reasons can be given for assigning authority in matters of morals to the organized community, in particular to the government of the State. One is that it represents the combined wisdom of the community and is therefore more likely to be right than the individual's private judgment. The other is the argument referred to above that some uniformity of conduct is required for social life and that the government of the State is the only means for securing it. The former argument is defective because the combined wisdom of the community is apt to be nearer the average than to the wisdom of the best minds. No State has ever devised a method for getting its affairs controlled by the wisest. The other argument is sound so far as it goes, but it is strictly limited. It assumes the existence of a government

with a good claim to represent the community, and then argue that its authority is justified because required to secure the value that come from social life. But there are also values which ca be attained at all, or attained in their highest degree, only c condition of the absence of this control by the government c any outside power. It is not because the individual resents hav ing his whole life determined for him, though that is something It is because what a man achieves by his own effort is of greate value to him than what he receives by gift or does from compu sion. Freedom heightens every value, and, in practice as wel as in science, there are ranges of human activity where free enter prise leads to new discoveries and advances on old lines whic would not have been reached by ordered activity controlled fro without. If the claimant to authority can be justified by th values it facilitates, it is equally open to condemnation by th values which it impedes.

We must remember that the ethical insight of the person who form the government of a State is probably on about th level of that of the average citizen, and certainly below that o the best citizen; the ethical insight of the ecclesiastical govern ment may be rather higher than that of the average member o the Church, but again it is almost certainly inferior to that of th best members. We cannot assume, therefore, that when institu tion and individual differ, the institution is in the right, or even that there is any very great probability in its favour. If we think of the immoral customs which have prevailed in certain com- munities—human sacrifice, suttee, child marriage, slavery—we fail to discover any evidence that the government of the com- munity in question took the lead in their suppression. In the British Empire, for instance, it was the agitation of Wilberforce and his associates that led to the abolition of slavery and the per- sistence of the seventh Earl of Shaftesbury that brought to an end the exploitation of children in factories and mines: in both cases the Government was unfriendly and the Church inert. The re- formers succeeded by appealing to the conscience of the ordinary man and so bringing pressure to bear upon the ruling power. Their method, be it noted, would have been inapplicable for obtaining acceptance of a scientific truth. There the appeal is to experts only, and the truth which they accept only afterwards and gradually infiltrates into the common consciousness. In

morality, on the other hand, there is not such a hard and fast line between the expert and the ordinary man. The ordinary man shares in some degree the sympathetic response to goodness whose fineness marks the expert, and, as Aristotle said long ago, he recognizes the man of moral insight when he sees him.

And there is a further point. The conduct which the ruling power enforces is probably the customary conduct of the day—or of yesterday—and in accordance with its prevailing ethical code. Now the recognized ethical code at any time represents the traditional and stationary factor in life, as distinguished from the ideal factor which has its rise in the minds of individuals. And there are two causes which tend to make the traditional code inadequate. In the first place changes in the environment of life may be so great as to require a new adjustment of the ethical code to the new circumstances, and what have hitherto been regarded as social duties may cease to appeal to the enlightened conscience. In the second place the received ethical code may be modified by the discovery of new values which were not recognized or not clearly recognized before. When these causes are operative, we hardly expect the official guardians of the traditional code to take the lead in urging its modification.

Time and again, in this way, the individual tends to come into collision with the organized community or institution. And, in asserting his claims, he is apt to fall into one or other of two extremes. These extreme attitudes I may call the experimental and the dogmatic. The former attitude is expressed in the claim to make experiments in morality and art as well as in science. With a necessary qualification the claim need not be gainsaid. But what is experiment? In science it means finding out the truth by putting things to a test—manipulating nature so as to make it answer our question. And this implies two things: first, that we have a question which calls for an answer—an answer which will be decisive of truth or help to decide it; and secondly, that we go about the process of manipulation in a way which is adapted to extract an answer; nature cannot be interrogated at large: it is too big. Something of the same sort may hold in morality and art. If you are experimenting with life you must ask a question of the form, what sort of conduct will contribute to the good life? Until you have an idea of goodness you are

not qualified to experiment. Random action is not experiment. Only when a principle has been accepted (at least provisionally) can experiment begin. And when it does get under way we find a peculiarity not shared by science or art. The moral experiment commonly affects other people than the experimenter in a way that the scientific experiment does not; and, although a man may think that he has a right to do what he likes with his own life he can hardly claim that he has a right to do what he likes with the lives of other people. Artistic experiments are more nearly akin to scientific, and may be fruitful in results—provided always that they are not made at random. To express oneself it is necessary to have a self to express; and a self implies ideas as well as impulses. It is not enough to use the brush boldly and then try which way up the picture will look worst.

The appeal to experiment represents the true humility of the scientific worker and does not throw scorn, as the extremists are wont to do, upon the results of accumulated experience. At the other extreme stands the dogmatist who holds to the truth of which he is convinced, and will not budge though he stand alone against the world. Anyone who believes in an absolute distinction between good and evil and who is thoroughly convinced of the truth of his own insight into goodness, may well think it better that the social order should dissolve than that he should be false to his belief. All one can say is that he should make sure that his conviction is well founded. Usually, I fear, there may be something to be said on the other hand which he has not taken into account. And yet almost everyone, perhaps, will draw the moral line somewhere, and say with Stevenson's young man that there are some things he cannot do and other things he will not stand. When that line is crossed he should refuse to obey the State or Church which enjoins him to act in a way plainly conflicting with what he holds to be his imperative duty. Of course, he should be prepared to suffer martyrdom for his belief, remembering that the martyrs of one generation have sometimes been the prophets of the next.

III.

I have touched very hurriedly on a variety of topics and tried to give each side its due. But certain results seem to emerge, and I will try to state them succintly.

(1) The authority ascribed to any man or organization of men derivative, dependent on the value seen or represented. And is problematic, because there is never complete proof that any man or organization has perfect insight into the values concerned. This holds even of a man's own conscience. It is authoritative not as *his*, but because it gives him his most direct insight into what is good. The duty to enlighten one's conscience stands logically behind every particular duty.

(2) A varying measure of this problematic authority is possessed by the consensus of experts, by the Church and the State, and by other associations.

(3) Discrepancies arise between this so-called external authority and the so-called internal authority of the individual reason, conscience, and artistic appreciation. On the whole the former represents the accumulated result of past experience, and forms the conservative factor in life; the ideal factor is more prominent in the latter. Neither should be submerged in the other in any social or intellectual order which we can foresee. But their interaction should not be mere antagonism. In science this is universally recognized. Old theories are being constantly re-tested by individual investigators, and in consequence the scientific tradition never stands still. In politics also it is often admitted. For a century and more the Liberal State has been trying to carry the people along with it and to become what it claims to be, but never fully is, an expression of the 'general will.' It is of the very essence of the Church which seeks to bring enlightenment and health to the soul of man and to raise him to the highest level which he is capable of reaching. But it is sometimes forgotten: as when a dual standard of morality is set up for different classes of men, or when duties are formulated and enforced as things to be done apart from any understanding of their ground and meaning.

(4) Almost every new truth, and most improvements in morals as well as every fresh creation in art, have been due to individual genius or insight. They then enter into the intellectual or ethical or artistic tradition of the community. It is a tragedy if, in the next generation, they become through their very success a restraint on the free movement of the human spirit towards still higher achievements.

THE SCOPE OF AUTHORITY IN THE SPHERE OF RELIGION

By the Rev. A. C. Bouquet, D.D., Vicar of All Saints, Cambridge.

AS commonly conceived the scope of authority in Religio is a variable, dependent upon the definition of the tw terms 'authority' and 'religion.' If we call these two latte respectively X and Y and denote the scope by the letter S, w may then write the formula $S \propto XY$, the value of S being deter mined by the fluctuating value of X and Y. Obviously almos everything in our discussion will depend upon the definitio of Religion. I propose to begin by giving the term its wides possible meaning, and to call it the definition of reality an of 'the total reaction proper on the part of the human specie to the whole of reality.' Enquiry naturally follows as to ho this proper reaction is to be evaluated. If by the rational pro cesses of trial and error, of experiment and deduction, then i may be that to a very great extent each separate human indi vidual must be his or her own authority, and indeed some woul say that since the approach of individuals to Religion varie greatly, people get on very well in such matters without an external authority at all. First-hand religious experience i what really matters.[1] There will be others, however, who, whil still adhering to the rational method of approach, feel that i is an unnecessary waste of time for each individual to cove the same path of trial[2] and error, and therefore that it is bette

[1] See Eddington, Swarthmore Lecture, p. 53.

[2] The following passage from Keyserling's new book, *The Recovery of Truth*, seems to me sufficiently interesting to be worth putting in a foot-note:—'The Church fulfils the same function as does tradition in the profane field: that is, it saves the individual the trouble of beginning over again; it supplies him from the outset with the living spiritual heritage. Furthermore, it preserves this heritage, as a homogeneous organism, from dispersal. These two functions, far from being insignificant, are immensely important. Not every man is able to rediscover by himself what his fore-bears found out; at any rate time would be lost in the process. Nor is every man inventive or even profound. Thus, thanks to existing authori-tative traditions—and here is the true root of the idea of authority—even those can participate in the most profound truths who cannot even person-ally understand them; truth then, nevertheless, bears fruit to the uncon-

hat there should be some specialists who can guide the general-y of mankind by their knowledge of its accumulated religious xperience. Such specialists would have the same kind of uthority as the expert in medicine, chemistry or physics, and heir pupils while accepting their authority would still feel ound, in order to obtain a grip of their subject, to test the con-lusions of the expert by first-hand experiment and even to en-age in independent research.

So far, however, we have been proceeding on the assumption hat knowledge in religious matters is attainable by processes kin to those by which knowledge is attained in physical or ental science. We have assumed in fact that complete know-dge as to the proper reaction of the human species to the whole f reality is a matter determinable by ordinary research. Now his of course is precisely the point which is most of all in dis-ute. Exponents of Religion usually maintain that the nature f reality renders it inconceivable that our proper reaction to it hould be determinable by purely rational processes. Reason ay carry us a large part of the way, but sooner or later we come o discriminate 'an element of utterly beyondness' which, if not ontrary to reason, is at any rate vastly beyond reason. The ature of our proper reaction to reality must therefore they say e determinable by intuition, and this intuition is only possessed n a high degree by a limited number of persons, commonly alled Prophets, whose special function is quite as clearly de-ned and as easily recognizable as that of the born healer, musi-ian, poet, or statesman. It may be that nearly all human beings

cious souls. On the other hand, traditional ties do not rob any man of he possibility of deciding for himself. In principle every man can at very moment throw off any tie; if he cannot, his freedom did not amount o much. For freedom takes effect under any circumstances from a given asis. Now the wisdom of milleniums is always wiser than all individual nowledge and achievements except those which surpass the ordinary. nd if there is no established tradition, then no one ever gets beyond the rimary stage. Precisely the second function, however—the preservation f the spiritual heritage from dispersal—has proved again and again hroughout the ages to be of the utmost importance. It is only owing to he Church that inferior doctrines did not gain the upper hand again and gain—for the man in the street is decidedly in favour of inferior pro-ucts . . . As long as there is such a thing as the Church, what we have vritten about her holds good even where she is seen to be far from ful-lling all the demands which can be reasonably made.'

experience moments of prophecy, just as there are few hum beings who have never tried at some time or other to expre themselves poetically, but the gift in a high degree is rare, ar those who possess it are clearly endowed with it in order th they may act as interpreters to mankind of the nature of reali and the proper reaction of mankind towards it.

But there is yet a further stage to be considered. The pr phetic intuition almost unanimously declares that reality is acti and not merely passive or neutral. If the human species h duties towards reality, there is also in reality that element whi maintains a positive attitude towards the human species. Th is commonly expressed by saying that Religion in its reaction reality becomes aware of a quasi-personal element which agrees to call deity, and that just as man desires to approach an discover deity, so deity desires to approach and reveal itself the human species. Now it will be plain if this is correct th there will be some prophets who will not only possess authorit as experts of profound religious insight, but there will also b some who in addition have become recipients of the self-revela tion of deity; and finally we reach the apex of the whole scheme when in the person of a supremely great prophet we find pro found insight and revelation present with such unique intensit that it seems as though in this concrete historical instance w have the essential truth about reality presented in such a manne that whatever other truths about reality may subsequently com to be known, this particular truth has features which render i final, normative, decisive, and absolute. Otto you will remem ber sums up this situation in the pregnant phrase: 'Solch ei Mensch ist mehr als Prophet, er ist der Sohn.' Prophecy thu throws light on what is meant by Incarnation.[3]

If we now go back to our formula you will see I think tha the value of S steadily expands with the value given to X an Y in the preceding paragraphs. If Y be the definition of th nature of reality arrived at by discovery, X will be comparativel small, but larger than it would be if Y were simply the immedi ate and independent apprehension of reality on the part of number of solitary individuals. If, however, Y be the definitio of the nature of reality and of our proper reaction towards i

[3] *cf.* M. C. Burkitt, *Modern Churchman*, August 1929, p. 270.

given by the prophet of supreme authority, then X will be proportionately large, and under such conditions it may well be maintained that the scope of authority in Religion is so wide as to leave little room for any other element. This, I presume, is not an unfair rendering of the position maintained within the limits of Christianity by both Catholics and Protestants of the traditional type. The historical Jesus for such is definitely τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, and the corporate society sprung from His loins and the sacred writings produced by His disciples possess such weight that the best we can do is to listen in patient humility to what they have to teach.

Unfortunately the three authorities in question are thought to have been found fallible in certain matters in which their competency can be tested. The historical Jesus is plainly human, and it is doubtful whether He was not at any rate to some extent eschatologically limited in His outlook. The infallibility of the Church in matters open to human reason disappears on inquiry; while the corpus of sacred writings proves to be very much like any other collection of literary documents, not in any wise exempt from errors due to the human infirmity of compiler and scribe. It is therefore no wonder that at the present day we find a reaction against the authoritarian approach to religion so serious that it carries us back not merely to the fairly moderate middle position in which there are held to exist a certain number of religious experts of a rational sort, whose word is to be trusted, but even further still, back to the position of those who say that each must make his religion for himself, and that no authority exists at all. $X = O$ and therefore also $= O$. Possibly there may be something to be said for the latter position where the standard of general education is high and where a good deal of grounding in the traditions of religion has been given at an early age, but it still remains a question whether authority as such in the sense of the surrender of an individual to some power outside himself, yet still within the human sphere, ought not to have a place as a permanent element in Religion. I think myself that it ought, and that the fallibility in certain particulars of the historical Jesus, His church and book, does not deprive them of the respect due to them in their own proper sphere. If they have seemed to fail us at certain

points, it is because we have looked to them for guidance questions where they are not able to give it, such as those history and science, rather than in questions relating to religio and ethical values and the character of the deity who guarante them.

I have chosen the word 'surrender' deliberately. Wheth I am right or wrong will depend upon a consideration of wh authority means, and to that we must next turn our attention.

The word 'authority' plainly derives from the Latin wor 'auctoritas,' which is the equivalent in translation of the Gree *ἐξουσία*. 'Auctoritas,' one supposes, is the power or influenc wielded by an 'auctor,' someone who creatively adds to the su total of human knowledge or experience, or who increases c enriches the welfare or nobility of human life. From this th word also comes to be used of any kind of power or influence b which control over the lives of others is exercised. An indi vidual, however, having authority must either himself be a 'auctor' or derive power from someone else who is an 'auctor. In either case the possession of 'auctoritas' implies the posses sion of power (Greek *ἐξουσία*) enabling the individual to contro the actions (mental or physical) of others. The Greek term *ἐξουσί* is related to the impersonal verb *ἔξεστι* (governing the dative which means 'it is permitted or allowed,' or 'it is in one's powe to do something.' The meaning I take it is best discovered from the first syllable, which suggests that the power or permission is something immediately deriving from the person who gives the *ἐξουσία*. If therefore a person possesses *ἐξουσία*, it must mean either that he has got it from somewhere inside himself, or that he has received it directly or indirectly from someone else who is the actual source in which it resides. It has been pointed out by Reitzenstein that in Hellenistic Greek *ἐξουσία* in a reli gious context denoted the idea of a combination of supernatural power with supernatural authority to teach. This is the sense in which it is used in the famous synoptic description of the teach ing of Jesus:

ἦν γὰρ διδάσκων . . . . ὡς ἐξουσίαν ἔχων.

It is worth noting that in English the word 'authority' is defined in a modern dictionary as 'legitimate power to command

r act, power, weight, influence derived from character, testi-
ony, credibility, standard of reference, an expert, entitled to
peak with authority.' From this, if not from the discussions in
hich we have already been engaged this week, it will probably
ave become clear that authority is not of one but of several
inds, and that in the sphere of Religion we have to consider a
umber of quite different elements equally entitled to bear the
ame of ἐξουσία. Thus for example assent to objective truth is
ot the same thing as surrender to a more or less arbitrary by-
w for purposes of convenience. Yet both assent and surrender
re equally instances of obedience to an authority. We might
e quite ready to concede the right of the prophet to be heard
ith reverent attention, especially if he seemed to have some-
ing new to tell us, but we might equally reject the claim of
e priest to impose rules and regulations for the moral and cere-
onial conduct of the community; or conversely we might say
at the power to make such (temporary) rules and regulations
as necessary on account of the naturally disorderly character
f mankind and that the power of government had been trans-
itted to an orderly succession of religious officials, but we
ight reject the claim of the Prophet to be heard, on the ground
at the deposit of faith had been once and for all delivered and
at nothing new could be added to it. Anything new could not
e true, or if true it could not be new.

A convenient analysis of the relation of freedom to authority
as recently made by Professor Runestam of Lund, at a con-
erence between Lutheran and Anglican divines. He there dis-
inguished between (1) freedom as mere licence and indiffer-
nce, (2) freedom as a right and as self-realization, and (3) free-
om as the deeper self-realization resulting from subjection to
n authority.

The modern world is frankly in favour of the second sort
f freedom, and it is so sure of the importance of self-realization
at it is prepared to risk the dangers of licence. The success of
mpirical science seems to it to have been due to the liberty given
o individuals to make an unfettered use of the methods of trial
nd error. The result of this is that in modern educational cir-
les, to quote the words of the late Professor Bury, 'Distrust
hy father and mother is the first commandment with pro-

mise.'[4] We have already observed that there is some reason f doubting the entire efficacy of this method, since if pressed its logical conclusion it involves a considerable waste of tim and also an unnecessary contempt for experience, but there I think a moderate use of it which is less open to criticism, which the experience of the past is tested before being final accepted. This is after all reasonable. What the modern worl refuses to do is to take the experience in question and swallow whole without scrutiny or test as to its value. At least this what the modern world says, but I am afraid that in practice is not always so scrupulous. When once a person or an institu tion has captured the attention of the crowd, it is surprisin what nonsense may be set forth by that popularly constitute authority almost without a murmur.

I think I must insist at this point on *the surrender o autonomy* as an element, a measure of which really does seen to me to be involved as a common feature in the acceptance c some of the different kinds of authority. Let us examine th nature of this alleged surrender. First of all, it is only possibl when there is some other being within range of communicatio to whom the surrender can be made. Alexander Selkirk on hi desert island might very well say, 'I am monarch of all I sur vey, my right there is none to dispute.' But then if he was reall alone, there could be no suggestion of competence about hi monarchy. Even supposing him to have been ignorant an foolish, and lacking in natural talent, he had to be his ow authority in the ordering of his own life. Nevertheless at th moment of shipwreck, unless we can assume him to have suf fered complete loss of memory, he would still have had in his possession stored up a certain amount of authority transmitte to him from others in his pre-shipwreck days on which he coul depend for guidance. He would in fact in a number of case have made no independent decision, but would have contente himself with the resolve to act on the authority of someone else and if the possessor of a wireless set could have taken instruc tions from a distance; and further, if and when deciding to act in accordance with what he might have called the dictates of his own conscience, or the guidance of the inner light, he would still

[4] *A Short History of Freedom of Thought*, p. 251.

ave been relying not upon himself but upon the spark of ivinity within him, and so would really be making an internal urrender to an inward authority. (Or should we say 'to a transendent authority making itself felt within him'?) The question ould then arise, 'Was there any moment in which his autonomy as complete, or was he acting under the influence of the Divine pirit even in those moments when he seemed most himself?' o deny him even the merest vestige of autonomy would seem to and us in pantheism, and yet there are some thinkers who seem o imagine that the attempt to discover an autonomous moment n the life of Alexander Selkirk is equivalent to the proverbial eeling of the onion.

It appears next that the surrender of autonomy may be of wo kinds, first surrender as between equals, and secondly surender as between superior and inferior. (1) Of the former kind e may take as an instance the direction of traffic by a policeman. Policemen are not usually men of superior intelligence, ut good average common-sense individuals, and one imagines hat any other average individual could very quickly learn to dminister the rules for directing traffic as well as they do. We urrender to the authority of the policeman for the sake of conenience, and our surrender makes for freedom of movement, ince to reject such authority would only end in a mere tangle of he traffic. Now if the practice of religious belief once be found ustified, it is quite evident that in any fellowship or society of uman beings founded for religious purposes a certain amount f authority of this kind is inevitable as well as beneficial. It is ot necessary that the minister of religion should be a person of xtremely superior intelligence and education in order that he ay conduct a religious service with decency and order or decide hat persons may properly be admitted to baptism, confirmation nd communion, or who may preach. A modicum of commonense, sympathy, and homely experience, together with a clear grasp of a few simple principles, is what is needed here. (2) The econd kind of surrender is rather more difficult to discuss. It sually means surrender to an expert. It is assumed for instance hat lawyers and doctors, unless they are misfits in their profesions, will have become lawyers and doctors in virtue of a natural ent leading them to undergo a course of special training which

has ended by making them authorities in certain subjects which are not studied in detail by the great majority of civilians.

Let us next consider the conditions which induce individuals to surrender their autonomy. In *theory* there seem to be three conditions of surrender:

1. Danger.
2. Conflicting claims and the necessity for order.
3. The division of functions for the purposes of saving time and increasing individual efficiency by specialization.

All that is asked is satisfactory evidence that the person or persons to whom the surrender is made is competent to receive it and knows what he is about, and security that such persons if appointed shall be removable if they are found to have forfeited confidence or to have shown incapacity.

In *practice* the surrender is not always made on these rational grounds, but sometimes for other reasons.

1. Force majeure. Authority develops from seizure of power by some person or persons (not always malevolent) who impose their authority sometimes by force (generally making itself felt in the form of physical coercion, but sometimes in an appeal to the numinous or supernatural), and sometimes by superior intelligence enabling the person in authority to retain control either by wider knowledge, skill in finance, or astuteness of diplomacy. The early history of the development of the power of the Papacy seems to furnish a good instance of this. The Bishops of Rome were the residuary legatees of a certain defunct temporal authority, and they acquired prestige partly because the barbarian invaders felt them to be socially superior and probably were not a little afraid of them as medicine-men.

2. Secondly, surrender may be made from fear or panic. Italy gladly surrendered to Mussolini from fear of a red anarchy, and it may be that some will always prefer an absolute Church government because it lulls them into a sense of security.

3. Or again, the surrender may be due to inertia or to the slackening of fibre, or to the disorders caused by revolution.

4. In some cases the surrender is customary, traditional or instinctive, as when younger members of a family submit to the authority of its natural head. The authority of merely having

ved long enough or of having lived longer than other persons of a simple kind and presupposes no exceptional gifts, but erely mature strength and the possession of knowledge which n only be gained by the experience of living, such as hunting, owing corn, building a hut, making tools, or studying the orkings of the divine providence.

'I have lived, seen God's hand through a lifetime, and all was for best.'

In simple matters, decisions carrying authority may be made we have seen by persons of average intelligence. In such ses the range of selection is fairly wide, since experience of an erage type is all that is needed, and it is usually gained by mply living long enough. There are, however, complex mat-rs in which as we have also seen professional training of a ghly specialized sort is needed, and then the selection is more nited. Even then such training without certain added gifts of ersonality does not always fit an individual to be entrusted with thority, or entitle him to wield it.

The exercise of authority involves a variety of functions, ost of which have already been casually noticed but which we ay classify as follows: (1) Giving orders. (2) Organizing. 3) Making decisions in matters where special knowledge not ailable to the ordinary individual is needed. (4) Dispensing jects of value otherwise liable to misuse, and (5) Acting as the ent or interpreter of Deity, or, if we prefer it, acting as inter-eter of the meaning and purpose of life.

Is there any test as to the limits of surrender? It is hard to y. Much judgment is needed in order to decide when it is ght to yield one's personality into the keeping of another. The le enunciated by Höffding is a vital one, when he says, 'The inciple of authority is subject to the principle of personality: thority can never be an end, only the means to an end.' As tween equals, it is fairly easy to agree upon surrender for ere convenience sake. We have already seen that in order to ve time and trouble and to free ourselves for other tasks we ree to accept the authority of others every day of our lives, d to submit to policemen, chauffeurs, tailors, hair-dressers, nibus conductors, railway guards, and the like. As between periors and inferiors, decisions are much more difficult, and

in any case it appears as though the willingness to yield one's personality into the keeping of another varies to some extent according to race. It is said that autonomy of the individual is more greatly desired among Nordics than among Iberians or Alpines.

The process of selecting the right person or persons to whom surrender should be made is both subtle and complicated. A competent authority may be defended in a right as well as a wrong way. Sometimes it may be buttressed by an aetiological myth or series of myths, yet it may still be a competent and necessary authority. (The myth may be thought useful, as appealing to the uneducated mind.) Sometimes, on the contrary, an authority which is intrinsically worthless may yet be theoretically competent, and the reasons given in its defence may appear on the surface to be entirely convincing.

I think we are now in a better position to discuss this vexed question of 'surrender.' In a number of matters in community life a large liberty may be possible and even desirable in the ordering of the lives of individuals. For example, while it may be necessary to insist that everyone building a house in the streets of a town shall conform to the building-line in those streets, on the other hand, apart from traditional customs now almost obsolete except in some Continental villages, the community imposes no obligation upon all ordinary citizens to wear uniform clothing or to cut their hair in the same way. Variety is permissible in matters which do not endanger the life or health of citizens. On the other hand, although what is called the right of private judgment may be taken to signify the right of the individual to make a fool of himself if he likes in matters which do not endanger the safety of the body politic, nevertheless it means a good deal more, because it implies an act of faith that the individual if left to himself may be trusted, provided that he is sane and normal, to arrive at a conclusion which is capable of standing such tests as are commonly applied to establish the correctness of any knowledge which we possess about anything. I do not feel myself capable of putting this point better than it has been put recently by Canon Quick:

> 'If my reason and conscience convince me that a thing is true my judgment is in principle no more "private" than it is when I assent

to some chain of mathematical reasoning as correct. In both cases it is subjective in the sense that it is *my* reason which accepts or affirms the truth. But it is the same acceptance by my reason which can alone assure me that the truth is objective and authoritative for all. The term "private" should be reserved for those judgments which do not claim to assert a truth binding upon others. The whole principle of the unity of truth requires the axiom or postulate that reason and conscience are not merely private faculties, but represent the embodiment in the individual of universal laws, of truth and goodness, which are the common basis of authority and of freedom.'

The gist of this seems to be that where you are assenting to some universal objective truth as the result of conviction, you are *not surrendering your liberty but increasing your freedom*, since your assent with your full intelligence to a universal objective truth enlarges the scope of your powers. It is not a universal objective truth that all men must have their hair cut the same way (except perhaps in the Army, where it becomes one of a number of details which actually contribute to efficiency, mobility, and freedom of action). Matters of civilian dress are consequently real matters for private judgment, and for the civilian to adopt some conventional device, such as pink silk stockings, is a real surrender of individual liberty. But it is not a surrender of individual liberty as a result of investigation to agree that twenty-nine is a prime number, or that water is compounded of oxygen and hydrogen in a ratio which appears to be the same for any part of the universe within the range of scientific observers situated upon this planet, or again that the properties of calcium in the solar chromosphere are identical with its properties as revealed in the blowpipe flame of a school laboratory. Nor is it a surrender of individual liberty to accept a judge's opinion on a point of law, if his interpretation is correct, or to accept the correct diagnosis of a physician in a case of disease, because in these instances there is only one right solution. This of course is the real argument for religious orthodoxy, for if it once be assumed that objective religious truth of an absolute character exists, assent to it must involve not loss of liberty, but actual access to a richer life, and greater ease of movement. As against this, surrender to a convention such as the wearing of stockings of a particular colour (a matter in which more than one legitimate line of conduct is possible) is a real surrender. In actual fact, strangely enough, it would seem that the right

of individuals to cut their hair differently depends upon gener assent, not to a convention, but rather to a universal objectiv truth, *i.e.* that for civilians variety in this particular matter ough to be permitted because it suits the style of each individual. W are driven, therefore, I think, to agree once again with Canc Quick when he says that there can be no ultimate conflict be tween authority and freedom as such, for the two are not an tagonistic but complementary or correlative. Freedom is no blind anarchy, but ordered liberty. The theoretic problem, a he says, consists not in relating authority to freedom, but in re lating different authorities to one another, and in particular, th general authority of reason to (1) the particular authority of special revelation which one prophet or visible society exists t proclaim, (2) the more debatable particular authorities whic lay down rules or conventions governing the social behaviour o individuals.

And now we arrive at the central point of our discussion We observed, you may remember, that in Religion the mos vital and important species of authority was wielded by th prophet, the person who spoke forth from his own internal con sciousness convincing truths about the meaning of life, th nature of reality, and the proper reaction of human beings t that reality. A useful analysis has recently been made by Dr Erik Fascher[5] as to the meaning of the term 'prophet.' I wil not trouble you here with the details of it, but it is desirable t mention a few points. Tracing the use of the word in Greek literature, he points out that in Pindar it plainly means the spokesman of Zeus. In Aeschylus, although the commoner word is *μάντις*, nevertheless *μάντις* and *προφήτης* are often sy nonymous, and *μάντις* means the person who declares the will of the Deity. In Euripides the use is much the same, but Plato distinguishes between the *μάντις* to whom judgment is impos sible, and the *προφήτης* who is *κρίνων*, and who is able to *inter pret μαντευομένα*. Diodorus describes history as the *προφήτις*, or the imparter or interpreter of truth, and Plutarch speaks of the prophets of Epicurus, that is to say the imparters of the teaching of Epicurus. In Dion Chrysostom the prophets are those who

[5] ΠΡΟΘΗΤΗΣ, eine sprach—und religion geschichtliche Untersuchung. Giessen, 1927.

xpress the intention of the Deity, and Lucian speaks of Dio-enes as the prophet of ἀληθεία. In the inscriptions, μάντις and προφήτης are the same, and γόης, or false prophet, occurs for the rst time in one of them. Although in most temples the prophet nd priest were distinct, yet at Miletus we have a ἱερεύς de-cribed as a προφήτης. The verb corresponding to the noun neans 'to speak in the name of a god and to reveal secrets.' Among the Greeks the prophet, however, mostly gave special nswers to special people, and although the Hebrew prophets ften did this as well, nevertheless Hebrew prophecy at its best perated on a far grander scale. The Hebrew nâbi in the LXX s translated προφήτης, but this Greek is κοινὴ and not specially . Jewish Greek dialect. Fascher argues that προφήτης is pro-ably taken over from current Egyptian language as the title iven to temple officials who were learned in the sacred books nd had to decide problems for enquirers. He further draws n distinction between the seer and the prophet, which re-embles Plato's distinction between the μάντις and the προφήτης. n the seer he says that the intuitive element predominates, in he prophet the reflective. It will suffice, however, for purposes f convenience if we here take the term προφήτης to cover the unctions of both, since whether the prophet's utterances pro-ceed from intuition, or from intuition plus reflection, the thing hat matters is that they *must* be forthtold: 'My heart was hot within me, and while I was thus musing the fire kindled and at he last I spake with my tongue.' Leaving Christology for the moment entirely on one side, it is a matter entirely beyond dis-pute that the earliest sources for the life of Jesus represent Him n the guise of prophet. He is 'a great prophet risen up among us,' 'the Prophet of Nazareth in Galilee,' 'a prophet mighty in deed and word,' and it is noticeable that this title is accepted for Him even by the writer of the Fourth Gospel. He is at the end of the direct line of religious geniuses which opens with such men as Amos and the prophetic editors of Hebrew history whose immortal aphorisms such as 'to obey is better than sacri-fice and to hearken than the fat of rams,' and 'the Lord seeth not as man seeth, for man looketh on the outward appearance, but the Lord looketh on the heart,' can never be forgotten. His spirit has descended upon a succession of Christian prophets whose

utterances have a quality and directness to be found nowhere else in human literature. As Matthew Arnold truly says, Jesus came 'to open out the choked-up wells of human intuition.' He was (to quote another writer) 'a prophet of universal faith appealing for the validity of His message to the instincts of man's deepest nature, which He interprets to man. Hence His unique authority. As in the case of no one else, His teaching corresponds with men's universal experience.' This is the reason why essential Christianity is Religion and not *a* religion.[6] Human intuition is feeble and choked without the power of the Spirit of Christ to open it up. There is a real sense in which every spirit must confess Jesus as Lord, or be condemned as a spirit of error.

The problem before us then is the nature of prophetic authority. Without the prophet the problem of religious authority becomes the same as the problem (let us say) of authority in medical science. Religion would in this case seem to be little more than 'applied philosophy.' But the element of prophetic intuition or of prophetic reflective interpretation of life claims to furnish a higher source of vital and ultimate truth than mere inductive reasoning.

The problem of the scope of authority in religion, without this special question of the claims of the prophet, would obviously be very much simplified. Few would deny the right of the expert to guide the beliefs of the generality of mankind towards the acceptance of universal objective truth in matters of pure inductive reasoning. It is the claim of the prophet to obtain his knowledge as it were by a short cut which raises the specially serious problem of religious authority. Not only do the voices of the prophets occasionally seem to contradict one another, but there is a reluctance on the part of a number of persons to accept statements about the nature of reality as true which cannot be proved by scientific experiment or even rendered probable by deductions from available data. Yet it must be admitted that the most distinctive type of authority in religious circles is precisely that of the expert who tells you that he *knows*, because it has been revealed to his inner consciousness that certain things are

[6] It is this which gives Quakerism its power and promise. A non-Christian meeting conducted on Quaker lines would have far less chance of success than one which acknowledged as its first principle the leadership of the living Jesus.

o. Without the prophet religion is shorn of its distinctive eature. It is true that the religious community contains within persons who can substantiate their claim to be the interpreters f the prophets, the historians of the prophets, the synthesisers f the prophets, the conservators of the prophetic experience, ne organizers of the community which accepts that experience s the basis of conduct, the exponents of the art of living as ased upon the principles taught by the prophet (including, if erviceable, both cultus and sacraments); but it will be evident nat the authority of all these persons is not immediate but merely erived authority, and goes back ultimately to the prophets nemselves or, it may be, to the one supreme prophet who spoke s never man spake. Without this ultimate authority the derived uthority exercised by these lesser individuals crumbles away. Scholars, dogmatists and bishops must ever remember that there ould be no Church to govern, no dogmas to decree, no doc- rine to expound, no scriptures awaiting exegesis, no sacraments o administer, no deposit to guard, without the simple postulate Jesus Christ is from God.' Christianity came into the world ot as the assertion that man was searching for God, but as the declaration that God was searching for man. The Christian iew of the universe involves inevitably the belief in what has been called 'The Divine Initiative.'

Our subject, therefore (as it seems to me), outlines itself as nvolving three main questions:

1. What may we justly believe about the nature and validity of the prophetic authority?
2. What is the position in our scheme properly to be assigned to a new prophet?
3. What is the relation of the prophet to the State?

I must needs try to give some answer to each of these questions, and if I have to be rather positive in my statements, you must believe that it is from no desire to be unreasonably dogmatic, but simply because brevity is necessary and also because I wish to stimulate discussion. (1) The problem of the nature of prophetic authority resolves itself more or less into the consideration of a theory of intuition, whether Bergson's or someone else's matters little. In this assembly I need hardly

digress to give an account of such, but the gist of any theor is I suppose that in all knowledge there is a certain elemer at times of 'givenness,' proceeding from the fact that beside the rational element of knowledge which develops as the resu of trial and error, or as we say of putting two and two togethe there is also the element of intuition which in the lower organ isms may seem only fit to be described as blind instinct, but i the more complex beings is found worthy of a higher nam as intuition or even inspiration. Someone has said 'Textua emendation is an inspiration.' Poincaré is quoted as havin said something of the same sort about the solution of mathe matical problems. Diagnosis as undertaken by a talented phy sician is fraught with a certain element of 'givenness.' Th nature of this element is hard to define, but it seems to be crea tive and originative rather than rational and reflective. In on person it may lead to the production of works of art, in anothe to innovations in the craft of healing, in another to mechanica invention, in yet another to the rearing of children and the train ing of character, while in some special cases it occupies itsel with the contemplation of reality, and desires to interpret realiti to the rest of the human species. In proportion as such effort are sincere and worthy the exponent of religion may justly claim to possess the authority of an expert in the interpretation of life and its meaning taken as a whole, but not necessarily the author ity of an expert in matters of detail, such for example as motor engineering. Nevertheless, religion is so much bound up with a wholeness of view on the subject of human life that the pro phet has often something valuable to say about the details o life as well as about the whole of it. On the other hand, the prophet may sometimes suffer from the weakness of all specialists, that is, he may be unpractical in matters of detail and occasionally subject to nervous or other disease as the penalty of his peculiar genius. The prophet is not always particularly good at taking care of himself, and may need a strong and competent wife or even a protective friend of the type of Theodore Watts-Dunton. He is perhaps no better and no worse than the college dons described by Cecil Rhodes with more candour than kindness. The intuitions of the seer rather more than the interpretative reflections of the prophet need the integration and cen-

worship of the calm intelligence of the philosopher-theologian, who proceeds to the discovery of deity by more pedestrian methods. The prophet par excellence, however, is free from these weaknesses, and has a calm and sane judgment coupled with profound intuition, being endowed in addition with heroic virtue.

The Roman Church, as might be expected, has quite a definite and clear-cut theory as to the nature of prophetic authority. She draws a distinction between universal revelation and private revelations. The former are contained in the Bible and in the deposit of the apostolic tradition, the latter have only a probable and not indubitable authority. Rome, however, being well aware that the genesis of universal revelation was itself a number of private revelations, is careful to provide a place for private judgment in excelsis. She admits that the highest wisdom may come as a divine revelation to an individual, and on sufficient evidence she will declare that individual to be a Saint, and 'a Saint,' remarks Bernard Shaw, 'may be defined as a person of heroic virtue whose private judgment is privileged,'[7] and who therefore may be treated as having higher authority than that of the ordinary religious person. To sum up then, on the first question, it seems clear that if we accept the proposition, 'There is such a thing as immediate religious experience which is valid,' we have no serious justification for refusing to accept the further proposition that the same kind of experience in an intensified form is also valid. If, however, we doubt the validity of immediate religious experience of any kind, then it will obviously be hopeless to expect us to grant the validity of the authority of any prophet, however wise and good he may seem. We shall simply think of him as a person who may be virtuous and well-intentioned, according to human standards, but nevertheless misguided, a γόης, in fact. You will hardly expect me to engage in a study of the validity of religious experience taken as a whole, and I must therefore leave this first question by merely stating the dilemma in which we put ourselves if we decide against that validity, and remarking that of course the validity of any special piece of experience depends upon its coherence with the general scheme of our ideas and upon the way in which it is authenti-

[7] *St. Joan,* Introduction.

cated by the faculties of normal persons to whom it is imparted. Such coherence and self-authentication we know to be marks of the prophetic teaching of Christ. Let us assume that we accept this position, and pass on to the second question: (2) What place is to be assigned to the *new* prophet?

In any branch of the natural sciences it is commonly assumed that from time to time perfectly new knowledge will come to light, but this knowledge will not be new in the sense that it did not exist before the human species became aware of it. For example, the planet Neptune was not created by the astronomers upon the earth who discovered its existence; they merely became aware of the planet as an objective reality. On the other hand the discovery of the laws (so-called), already existing, by which organic life breeds and develops, have actually enabled human beings to control that life to some extent, and so apparently to create new forms of it. The study of botany and the discoveries of the Abbot Mendel have enabled nursery gardeners to breed entirely new species of flowers, really new, in the sense that so far as we know they have not previously existed on this earth. That is to say, it has become evident that man is able to acquire knowledge actually empowering him to bring into existence combinations of matter which have not previously existed, but which are certainly *new* as much as anything can ever be called new. So startling are some of these inventions that he is tempted to speculate whether there be any field of activity, in which he is wont to engage, in which novelty is impossible, and he doubts whether a world which seems to be so full of flux and change can contain any entity such as an unchangeable deity (though it may be objected that without an unchangeable background we could not detect an element of changeableness in the world). Even if man does not go so far as this, he hesitates to suppose that a race of beings which he is told may still be inhabiting this planet a million million years hence can have really found out already all that there is to be known about the Deity, assuming His existence. There may be more religious discovery ahead, if not more religious revelation. He is therefore inclined to predict the appearance of other new prophets, and he thinks that he already sees some of them at work. If their prophesyings seem to conflict with the previous experiences of

ast prophets, are they therefore necessarily to be condemned? t may be, he says, that the discovery of deity by man is progressive, and that even among the prophets finality is not to be looked for any more than among the physicists. As far as this conference is concerned it seems to me that the liberal answer to his question was supplied last year, especially in one paper, of which it may be said that it is surprising how little attention has been attracted by its statements. [8] Let me just quote three of them.

> 'Can we say that it is impossible that somewhere and somewhen there should live another man who would do as much for the world, and be as much to it, as Jesus? I see no ground on which it can be called impossible.'
>
> 'An idea of Incarnation which rigidly limits it to one instance is, in its foundation and its consequence, sceptical and pessimistic, seeking in the abnormal what is found incredible of the normal.'
>
> 'At all events one thing is clear; if such an Incarnation were again to be, it would not be again the Great Figure of Galilee, for it would no longer be the world of Galilee.'

Keyserling in his recent book, *The Recovery of Truth*, goes somewhat further than this when he says:

> 'Christian wisdom will not be lost: it will be lost as little as any prechristian wisdom was ever lost. But it will, exactly like the wisdom of antiquity in the Christian era, recede in a steadily increasing measure, and to an increasing degree, from explicitness towards implicitness, and insert itself as a partial expression into a new higher synthesis.'

I have made these quotations for the sake of fairness, and not because I necessarily agree with their conclusion. It would be unscientific to deny the possibility of what they suggest, but the evidence seems to point to its being unlikely to occur. If anything has emerged from the comparative study of religions it is that the great period of discovery and revelation, of the questioning of life as to its fundamental meaning and the finding of the religious answer, which roughly corresponds with a period stretching from 800 B.C. to 300 A.D., is not likely to repeat itself. Of course our position as modern churchmen is bound up with the belief that there must be absolute freedom to examine the credentials of this creative period in religion without fear or favour, but I submit that so far the evidence shows

[8] The Rev. J. S. Boys-Smith in the *Modern Churchman*, October 1928, pp. 372 and *ff*, on 'The Significance of the Historical Element in the Christian Idea of Incarnation.'

that it is extremely unlikely that any new religion of importance will arise, and that the common world faith of the future is likely to be a simplified (*very much* simplified) form of Christianity shorn of many of the dogmas and institutions and even perhaps of some of the historical accessories which have hitherto been considered an indispensable part of it. Even in the event of another ice-age, or the shifting of the anti-cyclonic belt, something would probably be passed on in the process of milleniums from dying cultures to succeeding ones.

Our third question, the relation of the prophet to the State, is one which is apparently to be dealt with on a later occasion this week, so I will not enlarge upon it here, merely contenting myself by saying that I am not what is commonly called an Erastian. Religious authority must, I hold, be ultimately the expert authority of religious persons. I recognize that Caesar also receives his authority ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, but only in the same way that any other craftsman receives his authority, *i.e.* merely because I believe that from God all good counsels and all just works do proceed. I wish to make it clear, however, that I do not regard any single existing Christian denomination as capable of providing by itself such a set of religious experts. Rome cannot, in spite of her vast size. The Anglican Communion has hitherto had a better chance of doing so, but there are still wide fields of valid religious experience of which it knows but little, and if it continues to narrow its doctrinal outlook and so to lower the moral and intellectual standard of those who seek to become its ministers, it will throw away its chance of being a really competent authority.

I ask your patience for a few minutes more while I briefly refer to two other matters.

(1) Even assuming that we accept the validity of the prophetic authority, it appears that human nature is such that it is not enough for it to know the truth as revealed by the prophet. The truth can only effectively operate when it has been appropriated and made part of the habitual life of the race. This of course is the entire and indeed the only justification for the Church system. Everyone realizes that it is extremely difficult to harness society to the service of any objective ideal, however admirable that ideal may be. The Church exists therefore not

ly to declare the truth about reality and the proper reaction of ankind towards it, but also to provide human beings with an vironment and discipline whereby they may be enabled to ake that reaction habitual, and so to make it the basis for nstructing character. This conception of the Church, once it s been grasped, shows us why it must be a society wielding a rtain element of authority. It is a school for the Lord's service o use a phrase of St. Benedict's), and no school for training aracter can exist without some discipline. We may reasonably scuss whether the school should be of the type exemplified by undle under the rule of Sanderson or the extreme opposite. believe that our Church can have, if it will, no small part to ay in restoring tone to the moral fibre of the nation. But it ust know its own mind first. There is a wise saying enshrined the preface to the first Prayer Book of Edward VI and re-ined in all later editions:

> 'Although the keeping or omitting of a ceremony, in itself considered, is but a small thing; yet the wilful and contemptuous transgression and breaking of a common order and discipline is no small offence before God . . . and besides this Christ's Gospel is not a ceremonial law, but it is a religion to serve God . . . in the freedom of the spirit, being content only with those ceremonies which do serve to a decent order and Godly discipline, and such as be apt to stir up the dull mind of man to the remembrance of his duty toward God, by some notable and special signification, whereby he might be edified.'

And here let me observe in parenthesis that the traditional nception of the need of an external authority in religion co-eres with the doctrine of man's fallen estate. Man, it was elieved, had a heart so deceitful and so desperately wicked hat he could neither know nor act rightly in respect of God with-ut an authoritative revelation to light his way and the firm dis-pline of a ruling Church to guide his faltering footsteps. Those f us who to-day find little evidence for a single historic apos-acy, still less for a pre-mundane fall, are prone to minimize the eed for discipline by an almost equally doctrinaire adherence o a belief in the essential goodness of human nature. But this heerful belief is not born out by the facts, which reveal the sad endency of mankind to deteriorate and to fall not once but requently. The need of discipline in the formation of habits oral and religious shows no sign of diminishing, but the discip-ine, to be effective, requires a new type of justification.

It appears to me that these deliberations of ours will be li
better than the fiddlings of Nero, so long as they do not lead
any practical decision on the part of those of us who believe t
the intellectual position of the Church of England is stron
to-day than it has been for many years (a practical decisio
say), to cease from apology for our position, and to insist that
possess an interpretation of life and its duties which deserves
be taken seriously. I am sorry to have to say it, but I do
think that the nation at the moment is disposed to take it as se
ously as it should, and I think it is a bad sign when it is possi
for a quite average and decent ex-service man to be able to s
as one did in my presence the other day (after I had been d
cussing with him a small question of authority in which his o
son, a choir-boy, had been concerned), 'Oh! in the Church
England one can do as one likes!'

Submission to rules may not be as easy to justify as assent
objective truth, but it has its value nevertheless. There is, ho
ever, such a thing as an excessive docility[9] which in the suppos
interests of discipline sacrifices its loyalty to truth. Most of
I expect will feel that loyalty to objective and unassailable tru
requires no permission from any human official, and can be
hibited by none, and we regret the development of the wo
features of the Roman system within what has hitherto deserv
the name of the roomiest Church in Christendom.

And now finally. The method of this essay has been to tr
authority in religion rather from the point of view of the scie
tific student of ethics, and also as a matter of balance and p
portion in the relations of human beings to one another. If, ho
ever, we accept as valid the authority of the experience of c
various types of religious experts, we are ultimately broug
back to the nature and claims of the Great Reality which th
seek to interpret for us; and in the face of that Reality we fi
that our attitude must needs be one in which there is a stro
element of submission. Man is not, as in his moments of ὕβ
he fondly imagines himself to be, the irresponsible artist of l

[9] I have in mind the case of an excellent clergyman of my acquaintan
who continued to read the fourth commandment in full to a large cong
gation of young people, and, when reasoned with, replied that he f
bound to read it thus until he had obtained express leave from the Bisho
not to do so!

own life. It is true that we shall not feel inclined for the most part to adopt the posture of the devout Moslem. We do not believe that the Kingdom of God is a despotism. It is a pity that in our attempt to revise the Prayer Book we have done little to limit the use of the phrase 'Almighty God,' so dear to our Tudor forefathers. Although the idea of God's Fatherhood is the cardinal point in the prophetic revelation of Jesus Christ, it is very largely absent from our public prayers, and especially from almost all the collects.

Now Fatherhood implies obedient co-operation on the part of God's children, and the acceptance of Christian theism as a working faith involves our adoption of a decent attitude of responsibility to a Higher Power. The absence of this sense of responsibility from the lives of many people to-day greatly impoverishes them, and renders them mean and graceless. Christians have no need to apologize for insisting that the reaction proper on the part of the human species to reality is one of citizens of a divine commonwealth, who obediently co-operate with its Ruler in the accomplishment of His rich and varied aims. Such obedient submission is no putting of the soul in shackles. Rather it is the way which the soul finds its true self-realization. No better definition of Deity for our purposes can I believe be found than that which speaks of Him as *Auctor et amator pacis, quem nosse vivere, cui servire regnare.*[10]

[10] The Author and Lover of peace, Whom to know is to live, and Whom to serve is to reign.

THE CHURCH AS A DIVINE INSTITUTION

By the Rev. Alfred Fawkes, Vicar of Ashby St. Ledgers.

A FRIENDLY Bishop who kindly read the proof of th paper said that it would have been more to the point the subject had been 'The Church as a *Human* Institution.' am not sure that he was not right. But alternatives are not alwa exclusive. Things are often 'both,' or 'neither,' or 'somethi between the two.' And perhaps the Jewish doctors who answer our Lord's question as to the baptism of John had a certain jus fication for their evasive reply—'We cannot tell.'

I.

It has been said, and it is a truth of religion that it is s that the Church is a Divine Institution, and coeval with t Divine Purpose in the creation of man. Since there is sin an ignorance throughout mankind, it cannot be realized on eart But it exists, though, as Diotima says of the gods, it does so a way peculiar to itself. It is, that is to say, rather a living an directive idea than a concrete fact: like the pillar of fire whi shone in the desert by night, it led Israel; Israel stood behin The attempt to overtake it is the noblest work to which men ca set their hand: the belief it has been overtaken, or realized concrete shape, is of all beliefs the most mischievous.

'Oh, that way madness lies; let me shun that.'

In the early days of the Oxford Movement a leading mem ber of the old High Church party, Mr. Sikes of Guilsboroug spoke to a friend on the state and prospects of the Church. Th article of the Creed professing belief in the Holy Catholi Church is (he said) one of the last importance. The principl which it involves are far-reaching, and at no distant date it wi come into its own. And, whereas the other articles of the cree seem now to have thrown it into the background, once it brought forward it will swallow up all the rest. Our present co fusion (he was speaking in 1833) is mainly owing to the loss o it; and a still greater confusion will be caused by its reviva

We do not know how the revival will be brought about. But the powers of this world may any day turn their backs upon us; and this will probably lead to the effects that I have described.[1]

The words were prophetic. A living Bishop tells us of a devout Anglo-Catholic who described himself as 'not being much interested in God the Father.' He made up for this, however, by being immensely interested in the Church.

What Mr. Sikes called 'the powers of this world' have long turned their backs upon the Church; the tide of opinion sets the other way. The novel feature of the present situation is that it is from within that the attack threatens; the 'Angels of the Churches' are joined to their assailants, 'and have holpen the children of Lot.' They were mortified by their failure to carry the New Prayer Book through Parliament: officials, even Church officials, are men. They forgot that the first rule of play is to accept the decision of the umpire. The loss of a match is a trifle compared with the permanent depreciation of the values of the game. It would be well if no one were allowed to use the word Church without explaining the sense in which he does so. The claims of the mixed magnitude known by that name went out, it has been said, with the Nonjurors, and lay dormant for a 150 years. They were revived by the Tracts for the Times; and now the windows of heaven are opened. These claims are laid down in Pastoral Letters and Charges; affirmed by Synods and Assemblies; taken as much for granted by the *Times* as by the *Church Times*. They have 'awaked as one out of sleep, and as a giant refreshed with wine.' And if they have not put their enemies to a perpetual shame, they have gone a long way towards doing so. Opposition has been silenced; the press has been tuned; 'the shadow cloaked from head to foot' keeps the keys to office in its tenacious hands. To take one out of many instances: it is made a reproach to those who felt bound in conscience to oppose the Books of 1927 and 1928 that only five out of some thirty Bishops are on their side. Their opposition has been described as 'outrageous.' The obvious answer is that party feeling runs so high that no one who is not a supporter of the Bishops' measure has the remotest chance of being raised to the Episcopate. Last August, immedi-

[1] *Letters and Correspondence of J. H. Newman*, Vol. II, 483.

ately after the rejection of the Revised Book by the House of Commons for the second time, five Episcopal Sees, two of them Primatial, fell vacant. All five were filled by the ministry of the day by out and out Revisionists. Loaded dice can only fall in one way.

II.

Three generations have passed since the Oxford Tracts disturbed the slumbers of the Church of England; and the questions which they raised, great as is their historical interest, are for most of us no longer actual. We do not ask whether the beliefs then associated with the term are true: we ask how people came to think that they were so. Nor do we ask even this too curiously. I remember an Eton tutor who, explaining *Romans* viii, 30, "'Whom he fore-ordained, them he also called,' said 'This is what the thelogians call Prevenient Grace: But (he added wisely) the less we know of these things the better.' And, with regard to the Church in particular, we shall do well to get out of the heavy air of the ninteenth century, and the electric atmosphere of our own, into the drier and more bracing climate of an earlier age. In the famous chapter of *Leviathan*, 'On Power Ecclesiastical,' Hobbes argues that only the Pastoral Authority of Sovereigns (by which he means that of the State) is *Jure Divino*, that of other Pastors being Jure Civili. 'If a man, therefore, should ask a Pastor in the execution of his office, "By what authority dost thou these things? And who gave thee this authority?" he can make no other just answer but that he doth it by the authority of the King, or Assembly that representeth it,'[2] in this country, *i.e.* of Parliament. Hobbes was no doubt what is called an Erastian. But we are not to suppose that he desired Charles II to preach or read prayers. He knew as well as Article 37 that 'when we attribute to the King's Majesty the Chief Government, by which Titles we understand the minds of some slanderous folks to be offended, we give not to our Princes the ministering either of God's Word or of the Sacraments.' What he meant was that the Church is not what Canonists call a *Societas Perfecta*—an autonomous or self-governing society existing like a foreign body in the Commonwealth, but of loftier origin and

[2] *Leviathan*, ch. 42.

authority, being from heaven, not from men. It is in fact another form of, or name for, the Commonwealth; it is the community on its religious side. The language of traditional compliment need not in itself be scrupled at. It calls, however, for explanation; as *e.g.* when the seer of Apocalypse speaks of the Church as 'the Bride, the wife of the Lamb,' or the liturgy of the sacramental species as His Body and Blood; or the Ordination Service of a Bishop as a 'godly and well-learned man.' He is not so, indeed, necessarily or invariably. But such language is not to be taken syllogistically. Neither Scripture nor liturgy speak in syllogisms; when we take either as doing so, we do not frame to pronounce it right. To speak of the Church of England as 'an autonomous spiritual society within the nation,' or as possessing 'inherent spiritual authority,' is to invite misconception, and to use 'insignificant (or meaningless) speech.' For there is no such society and no such authority. 'The Clergy of England (says Selden), when they cast off the Pope, submitted themselves wholly to the Civil power, and have so remained.' While, with regard to Episcopacy, he reminds us (and in view of certain issues which may be raised at the Lambeth Conference of 1930, the reminder is timely) that 'there is no Government enjoined by example, but by precept. It does not follow that we must have Bishops still, because we have had them so long. They are equally mad who say Bishops are so *jure divino* that they must be continued, and they who say they are so anti-christian that they must be put away. All is as the State pleases.' Their *esprit de corps* makes the clergy untrustworthy guides in these mixed questions: 'Chain up the clergy on both sides.' It is easier indeed to say where the *locus*, or centre, of spiritual authority in the modern State is not than where it is. But we may be sure that it does not reside in clerical assemblies. For to which of the many claimants shall we assign it? If to our recently created Church Assembly, why not to the more august Vatican Council? If to Convocation, why not to the Synod of Dort which was attended by English Bishops? or to the Westminster Assembly of Divines? Is it not rather in the community as a whole that the authority of which we are in search resides—germinal, indeed, and incomplete, like the child in its mother's womb; shadowy and elusive, like a landscape seen

through cloud, yet taking shape and form as the mists disperse and the morning spreads upon the mountains? Shall we not with the Apostle, place it in the best mind and conscience of the community divinely trained and guided? 'I speak as unto wise men; judge ye what I say.'

III.

As used in connection with the historical Church, the alternatives 'from heaven or from men' are not necessarily exclusive. It is a certain atavism which leads us to suppose that Christianity cannot be put into a class with other religions, that its origin and history lie outside the natural order; and that like the Hind in Dryden's poem, it is 'immortal and unchanged.' An examination of the facts dispels the illusion. We are apt to expect more from institutions than they have to give. They are mixed, very mixed, magnitudes: they are neither this, nor that; but both, or neither; or something between the two. It was a saying of Baron von Hügel that, if we are looking for a 'pure' Gospel—meaning by 'pure,' one without a human element—we are looking for one which does not exist, and never has existed: because the Gospel was given to and has been received by men.

The Incarnation was an outpouring of the Spirit: *Spiritus Domini replevit orbem terrarum.* But Christ's kingdom was 'not of this world': that He did not found a polity in any way resembling what we now speak of as the Catholic Church is a conviction forced upon unbiassed readers of the Gospels. His teaching was a protest against the legal and ceremonial conception of religion on which ecclesiasticism, Jewish or Christian, take what form it will, rests. The horizon of the first age of Christianity did not admit of a future; the Lord, it was believed, was literally 'at hand.' The word Church marks a later stage in the process, one brought about by the transplanting of the Gospel message from Jewish soil to the great cities of the Dispersion—Alexandria; Antioch (where the disciples were first called Christians); and Rome. It was here, not at Jerusalem, where the disciples 'walked orderly, keeping the law,' that the Church was born. For the word may mean

things differing widely in kind and quality. It has been said that, while Christ is loved, the Church is hated. To ask why this is so is to have entered on the way of wisdom. The one recalls the Arms outstretched upon the Cross—'Come unto me'; the other, the closed fist, grasping, repellent, menacing—'Depart from me ye cursed.' For the Church is a great curser; and 'the talk of a man of many oaths will make the hair stand upright,' says the Son of Sirach (xxvii, 14): 'then began Peter to curse and to swear.' He does so to this day. Mr. Spurgeon is said to have announced to a crowded congregation that his own Church (I believe it was the Baptist) had never persecuted, and was the only one which never had. The statement was received with applause. But Mr. Spurgeon, although he was a great preacher, was a very honest man. 'Shall I tell you why? (he asked). Because it has never been in its power to do so.' The greater Churches reek of sulphur. Look at the Athanasian Creed, of which Tillotson wished we were rid, but of which we have not yet rid ourselves: and at the anathemas attached to the decrees of the Councils, such as in our own time to the Dogmatic Constitution of the Vatican Council of 1870 defining Papal Infallibility: 'if anyone shall presume to contradict this our Definition (which God forbid), let him be anathema.' If it is asked what this involves, the complete formula (now a curiosity of literature) is given in Mirbt's *Quellen*, p. 441. The religion which inspires such threats is one of terror and hatred. A writer of this school—the late Mgr. R. H. Benson—asks with what he believed to be unanswerable rhetoric, 'Have you never heard of the wrath of the Lamb?' The less we know of these blasphemous figments of Jewish Apocalyptic the better. 'Then if any man shall say unto you, Lo, here is Christ! or there!'—believe it not. Let us cultivate a certain wholesome scepticism, and not attribute *αἴσχρον τί*—what is shameful—to God. 'There shall arise false Christs.'

IV.

We are not to identify the Church with its officials. 'It cannot be proved (says Paley) that any form of Church government was laid down in the Christian Scriptures with a view of fixing a constitution for succeeding ages; certainly no command for

this purpose was given by Christ.'[3] The truth seems to hav been that such offices as Bishop, Presbyter (if the two are di tinct) and Deacon, with the later so-called Minor Orders, we created in the Church as the good order, inclinations and exigen cies of the society at the time required, without any intention o instituting a universal ministry, or even of constituting an in variable model for that of the then existing age. 'In the Prim tive Church there was no single system of church order laid dow by the Apostles,' says Canon Streeter. 'During the first hun dred years of Christianity the Church was an organism alive an growing—changing its organization to meet changing needs Clearly in Asia, Syria, and Rome the system of governmen varied from Church to Church, and in the same Church at dif ferent times.'[4] To claim Dominical or even Apostolic appoint ment, with Roman Catholics, for the Papal, with Anglicans, fo the Episcopal, or with Calvinists, for the Presbyterian form o Church government, is to commit ourselves to that 'corrupt fol lowing of the Apostles' against which our twenty-fifth Articl warns us; the Apostles made no such claim. Their successor did: 'the Fathers oft-times speak oratoriously.' This is wh later theology is, and is increasingly, critical. This note did no come in with the so-called Higher Critics—*Vixere fortes ant Agamemnona.* The Reformers criticized the ecclesiasticism o their own time, and by anticipation that of ours, drastically The Churches, even the greatest Churches, 'have erred in matters of faith'; as to the Councils, from that of Nicaea to tha of the Vatican, 'forasmuch as they be an assembly of men where of all be not governed with the Spirit and Word of God, they may err, and have erred, even in things pertaining to God.' They are not, then, from heaven, but from men; and very much so 'I am satisfied (says Dr. Arnold) that Church authority, whether early or late, is as rotten a staff as ever was Pharaoh, King o Egypt; it will go into a man's hand to pierce him.'[5]

[3] *Moral and Political Philosophy,* VI, 10.

[4] *The Primitive Church studied with special reference to the origins o the Christian Ministry,* p. 261.

[5] Stanley, *Life of Dr. Arnold,* 360.

V.

With regard to Convocation and the Church Assembly, the less said the better. The latter, in particular, seems to have fallen into general discredit. Most of us, however, have read *Voces Clamantium*. And the *Church Times* describes the Assembly as 'the somnolent creature of the bureaucrats, sedately dancing when the ecclesiastical lawyers pipe.'[6] The Life and Liberty Movement which gave rise to it was 'a most misguided adventure,' says Professor Creed. More than once the supremacy of the Crown—*i.e.* of the Law—has protected the nation from the tyranny of a too powerful religious party, and saved the Church from its friends. A government courageous enough to do so to-day would deserve well of the community. In a Christian commonwealth this is a proper function of the State in its relation to the Church. Infallibility, whether naked and unashamed as at Rome, or veiled and identified with an abstraction, such as the Undivided Church, or the collective Episcopate, or the 'unanimous consensus of the Fathers,' is an Idol of the Temple, as illusive as those of the Theatre and the Market Place, the Tribe and the Den. The reason why the Papal theory of the Church prevailed over these phantoms was that it was intelligible, which they were not—there could be no doubt about what was meant by it. It was also effective; a skilfully framed instrument for the government of men. Whereas the claim to corporate inspiration, take what shape it will, Conciliar, Gallican, Anglican, evaporates into sound and smoke. 'The root of the matter is that there is no royal road to certainty, no ordinance for summary extinction of doubt. As much in the sphere of religion as in the social and political domain, infallibility and perfection are dreams of the imagination. Conviction of the truth does not come at the command of some external authority. It grows by contributions from many sources: from the testimony of the past; from personal experience, from spiritual intuition, from conscientious following of the light, from the influence exercised over us by our fellow-men who are eminent for goodness. It never ceases to grow so long as we are faithful to what we have attained; and though in this world it can never

[6] *Church Times*, Feb. 15, 1929.

attain to logical completeness, the humble and patient w always find it sufficient for their practical needs.'[7] To deman more than this is to ask for better bread than is made with whea There are names which bulk large in Church history; and the tit of Saint prefixed to them shows that the opinions of the gre party leaders who bore them have finally prevailed. But not a the actions of the saints are saintly. The sanctity of David h been described by the Tractarian *Lyra Apostolica* as 'a bloo stained holiness'; and on the death of Cyril of Alexandria, th best and wisest men in the East openly rejoiced. 'At last (wro Theodoret) the reproach of Israel is taken away. He is gone t vex the inhabitants of the world below with his endless dog matism. Let everyone throw a stone on his grave, lest perha he may make even hell too hot for him, and return to earth Cardinal Newman, who idealized the Church of the Father calls this letter 'atrocious.' It is not, perhaps, particularl Christian: humanity was not a note of the ancient, and I a not sure that it is a note of the modern, ecclesiastical world It is, however, distinctly a note of the modern man; for which we may believe, much will be forgiven him. After all, there wa something in the boast of Homer's Phoeacians that they wer πατερῶν μεγ' ἀμείνοντες, much better men than their fathers. Unde Pius V, a canonized saint, more executions took place in a mont than in four years under his predecessor. Gregory XIII re turned thanks to God for the massacre of St. Bartholomew, an caused a medal to be struck in commemoration of it with th legend *Strages Ugonottorum*—'the slaughter of the Hugue nots.' Did not even an Apostle, not perhaps when his inspira tion was at its highest, pronounce an imprecation against Alex ander the coppersmith who had wrought him 'much evil'? 'Th Lord reward him according to his works.' *Passus est human aliquid*: the best of us are men.

VI.

It is astonishing how, even in the mind of Protestants, in fallibility, or something like it, has come to be regarded as an essential attribute of the Church. A Reformation is commonly followed by a reaction. In a famous passage, one of the mos

[7] Salmon, *The Infallibility of the Church*, 280.

hilosophical he ever wrote, Gibbon reminds us that 'the decay ancient prejudice leaves a numerous portion of mankind in a inful and dangerous situation. A state of scepticism and sus-nse may amuse a few inquisitive minds. But the practice of perstition is so congenial to the multitude that, if they are for-ply awakened, they still regret the loss of their pleasing vision. heir love of the marvellous and supernatural, their curiosity th regard to future events, and their propensity to extend their pes and fears beyond the limits of the visible world, were the incipal causes which favoured the establishment of Polythe-n.' The same may be said of mediaeval, and in general of pular, Christianity. 'So urgent upon the vulgar is the neces-y of believing that the fall of any system of mythology will obably be succeeded by the introduction of some other mode superstition.'

This is why the emancipation which followed the Reforma-on was neither complete nor lasting. The belief in witchcraft, r example, took deeper root in Protestant than in Catholic coun-es; that power of darkness, the Counter-Reformation, which too leniently judged by modern historians, slew by thousands d ten thousands, and regained much that the Papacy of the eceding age had lost. The vision of the ideal Church comes rough the gate of ivory. Already in the middle of the second ntury a Roman Christian saw in the spirit 'a Church covered th spots and wrinkles, and full of all manner of disease.'[8]

As long as the Church remains in the world, it must be so. he Church of the saints is in heaven, not here.

VII.

With regard to the Church of England, in particular, a man genius, destined in later years to be a Cardinal, wrote a hun-ed years ago that 'the stream of opinion was setting against r,' and that 'he believed she would ultimately be separated om the State.' To-day not a few even of her own officials wel-me the prospect. Newman, more wise than they, regarded it th apprehension: (1) because the results of revolutionary ange defy calculation; (2) because the upper classes (he was ute enough to foresee) would be left 'almost religionless'; (3)

[8] Rudolph Sohm, *Outline of Church History*, 21.

because the security given to the doctrine and worship of Church by Act of Parliament would be lost; and (4) because clergy would be thrown on their congregations for support- difficult, an almost impossible, position for a religious soci on a large scale. He adds an expression of opinion more appl able to the Church of our own time than some of us care to a mit: 'the intellect of the age is against her. The Church pa (he says) is poor in mental attainments: it has not shrewdne dexterity, eloquence, practical power. On what, then, does depend? On prejudice and bigotry.'[9] This was the view tak in 1829 by a far-sighted observer of the ecclesiastical situati of the time. It has much in common with that which persons education take to-day. A distinguished living Bishop who ha geuius for saying what is generally pungent, often just, and, a rule, disagreeable, reminded us not long ago that 'wh thoughtful people are demanding from the Church of Engla at the present time is not greater authority, but greater intel gence'; and that 'when language is used by which it seems be claimed that the priest, whether Anglican, Orthodox, Roman, is a person with certain magical powers, people do n believe it: they resent such teaching; it keeps them from atten ing the services of the Church; it alienates large sections of t more thoughtful parts of the poulation.'[10] It has already do so to a great and increasing extent.

VIII.

The case for the Church—the word is used in its wide sense—has been at once over and understated. The forme when it is made for any particular Church—which at once mak this Church a sect, and the argument for it ridiculous: the latt when the follies and crimes of Churchmen are taken as concl sive evidence against the institution which they represent. It indeed written, 'Woe to the man by whom the offence cometh but it is also written, 'It must needs be that offences come For religion is not a separate and watertight compartment

[9] *Letters and Correspondence of J. H. Newman,* I, 204.

[10] *The Church of England,* Bp. Headlam, edition ii, xvi. *The Time* April 3, 1923.

le—it is part and parcel of humanity. Christianity, in par-
ular, is bound up in and with the European life movement
which we Europeans are involved: we cannot make it more,
may not make it less, than this. Its history is one of a natural
d human growth; a succession of actions and reactions, of
cissitudes, of the *discrimina rerum* which—*non sine numine*—
it upon mankind. Its promise is more, and of another order,
an its performance; it is not to be judged by what it has been
is; it is a nucleus in which the germs of an immense, but dis-
nt development are contained. The Episcopate of the eight-
nth century does not suggest 'the crowned and robed seers'
the poet; it leaves an impression of thinness and aridity—'a
rren and dry land where no water is.' But there are oases
here we least expect them. In a letter from Warburton to
urd, pedestrian as both writers were, we find a passage in-
ired by a larger vision and worthy of a better age. 'The
urch, like the ark of Noah, is worth saving. Not for the sake
the unclean beasts and vermin that almost filled it, and pro-
bly made most noise and clamour in it; but for the little corner
rationality that was as much distressed by the stench within
by the tempest without.' It is here, in this little corner of
tionality, not among the unclean beasts and vermin which
ound in the Church, *i.e.* in the community on its religious no
ss than on its secular side, that the *locus*, or centre, of religious
owledge and authority is to be found. St. Paul, it seems,
as of this mind. 'Not (he says) for that we have dominion over
our faith': rather, 'I speak as unto wise men; judge ye what
say.'

It will be asked: Are we not to attach any value to the voice
the great society of Christians of the past and of our own
me—the religious group or association? Not merely the best
cular opinion of the time, but the particular religious society
which we belong? Well, *Incidit in Scyllam qui vult vitare*
harybdin: the question is a difficult one, and I plead guilty to
inclination to give it an evasive answer: perhaps no other
an be made. Our Article XX has in view the Puritan contro-
ersy of the Elizabethan period, which is now a negligible quan-
ty: to meet the question fairly it must be considered, not in
e watered-down shape which it takes in Anglicanism, or in

general in the Reformed bodies, but as it presents itself in th Roman Catholic Church where authority is living and actua where the issues are definite, and the alternatives sharp.

In *Bilychnis* (July 1925) a well-known Italian Modernist, D Giovanni Pioli, describes the answer given to the question by distinguished Roman Catholic layman, who had taken a pr minent part in the Modernist movement, and done so (it seem without coming into direct conflict with Rome.

'What,' he was asked, 'would be your advice to Modernis priests whose mentality resembles your own, but who, if the ventured to write as you speak, would be deprived of their fun tions, and probably excommunicated?' 'I should advise the to remain in the Church,' he replied, 'even if in order to do s they had to dissimulate (*dissimulare*) and to repeat the orthodo formulas materially and modestly (*materialmente e modesta mente*). The value attached to the historical forms of Chris ianity is so great that they cannot be allowed to perish, even i order to replace them by others which seem to us less imperfe and inadequate. As things are, there is no place for positiv forms of Christianity other than those which now exist.'[11] shall not say that such a position is impossible, or that it cann be taken, as the lesser of the evils, by hard-pressed men. But confess that it seems to me morally and intellectually uncon vincing. In any case we may be thankful that we live in anothe climate and under other skies.

[11] 'Dialogo col Baron von Hügel,' *Bilychnis*. Luglio, 1925.

A CORPUS OF SACRED WRITINGS

By Professor F. C. Burkitt, D.D., F.B.A.

I AM well aware that the subject about which I am to speak is the idea of *a* Bible rather than an examination of *our* Bible, but as I told this Conference last year, I believe in the reality of time, and consequently in the reality of the Course of Events. I am therefore going to begin by treating my subject historically. From this point of view we make a discovery almost at the outset. 'A Corpus of Sacred Writings' is not found in every religion, and where it is found it is due, directly or indirectly, to the position of the Law, the Pentateuch, among the Jews. I am not taking any account of the Religions of China. Whatever the history or the authority of the Chinese Classics in Confucianism, that religion lies outside the development of Western thought. Much the same may be said of the ancient Indian and Iranian sacred literature. Moreover, this literature lacks, so far as I know, the special characteristics of the Bible on which I wish to lay stress. On the other hand, the Kor'ān is distinctly an imitation of, or rather substitute for, the Bible. The Jews had their *Tawrāt* and the Christians their *Inǰīl*, but Mohammed thought that God was giving to the True Believers through him a new and better Book. Without the Bible the existence of the Kor'ān is unthinkable. Similarly the Manichaean Scriptures apart from the New Testament, the opening cadences of Mani's letters are modelled on those of S. Paul. The Mandaean Great Book, which is a collection of Mandaean legends, hymns, sermons, etc., is now thought to have been brought together into the corpus after the triumphs of Islam, in order that the Mandaeans also might claim the protection accorded by Mohammedan Law to the 'people of a Book.'

The Greek and Roman religious systems had no Bible. There were immemorial customs and taboos, there were sacred rites and feasts, there were sacrifices and priests to perform them, there were also tales and legends of the Gods. But there was no co-ordinated Corpus containing the essentials of religion.

What corresponded to some extent with our Bible, at least post-Alexandrian times, was the Homeric Poems, particular the Iliad. The Iliad was known to every educated man, bett (I suppose) than Dante is known to the educated Italian, an certainly better than the Englishman knows his Shakespear With good will and ingenuity it is possible to make apt quot tions from such sources on all manner of serious subjects. Yo can illustrate a philosophy with such quotations. But you ca hardly construct one. When all is said and done, the Iliad an the Odyssey remain narrative poems about an episode of th past: their use as a sort of Bible was and remains a me adaptation.

I very much doubt if the Ancient Egyptians had a Bible, i our sense of the word. The Book of the Dead contained charm and formulas which were regarded as in some sense a passpo for the soul of a dead man in the Underworld, and so they wer painted or engraved on a dead man's coffin. So much of wh is preserved to us from Ancient Egypt is funerary that the Boo of the Dead bulks larger to us than I imagine it did to the livin Egyptian. We have little evidence, so far as I know, that th Egyptians used to read it or learn it by heart, apart from pro fessional guilds of priests.

To come nearer home, the Christian Bible is the Jewish Bibl augmented by a fresh volume called the New Testament. An the Jewish Bible is a compilation or growth that has crystal lized, so to speak, round the Pentateuch. Whatever may hav been the dates of the several pieces of which the Old Testamen is composed, as Books of the Bible they are subsequent to th Pentateuch. The Prophets, Earlier and Later, were added t the Law, and the Hagiographa, the other Writings, were adde to the Law and the Prophets.

I propose therefore to recall to you some of the circumstance under which the Law became 'canonical,' and to consider th effect of this innovation upon the religious life of Jews. A account of the actual inauguration of the Book of the Law int its present position of supremacy may be read in the eight chapter of the book of Nehemiah. There we hear that th leaders of the Jews, backed by the authority of the resolut Governor Nehemiah, were determined to make the people know

learly what their religious duties were, in order that they might eep the Law of God properly. So they read out to the assem-led populace from the Book of the Law 'distinctly' (mphōrāsh, er. 8)—perhaps the word may mean 'paragraph by paragraph' -and when all was done they were told further, 'this is your ty, go and do it now and henceforth.'

At the moment, so far as we know, there were only two arties among the Jews, the religious observers and the lax. The ook of the Law had no competitor. Like Aaron's Rod it had allowed up all its rivals. Formerly there had been keen oppo-tion in Israel between those who were zealous for religion. mos is separated from the times of Nehemiah by about the same terval as the Reformation is separated from us. From the time Amos onward there had been a long contest between those no felt that what the LORD, the God of Israel, chiefly required as right social conduct, and those who put their trust in correct d immemorial ritual at the old seats of worship. 'Prophet' d 'Priest' had been in opposition, representing contrasted ndencies in the conduct of life. But now this opposition had ed down, and something fresh had taken the place of both.

It cannot be said that either 'Prophet' or 'Priest' had alto-ther triumphed. 'There is a time for everything,' says the ise man, and the time of the Prophets—the great, the real ophets—had passed away. It was now the time for a whole mmunity to digest the new view of things that Amos and Jere-ah had produced. Further, we shall do post-exilic Judaism a ievous wrong if we regard the Priest, in the sense that the word generally used by Amos and Jeremiah, as having triumphed er the Prophet. The contest between Prophet and Priest had t been on the alternative of 'Morality or Ritualism.' What e Prophets protested against was ritualism without morality, metimes against traditional ritualism that was definitely im-oral. Post-exilic Judaism, which is the religion of the Penta-ch, is ritualistic, but also severely moral. Neither the Gods the heathen, nor images of the God of Israel, nor magical in-ntations for good harvests, nor loose and degrading practices, e permitted by Pentateuchal Law. If we regard the Penta-ch as the final result of the great prophetical movement in ael, it may not unfairly be said that prophetism perished in

the successful effort by which the priests were converted to pr
phetic ideas.

It is no doubt more interesting for *us* to study the prophet
ideas apart from their concrete embodiment, and if we desire
concrete embodiment we tend to imagine a 'prophetic' refor
of our own religious practices. The iconoclastic Amos, the u
practical Jeremiah, stammering out the utterance of new ar
hitherto unheard-of truths, are to us more sympathetic than th
constructive Ezekiel, because Ezekiel's construction, so far
it was practical, was suitable for his own age rather than ours.

Of the actual contents and composition of the Pentateuch
shall say something later on. I must now touch upon some
the rather surprising by-products of this erection of the Pent
teuch into a Corpus of Sacred Law.

It was an essential part of this religion of the Law that th
Law was to be known by every Israelite and that it was to b
practised. 'This commandment which I command thee this da
it is not too hard for thee, neither is it far off. It is not in heave
that thou shouldest say, "Who shall go up for us to heaven an
bring it unto us, and make us to hear it that we may do it
Neither is it beyond the sea, that thou shouldest say, "Wh
shall go over the sea for us and bring it unto us and make us
hear it that we may do it?" But the word is very nigh unto the
in thy mouth and in thy heart that thou mayest do it' (*Deut.* xx
11-14).

These familiar sentences are not the mere truisms which the
sometimes sound like nowadays. They come from the Book
Deuteronomy, which had a circulation before its incorporatio
into the Pentateuch, but they embody the principle which th
canonization of the Pentateuch signifies. Deuteronomy, in fac
is a sort of first sketch of the Pentateuch, from the point of vie
from which we are looking, and these words from Deuteronom
are eminently characteristic of fully-developed Judaism.

Ancient Religion was mainly an affair of the Priests. It wa
their business. Like other key-industries it was immensely im
portant for the community. But it was complicated and dange
ous, and ordinary laymen in practice trusted to the exper
Round a great shrine there clustered associations of sanctit
The priests, often a hereditary caste, formed a guild with fixe

traditions of their *Canon Actionis*, of how in detail it was proper to prepare and offer the various kinds of sacrifices, on which the Divine favour so very greatly depended. The conduct of worship was therefore left in their hands. It was the priest who uttered the sacred formulas: the suggested speeches or protestations to be said by the lay worshipper in *Deut.* xxvi, 5-10*a*, 13-15, read like innovations.

But the conduct of public and private worship was not the only function of priests. It was for them to declare the Divine pleasure, or when that pleasure was unknown to ascertain it. 'Who shall go over the sea for us?' is not a mere rhetorical question: it was what the Ionian cities had to do when they desired to consult the Divine Oracle at Delphi. Omens and Oracles, given out and perhaps from time to time manufactured by irresponsible and close corporations of Sanctuary-priests were the *religious* means of guidance in matters of conduct. Such had also been the case in Israel, for the Urim and Thummim was a sacred Lot cast in due form by the Priest. But that was a feature of pre-exilic Israelite praxis: the Jew of Nehemiah's day had no longer any need to resort to divination. The Will of God, both for priest and layman, was now written down in black and white, plain for all to read.

My point, to which everything I have been saying has been designed to lead up to, is this, that the acceptance of the written Law produced a democratic, what may be called a lay, element in Jewish orthodox religion, which was absent from the heathenism of the post-Alexandrian world.

The chief characteristic of religion generally in the centuries that followed Alexander is syncretism, or (as we now tend to call it) Corporate Reunion. Antiochus Epiphanes was only an outstanding man of his age. The tendency everywhere was to submerge what was particularistic and local into the main current of thought and practice. The local fanes were restored or rebuilt to look like Greek temples, the local deities were assimilated to this or that member of the Greek Pantheon and called by the Greek name, with perhaps a distinguishing epithet of local origin. And with all this Reunion there went an ever-growing scepticism. The old pieties lost their immemorial authority, very greatly because they had lost their real significance.

Not that Religion in its best and deepest sense was absen from the post-Alexandrian world. If Religion means seriou thought about the Universe on the one hand and about the Dut of man on the other, then Religion flourished abundantly in th age. But it was not called Religion; it was called Philosophy The Philosopher in that age occupied very much the positio of the pastor or the missionary preacher in a Christian society But the new name meant that this teaching and practice was dis connected from the immemorial sanctions of worship: if w take Baron F. von Hügel's analysis of true Religion into a Institutional, a Rational, and a Mystical element, this Philo sophy was lacking in the Institutional element, it had not—if may borrow again from contemporary religious slogans—got th Apostolical Succession from the authentically Divine. It was make-shift shelter from the weather in a world where the ol homes of Religion had crumbled into ruins.

As we all know, the exception to post-Alexandrian syncret ism was the attachment of the Jews as a nation to their inherite way of life and belief. This was not due to the loyalty of thei Priests as a class to the old state of things. Unless the Book of Maccabees give an altogether false impression the Jewis Priestly families, the official guardians of religion, were largel favourable to the unionistic projects of Antiochus. And in th subsequent history of Judaism the Priests, while not neglectfu of their official duties, do not appear as what we should cal leaders of religion: it is the Scribes and Pharisees rather tha the Chief Priests who are swayed by religious ideas and con victions. It was not the Jewish Clergy but the Jewish Peopl that were so enthusiastically attached to the religion of thei fathers. Why? Why were the Jews so obstinately loyal, whe all the rest of the world was for Corporate Reunion and the En richment of Services? The answer is, that study and meditatio of their Bible had made them passionately attached to it.

The characteristic product of post-exilic Jewish Religion wa the Synagogue and the Scribe, or (as he is now called) the Rabbi These things are now more than 2,000 years old, for centurie they have become stabilized and stereotyped, but in their youth they were very remarkable phenomena. When the Greeks firs became conscious of the Jews, the Jews seemed to them to be

ution of philosophers, for each Synagogue seemed something ke the Porch or the Academy. The Synagogue was no Temple, o sacrifice was offered in it, but the assembled members gave lemn thanks to their God and then read and studied their cred Law together. And it was all done in sympathy with the ditional religious worship of their race at their ancient temple, t in opposition to it.

I must now turn to say something about the contents and aracter of the Bible in its various stages, as a necessary pre-minary to considering the elements to be required or desired in Corpus of Sacred Writings.' And first of all it is most impor-nt to remember that the Bible, when it exercises real influence er those who accept it as a Corpus of Sacred Writings, does o because it is believed to be essentially true. It is obvious, of ourse, that the idea of essential truth needs to be examined and assified, just as it is obvious that the 'truth' of the Bible has een, and indeed is still in many places, held in a crude and un-nable form. There was a time when an extensive use of Alle-ory was in fashion, when the 'truth' of single phrases or whole les was held to be found not in the literal meaning, but in some llegorical interpretation. But those who held these views be-eved that they were exegetes, not ingenious inventors. They hought that they were bringing to light the real though hidden gnificance of the Sacred Text, not putting an edifying mean-ng into what was really false or mistaken.

I make this point, because I venture to think that the plea for ntinuing to teach the Bible to coming generations on the round that it is splendid literature is beside the mark. Either here is a real sense in which we can say that the Bible is true nd helps us to get at truth in a way that nothing else can, or it ill drop out of use. I do not think the literary merits of parts f the Bible will keep it alive, if it be not uniquely useful in some her way.

Is the Bible true? Or rather, since I have been considering he Bible from an historical point of view, did the Bible in its arious stages of accretion guide the Jews, and afterwards the hristians in their turn, into true views of their religion?

We live in an age when relativity is one of the catchwords of he day, and on the other hand the modern study of Ancient History aims at a very high standard of accuracy. There are a

great many statements in the Bible about ancient times, which formerly were literally believed, yet now they have been discovered to be not literally true. The world did not come into being in six days about 6,000 years ago: death did not come into the world upon man and beast because the first pair of human beings disobeyed a God who walked in a Garden in the cool of the day. It has been claimed lately that certain deposits of mud in Lower Babylonia show that about 5,000 years ago there was a disastrous inundation, which seems to have drowned all the rural population of that region but not the dwellers in walled towns; and it is suggested that here we have the historical event which led to the Biblical tale of Noah's Flood. Perhaps so: we will leave it to the professed archaeologists to discuss. But on the most favourable view this interpretation does not restore the historical truth of the Bible story, the whole point of which is that all mankind were drowned except Noah and his family. What, then, is the truth which is to be found in the Bible, when we remember these obvious facts?

It is no use to say that the Bible was meant to teach us religious knowledge, not geology or profane history. That excuse was only invented when it was found out that the geology and history plainly indicated in fundamental portions of the Bible was not true.

I venture to think that our defence of the Bible must go on other lines, what may be called relativist lines. And let me say that in discussing the 'truth' of the old Bible, the Bible which did once so admirably make up 'a Corpus of Sacred Writings,' we are going the best way about to discover how a revised Bible, or even an altogether new Bible, should be constructed. Certainly such a construction cannot be made without a clear understanding in what the merits of the old Bible consisted.

First of all, then, I should like to put before you the view that there is a sense in which the Bible was true, historically true, after all; and further, that it tended to become more and more historical. The Pentateuch is not wholly true historically, but it is an attempt at serious history. The modern reconstruction of Ancient History is indeed a splendid enterprise—we dare not say achievement. Year by year the spade yields fresh data for the archaeologist. We can study the revolutions of

vilization in Egypt for, literally, thousands of years, and in abylonia we are learning something about a pre-Sumerian culre that must have flourished long before the Egyptian Pyraids were built. But all this was unknown to the ancients, to e contemporaries of Nehemiah and Alexander. We know that ır considerable information about the remote past is only an nperfect sketch, but it is immensely valuable because it is an pproximation to knowledge. Similarly the Pentateuchal hisry was an approximation to true knowledge of the origin and evelopment of the Jewish Religion.

The element of the first importance in the Pentateuch when first became canonical was the actual Law, the precepts which ıe Jews were to learn and to obey. But they were conveyed in n historical setting, and by comparison with Greek or Roman hythology it was a true historical account. I am very far from neaning to recede from modern critical conclusions. I am not illing you to believe that the Tabernacle was really and truly rected and used by the Children of Israel in the Wilderness, nuch less asking you to subscribe to the sketch of Israelite and re-Israelite history from Noah to Abraham and from Abraham o Moses, as it stands in *Genesis*. But the Pentateuch is not ltogether off the mark. It gives an account of the origin of the sraelitish nation as a conglomeration of clans settled on the estern frontier of Egypt some generations after the reign of khnaton — a name now so familiar — and it traces essential eatures of the Religion, which did as a matter of fact develop ithin Israel and was its distinctive contribution to humanity, to great leader, Moses, under whom the Israelites became to some xtent and for a time at least united.

If one compares the Pentateuchal account of Moses with Livy's account of Numa Pompilius, what I mean will be clear. From the first canonization of the Pentateuch the sacred religious Ordinances are connected with comparatively recent vents in a sort of historical setting, not with the immemorial anctions of a mythological Golden Age. Even the Name of God was a new Name, introduced long after material civilizaion had been established.

This historical element in Religion, the presence of which as a real place in the Pentateuch, becomes more prominent as

the Sacred Canon was expanded. To the Pentateuch was added what the Jews call the Former and Later Prophets. The Former Prophets are first the Book of Joshua, *i.e.* the last sixth of the great compilation of which the Pentateuch is the first five-sixths: from a historical and literary point of view its inclusion in the Canon was a great improvement. Then comes the historical work called by us Judges and Samuel and Kings: I know it does not come up to modern standards of history-writing, but after all it is serious history. It was a fine achievement in itself, and as part of Sacred Literature it has been invaluable in preserving a more or less historical view of the progress and development of the Religion of Moses down to the Exile. When it stops, how helpless we are! How many unsolved problems there are about the general course of Israelite religion between the times of Nebuchadnezzar and Darius! And more than that! this general historical view was set before the Jews centuries before the Romans had their Livy. I presume the Books of Kings were extant in their present form by 500 B.C.: in other words, it was compiled a couple of generations before Herodotus wrote! The Later Prophets are Jeremiah, Ezekiel, the Twelve Minor Prophets, and the compilation called the Book of Isaiah: in these works we have the wonderful contemporary utterances about Religion, which are the starting-point of so many of our own highest ideas about God and Duty—not a systematic treatise, but utterances about contemporary events and controversies, and therefore still more emphasizing the historical element in Religion.

I trust I have not wandered too far from my theme, which is the immense bulk of the element of History, of occasional, local, particular, unsystematic writing, contained in the Bible. And all of it, we must remember, regarded as a popular, not an esoteric or academical, literature, something to be read in the Synagogue every Sabbath Day by laymen for laymen to mark and learn and inwardly digest. There was nothing like it among the peoples of the Orient in the post-Alexandrian world, when a rather cheap Hellenism was spreading everywhere like an epidemic.

So we come, in due course, to Christianity. The Christians took over the Jewish Bible, adding to it an Appendix of their

wn writings. These are almost wholly what I have called His-rical as distinct from Systematic. The first fourteen chapters f Romans may be regarded more or less as a systematic treatise, ut as we have it this treatise is enclosed in a letter sent by l. Paul to the Christians at Rome on a particular occasion, *viz.* iortly before he was intending to pay them a visit. The whole ew Testament is occasional, contingent, historical, made up writings concerned with particular conditions at a particular me in such-and-such places. To make it useful or edifying, has to be frankly taken as part of a picture of the Past, or else stilled by those who read it into their own different Present.

We have arrived by easy stages into a consideration of a cond characteristic of the Bible. The first was that there must e a sense in which it is really true, that it leads us to a true his-rical view of things. The second characteristic is that what ie need is not there in the Bible ready-made: a certain effort of oplication is required on our part. What I mean may be clearer, we consider something the merits of which are quite of a dif-rent order. The *Summa* of S. Thomas Aquinas or anybody's rinciples of Philosophy may be difficult reading, but once you ave got the sense of it you are there, so to speak; you are con-nced by the argument or not, as the case may be, and there is ie end of it. But a contingent, historical Book, such as the ible is, is different. There is in such an 'authority' something ke the old Jewish explanation of Psalm lxii, 11, 'God spake nce, and twice I have heard'—that is to say, there is a double eaning. There is what the text says, and what it means for me.

I find it extremely difficult to express what I want to say with-ut falling into obscurity, and seeming to echo an extremely ut-of-date view about a Corpus of Sacred Writings. But I feel xactly the same about the Creeds, and I may add about the rayer Book also, so I suppose it is part of my constitution and, ke Luther, *ich kann nicht anders*. We cannot, I feel, discuss rofitably the notion of *a* Church, *a* Bible, *a* Creed, except with eference, expressed or understood, to our Church, our Bible, ven our historic Creeds. The last, I admit, is more feasible, or the Creeds may be envisaged as the essence of what *the* hurch has extracted from *the* Bible: in any case the historic reed may be contrasted with other statements of 'What I be-

lieve' at the present day. But the Church and the Bible are unique and, if they be abandoned I do not think a substitute in kind can be found.

The uniqueness of the Bible is intimately connected with the Christian view of the Incarnation, of the uniqueness and the abiding significance of Jesus Christ. You can have Religion without this, but as I look at the matter you cannot have the Christian Religion without this. The use of the Bible for Christians is to lead up to Jesus Christ: if eventually we are to 'leave the Cross as we have left carved Gods' we may possibly 'guard the Fire within,' but we shall not keep the Bible very long.

But, on the other hand, if we find Jesus of Nazareth central to our religion, then whether we are called Trinitarians or Unitarians, Catholics or non-Catholics, we shall find the Bible essential. Not that Bible statements are all true as they stand, or that every book of the Bible is essential. I could do without the Book of Esther, as in practice I do without the Book of Judith, and I am content, if it were necessary, to take my knowledge of Judas Maccabaeus and his times at third hand from *The House of Seleucus* or *Jerusalem under the High Priests*. Even here, of course, it is the Book in the so-called Apocrypha which still furnishes the matter of the tale. But it is better to drink of the spring, where possible, rather than the reservoir. There is a freshness derived from going to the earliest available sources, which cannot be got from modern studies and investigations, however well-informed and intelligent.[1]

The use of the Bible is to tell us about Jesus Christ. It contains all that survives of any value about His epoch-making career, for the one sentence in Tacitus and the documents of Egyptian origin dug up at Oxyrhynchus do not amount to much. If a copy of the elusive 'Q,' or the genuine reminiscences of Matthew the Publican, were to turn up it might be well to add them to the Canon of the Four Gospels, but it is very improbable

[1] Those whose business it is from time to time to read so-called 'research work' by students who have read the modern literature, but are not really familiar with the ancient documents upon which, in the last resort, the modern literature is based, will know exactly what this derived work lacks: in the immortal phrase of Isaiah (xxix, 13) it is 'a precept of men, a thing taught.'

at such documents are still in existence. Meanwhile what we ve is the text of the Four Gospels. Very different Portraits Jesus have been made from time to time, by learned and mple, by believers and unbelievers, but they are made from e Gospels, and these are in everybody's hands. The *Acts* give very ancient account of how the Church began, the *Epistles* e contemporary voices out of the first generation of Christians, ices directed not at us in our remote distance, but at contemraries about contemporary affairs. The Old Testament, hich was also the Corpus of Sacred Writings to this first generaon of Christians, tells us how the Christian movement had been d up to in the past; and is further necessary in order to explain any of the phrases used by Jesus and Paul, and their opponents also.

The most learned students of the origins of Christianity, the ost holy saints, the most authoritative ecclesiastics, have very ttle more to go upon. We can test their views by what the ncient documents—which are their authorities also—actually y. I do not mean that the obvious meaning of the Bible text to bind our beliefs or opinions for all time. It may be that the cumen of a scientific investigator may take us behind the actual tatements of the Bible: in the case of Pentateuchal criticism nd analysis it has obviously done so. The intuition of a saint ay reveal to us further duties or deeper springs of action than re set forth in Scripture. Ecclesiastics may impose new rules f conduct on their flocks, or relieve them of rules which are no nger suitable, and such changes may be really in accordance ith the Will of God. But in all this, *littera scripta manet*, as he old tag has it. The letter of the Bible still remains to tell s what had been asserted and believed, and in some cases a ucceeding generation may reject the new custom or the new iew, and return to more primitive ways.

But a Corpus of Sacred Writings, such as the Bible is, can nly retain its authority on the ground that what it tells us about s of primary importance. And, as the Bible is now in every part t least 1,800 years old, it must be antiquated and out of date, nless its importance is historical rather than systematic. There nce was a time when men really believed in a Golden Age, in a way of looking at things of which the tale of the Golden Age

is an embodiment. The highest knowledge, the ripest wisdom the highest achievements of mankind according to this view la in the Past. An Old Book was more likely to lead men to tru knowledge than a new investigation. In most departments o human life and thought this theory has passed away. We thin that we are wiser than the aged, not because we follow ancien commandments, but because we break them. Part of this ten dency is healthy and sound : I am not complaining of it, even i Christian practice and the study of Christian antiquity. But i there be any truth in the fundamental postulate of Christia doctrine, that about 1,900 years ago something happened whic is still of vital importance to us, then the documents which pre serve the records of this, or help us to understand it better remain of vital importance and are an indispensable Corpus o Sacred Writings. In the nature of things I do not think there could be any substitute for this Corpus : its value and use i bound up with the peculiar nature of the Christian Religion.

A SYSTEM OF DOCTRINE AS REVEALED TRUTH

By Principal George Galloway, D.D., St. Andrew's.

WE are often told that theology is not religion, and that belief in dogmas is not the test of personal piety. Though these propositions are in a broad way true, they do not justify us in going on to draw the conclusion that doctrines are an adventitious product, a kind of parasitic growth which depresses the life of the religious organism. For doctrine is an outgrowth from the life of religion itself: it is just as natural for religion, at a certain stage, to develop doctrines as it is for the tree to put forth branches and leaves. In fact it is a token of the inherent vitality of a religion that, when the time comes, it should express its values and define its meaning in doctrines. No doubt the formulation of doctrine is not the first-fruits of a religion, but belongs to its later growth. None the less it is a genuine outcome of the religious consciousness, and, on the lower levels of culture, it is anticipated by the beliefs and myths associated with the cult. There can be no religion without beliefs of some kind, however meagre, and there comes a stage in the evolution of the religious spirit when there arises a need, and there emerges a demand, that these beliefs should be explicitly stated and connected with one another.

Of course one must admit that only at a high level of religious development is there any real growth of theology. Early man felt no impulse to define his religious beliefs and to express them in general propositions. The theologian only emerges where there is a body of religious experiences which presses for formulation, and when man himself has reached the stage of self-conscious reflection. And it is especially in the case of ethical and spiritual religions which trace their rise to personal founders, and exercise a universal appeal, that the conditions for the development of doctrine are most conspicuously present. A religious community striving to propagate its faith, in the interests of its own consistency and stability, requires to formulate the truths for which it stands and which it deems to be essential.

This impulse to doctrinal development is accentuated when idea are present which are felt to conflict with the common religiou consciousness. Moreover, it is natural that the sense of th sacred which penetrates religion should by and by extend itse to the doctrines framed to express its meaning, and a divin authority should be claimed for them.

What holds of doctrines in general also holds of Christia doctrines. The Christian religion, just because of the fulnes and vigour of the religious experience bound up with it, has bee the source of the most elaborate and impressive of doctrina systems. Based on the common, or at least the prevailing, fait of the Church, this theology was judged to express its meanin in a sufficient and final form, and any secular knowledge tha conflicted with it must *ipso facto* be erroneous. For the truth o Christian doctrine was held to be divinely guaranteed. But wit the growth of fresh knowledge of nature and man, especiall in modern times, some theological doctrines were inevitabl challenged, and the claims made for theology in general wer called in question. Why, it was asked, should we be bound t accept a theological statement when it conflicts with assured re sults of science? Does the fact that a dogma is put forward i the name of Christianity guarantee its validity? Many claims t truth have proved mistaken. The old answer was, that Christian ity was the embodiment of a supernatural revelation; the revela ing process was at work in forming Christian doctrines, and s these possessed a divine authority. In this way dogmas were identified with supernaturally communicated truths. But how it may be asked, was it distinguished between a doctrine which was 'revealed' and one which was a mere invention of man and heretical. The reply of the Roman Catholic Church has been that the doctrines divinely communicated and sanctioned are those which have been explicated by the Church from the Bible and the ecclesiastical tradition. This position was fortified by the further doctrine, that the Church is a supreme spiritual authority, for it is in a real sense the continuation of the Incarnation. The Reformers broke with the conception of an infallible Church, and put in its place an infallible Bible which was the basis and norm of Christian truth. But Catholics and Protestants alike endorsed the principle, that dogmas have the authority of a supernatural revelation. In the face of modern

iticism this view has fared hardly, for it involves assumptions hich are capable of disproof. Thus the infallibility of the Bible ad to be supported by a theory of verbal inspiration which has een shown to be quite untenable. And the case is no better ith the theory of an inspired and divinely guided Church, deeloping with perfect truth and consistency the *depositum* of the ith contained in the Scripture writings. That the Chalcedonian hristology, for instance, is implicit in the New Testament is a onclusion which no one can draw on any fair reading of the vidence.

The unsatisfactory character of the appeal to supernaturally ommunicated truths becomes clearer when we consider the uestions which it raises. Obviously the process of explicating octrines is one of reflective interpretation. Is this process of eflection and reasoning also divinely safeguarded from any adixture of human error? Again, was the weighing of evidence hich led the theologians of the Church to endorse one doctrine nd reject another guided by revelation? The appeal of the eformers to the *testimonium Sancti Spiritus*, in virtue of which he truth in Scripture was intuitively apprehended, ought in conistency to give uniform and consistent results. But this it does ot do. It was Hegel, I think, who once remarked that every ect set out to seek and successfully found the warrant for its wn particular tenets in the Bible. The bankruptcy of the theory f an infallible tribunal is sufficiently vouched for by the fact, hat within the Christian Church to-day there is no unanimous onsensus of opinion on the question of what doctrines are uthoritative and what are not. This is not to say that the prinple of authority has not a religious value, but plainly in the orm put forward by the traditional theology it is incapable of earing the strain imposed on it.

Accordingly, it is now widely recognized that Christian theoogy can no longer carry with it the authority of a supernatural evelation. Yet the collapse of the older theory brought with it difficulty as well as a danger. The difficulty lay in finding some ssured basis for doctrine which would stand the test of hisorical and critical reflection. The danger lay in falling back on subjectivism where there was no test beyond that of individual eeling and conviction. A Church could have no bond of union n a body of doctrines, if there were no standard of truth except

the judgment of the individual. No corporate religious lif would be practicable, if each member of the community wer the supreme judge in matters of belief. The undoubted peril of a reign of pure subjectivism in the religious sphere is a weapo much used by those who contend for a return to a religion base on an infallible authority. On the other hand, the recognitio that theology must be in harmony with modern knowledge led t an effort during last century to reconstruct the conception o faith, to distinguish it from intellectual assent, and to find fresh basis for the organization of religious doctrine. It was clear gain when men came to see that doctrines could not be th ground of faith, since doctrines themselves presupposed th existence of faith. This meant that in the life of religion a dog matic system was secondary and derivative, not primary an fundamental. As a consequence the traditional conception o authority and of revelation was revised. The change is mos clearly marked by the theology of Schleiermacher, who found the source and basis of doctrine in the corporate Christian ex perience. Hence he opposed to the method of tradition an supernatural authority the experimental method.

I cannot, within the limits of this paper, discuss the merits or defects of Schleiermacher's work, nor the claims of the reli gious empiricism which are represented by Ritschl and his school. For I must concentrate on the problem, how far the re turn to the Christian experience provides a solution to the pro blem of the meaning of revelation and the status of a system of Christian doctrine. The first point is to define more clearly what is meant by Christian experience. For the use of the word is often vague, and it is sometimes treated as a datum about which we need ask no further questions. Speaking broadly we may say that the Christian experience embraces the beliefs, emotions, and psychical activities of Christian people. It is not something simple, but has different factors, and these factors are not always present in the same degree, nor are they always related in exactly the same way. The emotional element, for instance, may be more marked than the cognitive, and *vice versa*. The experi ence, therefore, admits of a certain diversity. Still, if it is to bear the name Christian, it ought to have a typical character, or at least it should possess a unifying principle which enables us to distinguish it from other kinds of experience. So in the sphere

historic religion we ought to be able to differentiate it from e piety of the Buddhist or the Mohammedan. Now the or-nizing principle from which Christian experience derives its ecific nature centres in the relation of the believer to Christ. part from that relation the experience could not exist, and from it draws its specific quality of being Christian. But does this ean, it may be asked, that the Christian experience bears a rtain fixed and stereotyped character, and preserves a strict ntity through all the changes of the historic life? In other rds, is it essentially static? Some theologians have so re-rded it, and this, I take it, would be true of Ritschl. But this a position which it is hard to defend, for it seems to involve an gitimate isolation of the Christian consciousness from its anging cultural environment. The past is always mirrored in e present, and coloured by the values which obtain in the esent. To anyone who has eyes to see, the Christian experience the first century is not exactly reproduced in the fifth, nor at of the thirteenth in the twentieth century. Even when a rm remains outwardly the same, it does not preserve an iden-al meaning and content in different ages. If we may speak of ristian experience preserving a certain pattern, it is important remember that the pattern grows in complexity with the de-lopment of the social life, and its parts acquire new shades of aning. The element of continuity in the process depends on constant relation to Christ, but the relation itself is qualified influences, intellectual and moral, which reflect the dominant lues of society from age to age.

If we are right, then, in concluding that Christian experience s a growing rather than a static character, it becomes impor-nt to ask how this conception affects the status of doctrines nceived to be the interpretation of this experience. In the first ace it is plain that the notion of a supernatural revelation given a final form, a notion on which the traditional theology unded, can no longer survive in its old form. We cannot ore the presence of psychological and historical conditions. revelation must be brought into line with the principle of velopment: it must be intimately related to the life of man d society. The idea of the pure communication of truths *ab tra* falls away, and the human medium and the historic en-ronment become vital factors in the revealing process. Need-

less to say, too, the sharp distinction, once so familiar, between natural and supernatural revelation can only stand for a difference in degree, not for a difference in kind. For if revelation is given in and through the religious experience of individuals: the human factor always counts in determining what is revealed, and there can be no abstract isolation of divine communication and human discovery. Living personalities are the primary medium of revelation, and if the ultimate source of the experienced truth is divine, its apprehension and mode of expression are human. The two sides meet and blend in the one process. We shall agree, I suppose, that the apprehension of divine truth may be described as intuition. It is immediate in the sense that the result is not reached by an explicit drawing of inference. Yet I do not think we should take this to mean that the truth is a pure communication from a higher world which is apprehended by a mysterious flash of insight on the part of the prophet or spiritual experient. In the experience of revelation the element of mediation is always present, though it be not consciously recognized. And this is due to the personal character of the recipient, the historic environment, and the given situation.

The late Mr. Bradley termed our moral judgments 'intuitive subsumptions,' and I think this would describe the phenomena we have in view.[1] The premises in this case are the religious outlook of the historically conditioned individual: into this the new truth enters, thereby gaining in its meaning, and in turn lending a deeper significance to that outlook. The main point is, that the fresh intuition does not come as an isolated fact: it presupposes and fits into the body of the individual's religious experience. To say this is therefore to say that revelation has a relative character, relative in the sense of being related to the personality, outlook, and environment of its recipient. If it were not so, it would not be an experience which is psychologically possible.

Revelation is primarily given through the inner experience of the great religious personalities, and only in a secondary sense can the record of these experiences be termed a revelation. The only legitimate meaning we can attach to the supernatural in revelation is the divine quickening of human powers, in virtue of which a deeper vision of spiritual truths and values is achieved

[1] *Ethical Studies*, Second Edition, pp. 194, 196.

y a commanding religious genius. We need not discuss the uestion whether the new insight should be construed as divine ggestion coming through the sub-conscious life. The idea at l events would harmonize with a psychological interpretation the experience. The important thing is to recognize that the evealing process is personally and historically conditioned. here can, we repeat, be no clear-cut separation between the ivine and human elements, and to assign certain religious uths to the category of the supernatural and others to the cate- ory of the natural will always remain unconvincing.

Though we refuse to isolate the two factors in revelation, we o not therefore hold that all religious experience has an equal aim to the status of revelation. If the word is not to lose its pecific value, it must connote something more than the neces- ary self-expression of an immanent Deity. For revelation hich means no more than the inevitable self-communication on e part of God becomes devoid of ethical and personal mean- g: it stands merely for a metaphysical fact in the structure the universe, not a personal disclosure of divine truth. Reve- tion implies Theism, and Theism involves the transcendency s well as the immanence of God.

The problem before us now is not to draw a clear line be- ween what is and what is not revealed. Put in this way the pro- em evades solution. The question rather is whether we can istinguish degrees in which the revealing activity is at work in ligious experience, and so assign a higher authority to reli- ous experience in which this factor is more conspicuously esent. Here one cannot proceed without presuppositions. One esupposition is, that the movement of revelation is directed wards the fullest and most harmonious realization of the reli- ous life of man and society. This is impossible where there is ot concord between the elements of personality. Thus the dgments of the moral consciousness must be in harmony with ligious beliefs. Of course the moral as well as the religious nsciousness is subject to development, and we are not entitled deny the presence of revelation in an earlier phase of religion ecause it is linked with ideas not in harmony with our developed hical judgments. A case in point would be the pre-prophetic age of Hebrew religion. But with regard to the stage of reli- on reached, where revelation is operative it will carry with it

the demand for concord between the moral and the religious consciousness. For this is essential to spiritual development.

Implied in this view is the presupposition that revelation is a development which is teleologically controlled. It is progressive and therefore orderly. The divine word may be given πολυμέρως καὶ πολυτρόπως, as the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews puts it. None the less the historic conception of revelation means that it is not a series of disjointed fragments: the parts must form a related whole and together constitute a teleological development. In other words, revelation is not a series of intuitions vouchsafed to individuals, but devoid of any larger reference. It is a historic process coming to utterance at specific times and places, yet moving concurrently in its parts to an ethical and spiritual goal. And if it would be a narrow view to say that Christian revelation ended with Christ, we may still say that the significance of the whole process was summed up and made manifest in Him. It will be possible, then, to test in a general way a claim to religious revelation by considering the consistency of the claim with the character of the larger movement, and by showing its value as an element in the whole development. Judged in this manner no one, for instance, will refuse the name revelation to the message of the eighth century prophets of Israel.

It will now be clear how the problem of authority in religious experience should be answered. The authority of the experience will not be something external to the experience itself, but will depend on its moral and spiritual content. This content will gain in authority, if it is charged with revelational value in virtue of its place in the general development of revelation. But in the end, no doubt, the recognition of a claim to revelation to be authoritative will depend on its appeal to our conscience. However cogently the case for the spiritual claims of a religious truth may be put, it will not be authoritative *for us* unless it evokes a response and wins an acceptance in our own souls. The sense of certitude in religion is inward and personal. As Martineau has put it, 'The consciousness of authority (in religion) is doubtless human, but conditional on the source being divine.' Here we come to the ultimate presupposition of authority in religion, the presupposition which lies behind the whole idea of revelation. It is a living or organic relation of the human spirit to the

Divine, so that in the depths of his soul man is open to divine influence. If this final postulate is false, religion sinks to the level of a specious illusion, revelation becomes a superstition, and theology ranks with the vagaries of mythology. It lies beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the validity of this postulate. But for those who deny its truth, and treat the impressive fabric reared by religious faith and hope as an unsubstantial vision, the emergence of religious experience in the world, an experience universal and persistent, becomes an inexplicable mystery.

A system of doctrine is the product of a mature religion. Its condition is the existence of a body of religious experience calling for explication. The task of theology, we have seen, is to express the meaning of the experience in a generalized form. The method by which doctrinal statements are developed lends no support to the conclusion that these have the status of revealed truths. For the theologian proceeds by interpretation and reflection, and dogmas were never the direct outcome of intuition or vision. At the most we could say that religious experience contains a revelation, and that religious doctrines adequately present its meaning. The authority of doctrine would then be derivative, and would depend on its really expressing the primary revelation. But even this claim for a doctrinal system cannot be defended. For, as we have contended, divine communication can never be exactly separated from human apprehension, and the process of interpreting is at no time free from inaccuracy and defect. Moreover, Christian experience has not furnished its own categories, and theological interpretation has been dependent on forms of thought drawn from the intellectual environment of the age. So unless we make the unjustifiable assumption that these categories are adequate and final, we cannot conclude that form and matter are united in a perfect embodiment of religious truth. On more general grounds the same conclusion follows. For both the religious experience and its formulation are subject to the law of development, and this means that no stage of the process is final and complete. And the idea that everything has somehow been given in the beginning will not work. The notion that development is simply the explication of what is performed at the first has been abandoned in biology, and it is just as impracticable in the field of theology.

The attempt has been made to advocate a purely empiric theology, which simply reports what is contained in Christian e perience, and so carries with it all the authority that can b attached to the experience itself. This method, I venture t think, cannot consistently be carried out. The beliefs implicit i spiritual experience are not correlated and unified, nor are the stated in universal propositions. To do this is the task of th theologian. He has to valuate his materials, to distinguish wha is relevant to his purpose from what is irrelevant, and thus exe cises selection in the process of dealing with his data in order t bring them into a systematic form. And where there is selectio there is some norm or ideal of truth, in the light of which w select. This norm is never purely empirical, but is in some de gree determined by a larger conception of religious truth whic the theologian brings with him. You will find, for instance, tha Harnack's attempt to define the essence of Christianity on em pirical lines is not purely empirical. Again, though St. Paul' theology has its roots in experience, his doctrines sometimes g beyond what he could have experienced. Hence I should agre with a recent theologian in saying, that 'in no case is dogma th pure transcript of experience.'[2] The fact is that in framing system of doctrine the question of truth is raised, and that in form which has no counterpart in the sphere of religious experi ence. It is not merely that the theologian has to make his doc trines internally coherent, so that they support one another. H cannot evade the task of bringing them into harmony with the existing body of knowledge, and his problem becomes a philo sophical one.

In his *Literature and Dogma* Matthew Arnold remarked: 'I there is anything with which metaphysics have nothing to do, i is religion.' This is true in the sense that religion is not meta physics. It is not true if it means that theology, which is the out growth of religion, does not enter into relation with metaphysics Ritschl and many of his followers made a strenuous endeavou to bar the door against all intrusions of philosophy in the theo logical domain, and to base doctrine on historical revelation. But the attempt has not permanently succeeded, for it involves a false isolation of religion from the wider world of knowledge. The assumption that theology can be restricted to a definite

[2] W. Morgan, *The Nature and Right of Religion*, p. 181.

phere of supernaturally revealed truths is inadmissible. In the nterests of theology itself we are bound to try to show that reli- gious doctrine can be harmoniously related to human experience nd knowledge as a whole. Therefore, it seems to me, in work- ng out the implications of Theology we pass into a Philosophy f Religion.

I do not, however, deny that doctrines which are closely re- ated to the personal and historic Christian experience, for in- tance the working of grace in the soul, in virtue of the intimacy f the relation, possess a greater authority than a purely specula- ive construction. But there are many Christian doctrines which lo not exhibit this close relationship. And, in any case, it is a egitimate demand that doctrines, whether intimately related to xperience or not, should be brought within the synoptic outlook f philosophy. It will always supply a test, and if need be a cor- ective, to bring the conclusions gathered in one department into elation with a larger view of things.

Does the claim of dogma on our allegiance depend on its being rationalized? Certainly a dogma, or group of dogmas, which contradicts reason has no right to our acceptance. But rationality cannot be a complete test of religious truths, for the process of rationalizing is never complete, and the final postu- ates of Christian faith cannot be matters of logical proof. Faith goes deeper than reason, and reason cannot supersede faith. But f reason has its limits, it has also its rights. For reason in its arger sense is the principle of coherence and system; and our whole experience, so far as it is organized, will always be the norm by which we scrutinize and put to the test conclusions drawn from a special phase of experience. Coherence, then, with the systematized whole of knowledge at any given time will provide a test of the validity of doctrines. Not of course an absolute test. For our philosophic insight into the whole of things is partial. Moreover the materials which contribute to our world-view are ever growing, and philosophy is in process of development just as much as science or religion. There is therefore no complete speculative insight from which we can deduce the truth of theo- logical constructions. But there is always the need of bringing about a concord between our religious doctrines and the existing organism of knowledge; and where there is inconsistency the demand for the revision and modification of theological state-

ments is legitimate. This interaction is a condition as well as stimulus to doctrinal development. A theology which falls bac on its own sufficiency, and eschews all contact with the large world of thought, declines to the level of a stereotyped and tradi tional system: it ceases to be vital and the thought of the ag moves away from it.

The view for which we are contending is not that advocate by Hegel, and repeated in substance in our time by Croce—th view that philosophy is the true arbiter of religious truth whos judgment is final. For a completed system of thought, in th light of which absolute judgments on all claims to truth coul be pronounced, is an unattainable ideal. The movement of reason is provoked by the presence of unrationalized elements, an speculative thought only lives in the process of development. On the other hand, interaction between religion and philosophy will be to the profit of both.

From this point of view, then, what will be our judgment on the historic development of Christian doctrine? It would, it seems to me, be a serious misunderstanding of the situation to regard the growth of Christian doctrines in the early centuries as a process of deterioration from the original gospel, a process due to the infiltration of alien elements from outside. The religion of Jesus could not go on to realize itself as a universal faith, and at the same time remain isolated and unaffected by the currents of life and thought in its environment. It revealed its vitality by its power to assimilate and transmute elements which came to it from without. And some interaction with Hellenism was essential, if primitive Christianity was to be enlarged to meet the needs of the Gentile world. Moreover, there must have been some affinity between values of the Christian consciousness and the forms supplied by Hellenism which were selected to express its meaning. What distorted its meaning would be rejected. Hence the doctrines of the first four centuries were, on the whole, appropriate statements relative to that age of religious and intellectual development. They were generally recognized by the Church to express its sense of Christian truths and values. On the other hand, these doctrinal propositions have no claim to be taken as final: a later age must be free to reformulate its doctrines in the light of its own knowledge and values, if theology is to live and

give. It does not follow, for example, that the Logos-concep-n, which plays so large a part in early Christology, must deter-ne throughout the modern interpretation of the person of rist. Perfect fixity of conception is an illusion: even when a egory remains the same in name, its significance changes with changed ideas and values of the onward-moving historic life. Our conclusion therefore is, that the notes of fixity and abso-eness cannot belong to a system of Christian doctrine. Theo-y as a constructive system cannot escape the doom of relativ-, and the doctrinal formulations which satisfy one age will not isfy another. If we are to look for finality anywhere it must be he fact of Christ, whom we take to be a manifestation of the nscendent God in the sphere of sense and time. If it be argued t fact is nothing apart from the meaning and value we read o it, I should urge that interpretation and valuation *posit an imate datum*; for working-values are more than subjective rations: they have an objective reference. If we say that the lity on which Christian experience and theology rest is the que manifestation of the transcendent God, our conviction is ed on faith, not on demonstration. But this faith saves us m the depressing conclusion that our Christian doctrines are y dissolving symbols, or fictions which are useful for one age t will prove useless for another. Yet Christ abides, even ugh our theological interpretations of His person and work subject to change. The revelation of God in Christ is the al ground of Christian faith, and from it the impulse to trans-e faith into doctrines derives. The reality which lies behind work of theological construction likewise conditions the broad velopment of doctrines; and it furnishes an assurance that, spite inevitable changes, Christian doctrines will manifest a tain unity of character and purpose. Can we look for more a world where knowledge is ever growing, but where in the end n only know in part? To claim finality and absolute truth for ystem of doctrine is to ignore the way in which it has been veloped, and to forget the limitations under which the theo-ian works. The authority which belongs to doctrines will de-nd on the degree in which they express the living faith and the ritual values of the Christian society.

THE IDEA OF A NATIONAL CHURCH

By Professor J. M. Creed, B.D., Canon of Ely.

THE value of an idea in civil or ecclesiastical polity is n necessarily to be measured by its utility in a given set circumstances. For circumstances change. To those who a immersed in the difficult and absorbing duties of administrati it may seem that some guiding thought or principle which h once powerfully influenced the history of the institution whi they serve has lost its virtue and its relevance. And it may that this is in truth the case. But if an idea has a long pedigre this conclusion should not be too hastily drawn. When circu stances change, as they certainly will, the old idea may come life again in a new form. The Bishop of Durham has placed upon record[1] that at the meetings of the bishops which preced the publication of the 'Deposited Book' he learnt to recogni that in the minds of his fellow bishops the Church had be already disestablished. Some recent utterances of some of th bishops perhaps justify the suspicion that Dr. Henson genera ized too hastily. Subsequent events have at any rate prove that in the mind of the country the Church is not disestablishe and that on occasion the country is prepared to speak and a when the interests of its Church appear to call for action.

The nineteenth Christian century witnessed a powerful r vival in Church consciousness and Church life. The age was revolt against its predecessor. The eighteenth century ha marked the extreme of reaction from mediaeval polity. In th middle age the Church ruled, or claimed to rule, the State. I the eighteenth century the State almost succeeded in ruling th Church. The Church became virtually a department of th State. Its activity was judged by the standard of utility. In s far as it promoted order and good morals, or seemed to do s its utility was acknowledged. But in Protestant Germany, a the century wore on, it seemed to many that the 'enlightenmen of the age had at length made the Church superfluous. I Catholic France there was open war between the Church an

[1] *Disestablishment*, p. 46.

ilosophisme. After the Encyclopaedia was forbidden by au-
ority in 1759, a league was formed by the Encyclopaedists
d those who sympathized with them 'to raise the throne of
eason upon the ruins of dogma.' The *esprit philosophique*
netrated to the Sorbonne, the seminaries and the clergy.
me of the most eminent prelates were at no pains to conceal
eir infidelity. Diderot was confident that the days of the
urch were numbered, and a bishop is reported to have said:
t the rate at which everything is going now, religion cannot
ve fifty years to live.'[2] In 1790, by the *Civil Constitution of*
e Clergy, the Revolutionary State asserted its authority over
e Church. The organization of the Church was to be re-
odelled and reformed on the basis of popular election. All
terference of a foreign bishop in administration was for-
dden, though the headship of the Pope in matters spiritual was
lowed. When the Pope refused his consent to this constitu-
on, and when the Assembly required from all priests an oath
allegiance to the nation, the law, the King and the Civil Con-
tution as a condition of exercising their office, the clergy were
once sharply divided into two classes, Jurors and non-Jurors,
ose who obeyed the nation and those who obeyed the Pope.
1793 the Convention suppressed the worship of the Church
d either closed the churches or converted them into Temples
Reason.

It was well enough to hurl invective at the Church when
e still stood battening on the resources of the country and
ained with the blood of innocent victims. When the Church
ll, the temper changed. Robespierre's grotesque attempt to
place the historic worship of the Church by a national festival
honour of the Supreme Being did but prove the impotence of
e Illumination to create. In the desolation of the Revolution
e Church appeared no more as the enemy of progress but as
e supreme symbol of past greatness. She was mother of the
ts and nurse of civilization. So she was displayed in the
oquent pages of Chateaubriand's *Génie du Christianisme*. Not
e truth of the faith, not its power to redeem the souls of sinful
en, but the 'beauties' of the Christian religion and its power

[2] Rocquain, *L'Esprit révolutionnaire avant la révolution*, p. 263; quoted
ielsen, *History of the Papacy in XIX Century*, I, p. 55.

to console and to relieve were the themes of the new apologet
Alongside this Rousseauesque enthusiasm for the Catholic fai
there was developed the more serious political defence of th
Papacy. The *a priori* necessity of an absolute authority
crown the state system of Europe, and the actual presence
that authority in the Supreme Pontiff, became cardinal principl
of an important school of political thought.

In Protestant Germany, too, the Church revived under th
influence of Romanticism. Schleiermacher broke with th
atomic individualism of the Illumination and grounded his do
trinal system upon the piety and religious experience of th
Christian society. The Fellowship of the invisible Church be
came again a living article of the Faith, and in the Evangelica
Union of 1817 a new interconfessional form was found for th
empirical Church on earth. Both the Union and the reaction
towards confessional orthodoxy which the Union occasione
testify to a renewal of Church life and Church consciousness.

But the outcome of the Illumination was not confined to th
reaction which it provoked. The principle of toleration whic
during the eighteenth century had permeated and transforme
the old confessional form of state had done its work, and if i
was sometimes defied, it was never forgotten. In spite of de
nunciations of civil liberty by Popes Gregory XVI[3] and Piu
IX,[4] in spite of the opposition of Protestant Archbishops an
Bishops in Great Britain[5] to Catholic emancipation, the principl
of liberty of worship, with its corollary that the service of th
State must not be conditioned by religious tests, has come to
assume in the modern State the position of an accepted axiom.

These two factors—a revived Church consciousness and the
principle of religious liberty for the citizen—created the condi
tions for the perennial problem of Church and State in the post
Revolution world. Both factors find satisfaction in the Libera

[3] See the encyclical *Mirari vos arbitramur,* 15 Aug., 1832 (Denzinger
Bannwart *Enchiridion*[15], p. 429) '. . . Ex hoc putidissimo indifferentism
fonte absurda illa fluit ac erronea sententia seu potius deliramentum
asserendam esse ac vindicandam cuilibet libertatem conscientiae.'

[4] See the 'errors' condemned by the Syllabus of 1864, Denzinger
Bannwart, p. 472.

[5] In the final division in the House of Lords on Catholic Emancipation
a hundred years ago, ten Bishops supported the measure, three Arch
bishops and seventeen Bishops voted or paired against it.

ctrine of a Free Church in a Free State, always provided that
freedom of the Church be not interpreted to involve the
ercise of temporal power and the control of education and
igion throughout the State. With the doctrine of 'a Free
urch in a Free State' as its ideal of ecclesiastical policy, the
ate may disencumber itself of embarrassing associations with
igion and Churches. The interests of the State are secular,
t religious. On the other hand, the Church or the Churches
st as independent societies within the compass of the State,
e to direct their own affairs and to administer their own dis-
pline, subject indeed to the controlling hand of the State, like
other societies and corporations, but not more so than other
cieties and corporations. This is a doctrine which certainly
es justice to many of the conditions which demand to be satis-
d, and, for some countries, the arguments in its favour are
erwhelming. What other doctrine, for instance, is possible
r modern America, with its heterogeneous population drawn
m all the nationalities of Europe? To unite these people
the basis of a common citizenship is an obvious necessity.
impose upon them the national recognition of some one of
e many sects and Churches would be as unjust as it would be
diculous. The thing is not conceivable. Take again the
dely different circumstances of nineteenth century Italy.
ven Cavour's problem of fashioning a united Italy out of a
mber of states, whereof one was claimed by the Pope as the
alienable heritage of his see, how, without that idea, could he
en envisage the problem which he had to solve?

But if the long and tangled story of the problem of Church
d State has any one lesson to teach us, it is surely this: that
one answer is likely to be the last and conclusive word for
l time and every place. The Liberal doctrine has its clear
stification, and the factors which determined it must receive
tisfaction. If it is impossible for religion to hold or win a
ace in organic relation to civil society by other means, it cer-
inly will not win or keep such a place by attempting to impose
secure tests of conformity for rights of citizenship. In face
any such policy, the Liberal doctrine is and will remain rele-
nt. Nor, again, can a Church ever acquiesce in being treated
a means to some end of State. The end of the Church is

religion. And religion can never, without ceasing to be religio surrender its claim to exist in its own right. As against such policy on the part of the State, the Liberal doctrine is and w remain relevant. But when the separation of Church and Sta is urged as the only means by which these just ends may b secured, I think that we may well hesitate. The separation Church and State is a negative idea, and as an ultimate solutio of the problem it seems to lie open to this objection, that separates in theory, and as far as may be in practice, what i real life is not separable. We distinguish the religious and th non-religious, the sacred and the secular, but we never know th one in isolation from the other; the terms of the contrast impl each other. In the ideal society Church and State would be fe to stand in organic relation. For society is one, and man is one The religious and the non-religious play upon each other. Eac fructifies the other. Religion purifies, hallows and strengthen the life of man in civil society: the duties of civil society pro vide religion with its tasks and its opportunities. Religio draws upon the resources of a world 'beyond,' but, if it is t remain healthy, it must also find contact with normal life. I it fails to do this, it hardens into an irrational superstition crippling to the individual and menacing to society. The separation of Church and State may be a necessary phase fo some peoples, but it shirks the real problem, which is to deter mine the proper relation of the two aspects of society.

In the Greek Bible the word ἐκκλησία represents the solemn assembly of Israel. The incarnation of the Word found its historical setting as the culmination of a national history. If it is written 'His own knew Him not,' it is also written 'He came to His own.' It is congruous with the national setting of the redemptive tragedy of the Bible that when the Catholic religion of the Incarnation takes visible and local form, those forms themselves should be related to the natural associations of mankind.

It is unwise and unprofitable to attempt to determine *a priori* what forms the Church must or must not take. There is no fixed external *criterion*. Richard Hooker states the case for the Anglican doctrine of the supremacy of the Crown with characteristic restraint. 'Let it stand for our final conclusion,' he writes, 'that

n free Christian state or kingdom where one and the self-same
ople are the Church and the Commonwealth, God through
rist directing that people to see it for good and weighty con-
eration expedient that their sovereign lord and governor in
ses civil have also in ecclesiastical affairs a supreme power;
asmuch as the light of reason doth lead them unto it, and
inst it God's own revealed law hath nothing, surely they do
in submitting themselves thereunto any other than that which
vise and religious people ough to do.'[6] Hooker will not dis-
ow the Puritan doctrine of the two kingdoms, but he disputes
Puritan contention that it is to be imposed as a necessary
nciple. The ecclesiastical supremacy of the civil ruler is *a*
itimate method of Church government. Where good and
ighty considerations make it *expedient*, a people does right
adopting it.' The conception of the relation between the
urch and society which lies behind Hooker's great treatise
s struck deep roots among us, and with variations character-
c of different epochs it has reappeared once and again in
ne of our greatest writers. We have never, as a nation, taken
dly to the idea of the Church as a distinct corporation, exer-
ing, through its officers, an independent jurisdiction. That
why it is often said of us—not justly, I think—that we have
led to realise the idea of a Church. I should prefer to say
t we are keenly alive to the dangers which beset the Christian
urch when it is too closely identified with the institutional
ms which it is bound to assume. Against these perils the
a of the Church as the nation in its religious aspect is a safe-
ard. The conception no doubt exposes us to other perils—
rticularly that of a too complaisant attitude towards the
wers that be. The national Church has always required—
d has never been spared—the healthy corrective of Puritan
ticism. But even Presbyterianism has its drawbacks, and we
ed not be too apologetic about ourselves. If our main Angli-
n position — one of our main Anglican positions, I will say—
threatened, I think we should by all means stand to our guns.
o far is Hooker's idea from being out of date that never, as it
ems to me, has the time called more loudly for its reassertion
an it calls to-day. *The Church of England is the nation*

[6] *Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity*, VIII, iii, 6.

viewed as a religious community. I am not prepared to pressed into accepting all the implications which might be he to be involved logically in such a definition. But neither am prepared to accept the conclusions which are usually explici drawn from any rival definition of the Church of England whi I have ever come across.

The life of the organized Christian Churches is to-day in uneasy state, because the denominational system under whi we live, which still plays a part which has not been and, so f as I can see, cannot yet be replaced, took shape at a time wh the structure of men's thoughts was wholly different from th which now prevails. If religion were a separable item whi persists unchanged amid a changing world, this would n matter. But such a supposition is unfounded. There is co tinuity in religion, but there is also change. Our Church life uneasy because we are all, from Archbishops to churchwarden making adjustments, more or less extensive, of an inherite system to a new environment. The process is not comfortab for any of us, and it is very natural that some, who do n realise how far they have themselves already moved from th Christianity of the Fathers and the Councils, should view wha is happening with great alarm. This alarm is reflected in muc of our popular religious literature. The rise of a new worl which knows not the language of our denominational agree ments and dissensions appears as a rising flood of irreligiou materialism, and a picture is conjured up of the Church stand ing, amid a perverse and crooked generation, as the one witnes to the reality of God and the truth of religion. To me it appear that this kind of contrast between the Church and the worl obscures the facts as they are. I regret the alienation fron organized Christianity; I wish to make the best of the situatio as it is; and I cannot join in the popular outcry that the Churc has failed, because when the difficulties which confront us hav been measured, I am by no means sure that the Church ha failed. Yet I note that two or three of the most religious an withal intelligent men that I know do not identify themselve with the Church as it is or with any other denomination. An these are men who will powerfully influence the future of reli gion. No doubt my experience is not unusual. How unreal

ien, is this contrast between Church and world, if by 'Church' e mean some clearly-marked organized body or bodies! lease note that I am not depreciating the importance of the ganization. My point is this: if I think of the Church of ngland as the nation in its religious aspect, I am encouraged ask a rather different and, as it seems to me, more important t of questions than if I think of the Church of England as a enomination with certain peculiar tenets and practices which lark it off from other denominations. The mental association the Church as an institution with the life of the nation is the y to the position.

In conclusion, I must note an important criticism which is metimes urged against the line of thought which I am anxious defend. A national Church, it is said, implies and encourages parochial view of Christianity, and may even foster a danger- s and un-Christian spirit of national exclusiveness; a national hurch is indeed a contradiction in terms, for the Church is by nature, not national, but catholic. I am in no way concerned dispute that the idea of a national Church, like other ideas, ay be, perhaps often is, perverted and misused. But the iticism to which I have referred misses two important points.

The idea of a national Church is, in a sense, limited and un- bitious, but its very limitation is one of its strongest recom- endations. If, with Coleridge, we distinguish carefully the ea of a national Church from the idea of the Christian Church e criticism loses its sting. Coleridge's Essay on Church and ate, called forth by the crisis of Catholic emancipation a ndred years ago, was written in view of problems entirely fferent from our own. But the virtue has not departed from s main contentions. The contrasted terms Church and State, urges, are only relevant as between the national Church and e State, viewed as two constituent elements of the realm. The hristian Church and the State are never properly antithetical rms, since the Church, though itself 'visible,' can never, ex- pt by usurpation, have a visible sovereign. The only proper tithesis to the Christian Church is the World. 'The Christian hurch, I say, is no state, kingdom or realm of this world; nor it an estate of any such realm, kingdom or state; but it is the pointed opposite to them all collectively — the sustaining,

correcting, befriending opposite of the World; the compensating counterforce to the inherent and inevitable evils and defects of the State, as a State, and without reference to its better or worse construction as a particular State.'[7] It is one of the merits of the idea of a national Church that it discourages us from identifying a particular organization with the Church Catholic. It is plausible to identify the Papal Church with the Church Catholic. It is not plausible to identify the Church of England with the Church Catholic. To realize our limitations is to take the first step towards overcoming them. Our claim for the Church of England is not more than this: that it is a particular embodiment of a universal faith.

The second point which the criticism overlooks is that in the political and social condition of the modern world the national character of the Church itself makes for the catholicity of the Church. The ancient Church found its home in a world wherein the Empire of Rome was the all important political entity. Inevitably the Church was assimilated in structure to the mould into which it was cast. The Papacy did not originate in our Lord's commission to the Fisherman, but in the association of the Fisherman with the imperial tradition of Rome. This is the historical justification for the Roman Church. And the same principle justifies in our day the idea of a national Church. For in our day the supremely important political association is, and is likely for long to remain, the nation. The dangers of our international system are grave, but they do not alter the fact that the system exists. When we seek to mitigate the perils of national rivalry we do not look to a spiritual overlord, or to a temporal emperor. We do what alone our circumstances allow us to do: we form 'a league of nations.' The nation is the chief political unit and the necessary medium of our cultural and intellectual life. A national Church is thus a natural ecclesiastical counterpart to the political and social order in which we live. The idea of a national Church helps a Churchman to feel that he may throw himself open to the currents of thought which are circulating in the community without narrowly questioning their bearing upon his denominational loyalty. His denomina-

[7] *On the Constitution of Church and State* (3rd ed., Pickering, 1839), p. 124.

on is the nation, and therefore the general drifts and changes opinion and belief which are for ever taking place in human ie are taking place within the Church. It is a matter of course at the Churchman will try—so far as his capacity allows—to influence, and be influenced by the world about him. Of course am not meaning that all, or even many, of the drifts are necessarily in the right direction, or that we ought to surrender to le flow of opinion. By no means. It is of the very essence of ligion that man should find himself enabled to rise above the w and eddies of his environment. But the first condition of fective action upon society is a sensitive perception of the tual currents in the world of ideas. Without this perception we n never hope that religion will strike the universal note. It is erefore the contention of this paper that so far from its being e case that Catholic and National are antithetical terms, in the nditions of our world the exact opposite is the case. For our orld a national Church is best fitted to find and express a catho- tone and temper.

The idea which I have tried to justify and defend has not een disinterred from the thought of a bygone age. It had its igin in the past, but it is grounded in the nature of things. It as lived through history, and it lives to-day. 'To my mind,' id the late Bishop of London, 'Church and State are not con- adictory things. Church and State are the nation looked at om different points of view. The nation looked at from the cular side is the State, looked at from the religious side it is e Church, and separation between the two is impossible.'[8]

The writer of this paper is conscious that he has essayed a ifficult task and that he has failed to tackle many acute ques- ons which are directly relevant to his theme. He is conscious, o, that a strong wind is blowing in a contrary direction, and at at the moment the line of least resistance for a Churchman to acquiesce in a process which denationalizes the national hurch. Those of us who are unable to acquiesce may perhaps nd comfort in the reflection that the line of least resistance is eldom the line of true development.

[8] *Life and Letters of Mandell Creighton*, Vol. II, p. 384.

THE ACTUAL POSITION IN ENGLAND TO-DAY

By the Rev. NORMAN SYKES, D.Phil., King's College, London,
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IN the controversy between the upper and lower houses of the Canterbury Convocation which engrossed clerical attention throughout the reigns of William III and Anne, a defender of the rights of the archbishop in convocation protested against the practice of his opponents in arguing their case, not from historical precedents, but from abstract theories concerning the nature of a 'house' and of its necessary prerogatives. 'Such metaphysical reasonings,' he urged, 'are applied only to things that are in their nature fixed and unchangeable, and not to legal constitutions of any kind.' The warning is apposite to present controversies, in which the problem of the relations of Church and State in England is discussed not infrequently by reference to *a priori* notions of the inherent spiritual autonomy of a Christian Church, rather than by careful consideration of the process of historical development by which the contemporary form of English institutions, political and ecclesiastical, has been moulded. Of churches no less than of convocations it is true that 'law and custom, and not metaphysical notions, are the measure of their proceedings.' This circumstance justifies the inclusion within the scheme of 'Spiritual Authority in the modern State' of the subject of this paper: which is defined as the consideration of 'the actual position in England to-day, tracing from the sixteenth century onwards the authority which has actually been exercised by the nation whether represented by the Sovereign or by Parliament.' Its province is to expound such outstanding constitutional acts and usages as have influenced the relations of Church and State from the Reformation to the Enabling Act of our own day. Such exposition must involve of necessity the recital of sundry facts of historical incidence, brute, dull, archaic facts of a character calculated to provoke the spirit of hasty reformers who aspire to wrestle with difficult and delicate problems without patient investigation of their sources. But since the function of historical study is to interpret as well as to narrate,

will be necessary to adventure further an impression of the eaning and importance of these various acts and customs : more pecially in relation to the provisions of the Enabling Act of 19, and the consequent and contemporary *impasse* between the hurch Assembly and the House of Commons in regard to the evised Prayer Book. In offering such an individual interpretion I do not hope or desire to avoid debate and dissent. The inciple which I should wish to establish is that, whatever the nclusions reached, the problem should be studied by reference known historical statutes and uses, not to theoretical speculaons concerning the nature and rights of a church. The apologia r this historical approach may be stated in words borrowed ain from the convocation writer : 'Points of power, privilege, d jurisdiction are determined by usage and precedent, and not uncertain inference from the nature of things.'

II.

The keynote of the English Tudor Reformation viewed from e constitutional standpoint, consists in the resolution of the ng and parliament to assert the principle of nationality against at of universality in ecclesiastical matters by removing the gal basis of the papal monarchy over the *Ecclesia Anglicana* d replacing it by the royal supremacy. The principle of this olicy is stated in the preamble to the famous Act of Appeals of 33 : 'Where by divers sundry old authentic histories and ronicles, it is manifestly declared and expressed, that this alm of England is an empire . . . governed by one supreme ad and king, unto whom a body politic, compact of all sorts d degrees of people, divided in terms, and by names of iritualty and temporalty, be bounden and ought to bear, next God, a natural and humble obedience; he being also institute d furnished . . . with plenary, whole and entire power, preminence, authority, prerogative and jurisdiction, to render and eld justice and final determination to all manner of folk, residents or subjects within this realm, in all causes, matters, dees and contentions happening to occur . . . within the limits ereof, without restraint, or provocation to any foreign prince potentates of the world.' The liberation of the English Church om subjection to the papal authority was effected accordingly

by a series of parliamentary statutes, in the enactment of which the Convocations were generally not consulted, though the ecclesiastical interest was championed of course by the spiritual peers in the House of Lords. In 1532, however, the Convocations made their famous submission: whereby they acknowledged the King to be 'the single protector, the sole and sovereign lord, and, in so far as the law of Christ allows, supreme head' of the Church of England. They undertook further not to enact any future canons without the king's assent first given to their assembly in convocation and accorded finally to the projected legislation laid before him, whilst the existing corpus of canon law was to be revised by a committee of thirty-two, half clergy and half members of the temporalty in parliament, to the end that such ecclesiastical laws as were contrary to the statute law of the realm should be abrogated. Two years later this submission was incorporated formally in an act of parliament; and in the meantime the entire financial and judicial connection between England and the Apostolic See had been severed by the Act in restraint of Annates and the Act of Appeals respectively. The latter statute not only prohibited the evocation of any cases in an ecclesiastical court to Rome, thereby cutting off the appellate jurisdiction of the papacy, but severed the entire judicial and legislative ties which bound the national Church to the supreme pontiff. The process of reform was carried further by the Act of Supremacy which required the king and his successors to 'be taken, accepted and reputed the only supreme head in earth of the Church of England, called *Ecclesia Anglicana*,' with all the prerogatives thereto attaching.

In order to provide new machinery in the place of the papal administration now removed, statutes were enacted laying down procedure for royal visitation of the Church, for the election of archbishops and bishops, and for the erection of a final court of appeal in ecclesiastical causes. In all these respects the significance of the royal supremacy was illustrated and emphasized, especially in the control of capitular elections. The Act of 1534 inaugurated the process whereby a licence to elect is issued to the capitular body, accompanied by a letter missive containing the name of the person to be elected; 'by virtue of which licence the said dean and chapter . . . shall with all speed and celerity

due form elect and choose the said person named in the said tters missive . . . and none other.' If the chapter should re- se to elect the royal nominee they 'and all other persons so fending . . . and their aiders, counsellors, and abetters shall n into the dangers, pains and penalties of the statute of Pro- sion and Praemunire'; whilst the Crown could still proceed appoint by letters patent. In this reorganization of the Church, s internal administration was altered only slightly and in such egree as was necessary in consequence of the excision of the apal authority. For example, the right of issuing dispensations or plurality was transferred to the Archbishop of Canterbury, nough the legal limits of and qualifications for plurality were arefully defined in a statute of 1529, within the provisions of hich the archbishop was required to grant dispensations. The ple important and significant exception to the very conservative naracter of the Tudor reformation was the use of the visitatorial owers of the Crown to effect the complete suppression of reli- ious Orders, so that the reformed Church of England was to onsist of secular clergy alone, and the balance of the House of Lords was changed permanently in the interest of the temporalty gainst the spiritualty.

The ecclesiastical settlement thus fashioned by the legisla- ion of the Reformation Parliament created a series of constitu- tional problems, difficult in character and of far-reaching in- fluence in moulding the future relations of Church and State. In particular the liberation of the Church from the jurisdiction of ny foreign prince necessitated a definition of the relation of the Convocation and the Parliament to each other in virtue of their ommon subjection directly to the Crown as Supreme Head and Sovereign respectively. Both assemblies had played a part in he framing of the Reformation settlement, and the question nust inevitably arise whether the supremacy over the Church esided in the King personally or was shared by the Parliament which had given statutory force to his ecclesiastical policy. Around this problem centred the theoretic and practical con- troversies of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries; and he solution achieved at the Revolution of 1689 and developed subsequently has exercised a direct influence upon the contem- porary relations of Parliament and Convocation. It will be con-

venient therefore to trace the main lines of subsequent develo ment of the Tudor settlement from the standpoint of the confl of the two parts of the body politic in reference to the ecclesia tical supremacy of the Crown.

III.

The legislation of the Reformation Parliament did not crea a new ecclesiastical society, but effected rather certain chang in the mediaeval system. Its action was restrictive and regul tive, not creative. Thus the Canon Law continued to hav authority in England in so far as it was not contradictory to th statute law of the realm. The Convocations assembled still obedience to the mandate of the archbishop and retained the ancient right to debate and draft canons. Henceforth, howeve the archiepiscopal mandate could not be issued without roya licence, nor did the resolutions of the convocation enjoy th coercive force of canons until they had received the royal assen It would be erroneous to conclude that the Tudor Reformatio settlement implied the ascription of spiritual authority to civ magistrates, though it did involve the emphatic assertion of th right of the temporalty to restrain the spiritualty from the un fettered exercise of its ecclesiastical authority. In the words o Swift, 'although the supreme power can hinder the clergy o church from making any new canons, or executing the old; from consecrating bishops, or refuse those that they do consecrate; o in short, from performing any ecclesiastical office, as they ma from eating, drinking and sleeping; yet they cannot themselve perform those offices . . . ; or, if they do, it is not according t the divine institution, and consequently null and void.'[1] In stric theory the constitutional position of the convocations was emi nently satisfactory. The preamble to the Act of Appeals de clared 'that part of the body politic called the spiritualty, now being usually called the English Church,' to be 'of that sort that both for knowledge, integrity, and sufficiency of number it hath always been thought, and is also at this hour, sufficient and meet of itself without the intermeddling of any exterior person or per sons, to declare and determine all such doubts, and to administer all such offices and duties, as to their rooms spiritual doth apper-

[1] Swift: Remarks upon a Book intituled 'The Rights of the Christian Church': *Works*: ed. Scott, Vol. III, p. 92.

tain'; and it continued to affirm further of the temporalty and spiritualty that 'both their authorities and jurisdictions do conjoin together in the due administration of justice, the one to help the other.' It was in accordance with this declaration that the learned and careful canonist, Bishop Gibson, in the Introductory Discourse of his *Codex Juris Ecclesiastici Anglicani* (1713), maintained 'that England is governed by two distinct administrations, the one spiritual for matters of a spiritual nature, and the other temporal for matters of a temporal nature. And to the same end it hath two legislatures: the one consisting of persons spiritual and the other of persons temporal: whose business it is to frame laws for the government of Church and State; and these laws being enacted and confirmed by the Prince as Sovereign and Supreme Head, become obligatory to the people, and rules for the administration of justice in spiritual and temporal matters.'

If this theory could be sustained, the position of the Convocation would be exalted to an equality with that of the Parliament, and ecclesiastical matters would be dealt with by the clerical assembly alone, subject only to the controlling authority of the Crown. In particular, Canons made in Convocation with the assent of the King, provided always that they were concerned with spiritual matters and did not contravene the statute law of the realm, would be equally binding with Acts of Parliament as well upon laity as clergy. This became the official theory of churchmen during the early seventeenth century, but a variety of circumstances militated against its realization in practice. In the first place, the large part played by the Parliament in the actual establishment of the Reformation settlement under Henry VIII and its restoration by Elizabeth in 1559 without the co-operation of the Convocations, furnished a precedent for continued interference in church matters. Further, the constitutional expedients adopted by Henry VIII in his ecclesiastical policy were too diverse and uncertain to support any consistent theory that spiritual matters must be dealt with by the clerical assembly alone.[2] The Convocations had played little part either in the production of the two English Prayer Books

[2] For details illustrative of this point see my *Church and State in England since the Reformation* (Benn's Sixpenny Library, 1929).

of Edward VI's reign, or in the revision of 1559, whilst the
forcement of the use of the English Liturgy by the enactment
Uniformity Acts gave to the Parliament an undoubted share
Church affairs. When, after the legal establishment of the Eli
bethan settlement, the Queen adopted a strict and strong line
this matter, rebuking the Commons for interference with eccle
astical questions, the very alliance of the monarchy and the ep
copate served only to provoke a determination on the part of
Puritan majority in the House of Commons to control the ro
supremacy in their own interests. Accordingly the enactment
the Canons of 1604 by the Convocations with the assent of t
Crown, and without reference to the opinions of the Parliame
became a cause of friction between the early Stuart kings a
the Commons down to the Civil War. The attitude of the chu
party was expressed in a protest of 1625, signed by three bisho
chief of whom was Laud, against the proceedings of the Co
mons in the case of Montague, in regard to the legality of
Arminian interpretation of the Thirty-Nine Articles. The pr
test declared that 'if any difference, doctrine or other, fell in t
Church, the king and the bishops were to be judges of it, ir
national synod or convocation, the king first giving leave unc
his broad seal, to handle the points in difference. But the Chur
never submitted to any other judge, neither indeed can sh
though she would.' The real issue between the Church and P
liament was illustrated by the Canons of 1640, passed in Conv
cation with the assent of the Crown, but denounced by the Lo
Parliament and expressly disallowed by the Restoration Parli
ment in an Act of 1661. The theoretical reason for their i
validity, which has been pronounced recently 'technical y
sufficient,' was that they were passed after the dissolution of t
Short Parliament; but I venture to hazard the opinion that, h
the royalist party triumphed in the civil war, these Canons wou
have been accepted as valid, despite the legal objection to t
time of their enactment. With the victory of the parliamenta
forces in that conflict, the possibility of the independence of t
Convocations and of their maintenance of the position allow
to the spiritualty according to the preamble of the Act of A
peals, disappeared. Henceforth the supremacy over the Chur
became a parliamentary, not a royal, supremacy.

The Restoration settlement itself bore witness to this change. For, although in the Prayer Book revision the Parliament adopted the recommendations of the Convocations without alteration or debate, the Commons recorded formally their right to such debate. Further, from 1664 to 1689 the sessions of Convocation were suspended by prorogation after their formal assembly, and without allowing their members to proceed to debate. In the chorus of denunciation visited upon the head of the Whig administration of 1717 for its suspension of the Convocation sessions on account of the dispute concerning Hoadly, church historians have passed over in silence the precedent of 1664 to 1689, when, during the Indian summer of Caroline high-churchmanship, a similar silencing of Convocation was enforced for a quarter of a century. Yet the circumstance that the Crown ceased to desire the services of sitting Convocations after their surrender of the right of voting separate subsidies, and that two primates of such high-church views as Sheldon and Sancroft acquiesced in the suspension, suggests that the need of frequent and protracted sessions was not recognized by the authorities either of Church or State. With this first suspension the position of Convocation steadily declined. The next sitting Convocation came in 1689, followed by a series of formal assemblies until 1701; from which time until 1717 the experiment of regular meetings produced only an acrimonious and discreditable controversy between the two houses, which justified amply a further temporary suspension. The prolongation of the Whig suppression for nearly a century and a half marked the final extinction of the hopes of a parity betwixt Convocation and Parliament.

IV.

Meanwhile the power of the Parliament in ecclesiastical affairs had steadily increased. Reference has been made already to the important part played by the temporalty in the establishment of Henry VIII's settlement and its restoration under Elizabeth. Moreover, the Parliament had debated and passed the Six Articles statute, and the various Acts of Uniformity enforcing the use of the English Prayer Books. During the reign of Elizabeth the Commons ventured to debate the advisability of revising the Liturgy in a more Protestant direction, and though re-

proved by the Crown, did not abate their determination to sec control of Church policy. After the passing of the Canons 1604 their opposition was reinforced by the hostility of the Cc mon Law judges to the procedure of the High Commiss Court, and by the conclusion of Coke 'that a Convocation m make Constitutions by which those of the spiritualty shall bound (for this, that they all, by representation or in person present) but not the temporalty.' Under the *régime* of Charle and Laud the conflict became open; and in 1640 the Commc resolved 'that the clergy of England convented in any convo tion, synod or otherwise, have no power to make any consti tion, canons, or acts whatsoever in matter of doctrine, disciplin or otherwise, to bind the clergy or laity of this land without co mon consent of parliament.' During the Commonwealth t remnant of parliamentary personnel exercised complete contr over the religious administration of the country; and even at t Restoration a statute was passed expressly forbidding a 'archbishop, bishop, or any other ecclesiastical judge or office to 'confirm the canons made in the year 1640 or any of them, any other ecclesiastical laws or canons not formerly confirme allowed or enacted by parliament, or by the established laws the land as they stood in the year of our Lord 1639.' At the sam time, the resolution of the Commons, recording formally the right to debate the changes in the Book of Common Pray drawn up by the Convocations, although accompanied by a con plimentary resolution of thanks from the Lords to the Convoc tions for their plans was significant by its careful assertion the right of Parliament to determine the form of the Liturgy be used in public worship. The chief feature of the restore rule of the Stuarts lay in the adhesion of Charles II and James I to the Popish religion, an apostasy which evoked first the Te Act of 1672, designed to exclude from office Popish, not Pro testant, Dissenters, and led finally to the expulsion of the kin *de jure* in the Revolution of 1689. With the accession of Willian of Orange, and the passing of the Toleration Act, the parlia ment definitely assumed control of the government of th country both in temporal and ecclesiastical matters. The episod of the Non-Juror secession weakened the Church whilst illus trating the strength of the civil administration, and the Convo cation controversy destroyed the last opportunity of useful in

fluence allowed to that body. When the Hanoverian princes established themselves safely on the throne of Great Britain, the last vestiges of the royal supremacy in ecclesiastical matters were surrendered into the hands of Parliament.

The Parliament meanwhile had been reinforced by the addition of Scottish peers and commoners consequent upon the Act of Union of 1707, a change which helped further to emphasize the Puritan tendency of the Commons which had been its distinguishing characteristic in the seventeenth century. The reigns of the first two Georges witnessed debates in Parliament upon various measures directed against ecclesiastical privilege, whilst the Convocations were rendered silent and impotent by prorogations. The chief illustration of the power of Parliament over spiritual matters, however, occurred in the famous incident of the Feathers' Tavern petition. The presentation in 1772 of this petition for relaxing the terms of subscription required of Anglican clergy, led to a noteworthy debate in the House of Commons, in which the eloquence of Burke induced the House to refuse assent by 217 votes to 71; nor did further attempts in the two succeeding years meet with any better result. The significance of the episode lay in the circumstance that the opinions and vote of the Parliament were recognized as authoritative factors in determining the tests of doctrinal orthodoxy to be required of clergy of the National Church. Such incidents made plain the ecclesiastical implications of the parliamentary victory confirmed by the Revolution Settlement of 1689.

Contemporaneous and correspondent with the eclipse of the Convocations was the decline of the power of the Crown in the direction of ecclesiastical policy. With the Tudor monarchs, the royal supremacy had been emphatically resident in the Sovereign personally. Henry VIII had prefixed to the book *A Necessary Doctrine and Erudition for any Christian Man* a preface in his own name; he had intervened in person in the debates of the Lords upon the Six Articles Bill to confound the opponents of Transubstantiation; and the doctrinal standards of the Church during his reign had been determined largely by his personal predilections. Nor did the Council which directed the policy of Edward VI shrink from the like bold exercise of authority in Church affairs. It was by its authority that the Black Rubric was interpolated in the Second Prayer Book of 1552

after several copies had been printed, and that the Forty-T Articles were issued in 1553. Throughout the reigns of Tudor sovereigns the expedient of royal injunctions for regulation of a variety of ecclesiastical matters was employ Elizabeth also, upon the re-issue in 1563 of the Articles r reduced to Thirty-Nine by the Convocation, omitted before p lication the twenty-ninth on eucharistic doctrine, and adde prefatory clause to the twentieth, which addition was accep by Convocation in 1571. The close alliance between the ea Stuart kings and the episcopate led to much reliance by spiritual society upon the support of the prince. After the R storation, the Popish sympathies of Charles II and James c solved this co-operation, and with the accession of William the disposition of Crown patronage was generally entrusted a commission of divines, whilst the old method of administrat by royal injunctions was revived. More particularly, the grov and establishment of the two political parties produced the te dency on the part of their respective leaders to appropriate themselves the ecclesiastical patronage of the sovereign. Que Anne struggled to resist this usurpation, but with the accessi of the Hanoverians, the Crown withdrew as a general rule fr active interference with the distribution of preferments, whi became a most valued weapon in the armoury of politicians. T indignant protest of the younger Pitt when George III insist on disregarding this self-denying tradition was itself a testimo to the strength already gathered by it. The end of the eighteen century saw the Parliament supreme over both its rivals in t exercise of ecclesiastical authority, the suspended Convocatio and the acquiescent Crown.

VI.

The fruits of this victory were garnered in the second quart of the nineteenth century, when the anti-revolutionary panic h subsided so far as to allow the reform of the abuses of so vene able an institution as the Established Church. The series of r forms carried out between 1832 and 1840 were essentially t work of radical statesmen, though adumbrated by the report the Ecclesiastical Commission appointed by Peel. Moreove the Parliament which presumed to abolish pluralities, to r organize the financial resources of the Church, and to transf the supreme jurisdiction in ecclesiastical cases to the Judici

Committee of the Privy Council, had little claim either by composition or sympathies to be regarded as the handmaiden of the Anglican Church. Accordingly, in the very heyday of its triumph there was sounded the challenge to its right of interference with spiritual matters. The famous Assize sermon of Keble and the rise of the Oxford Movement represented a direct opposition to the situation which had developed in consequence of the disappearance of Convocation and of the personal direction of policy by the Crown. The history of the English Church since that time may be regarded with much justice as the record of the contest between the principles of Keble and those of the Erastian school. The revival of sitting Convocations in 1855 and the foundation of the English Church Union in 1860 were notable results of the success of the Oxford leaders; whilst the efforts of Parliament to repress new ceremonial practices and to combat the influence of high church principles, culminating in the Public Worship Regulation Act of 1874, represented the reply of the older party. The division of interest penetrated even more deeply than these conflicts indicated; for the Parliament was proceeding steadily to remove all religious and restrictive tests not only from its own constitution but from the statutes of the ancient universities, and in the political sphere Gladstone himself carried the disestablishment of the Irish Church measure in 1869. In such circumstances controversy and contest were inevitable; nor did the situation clear even in appearance until the passing of the Enabling Act in the post-war parliament of 1919. During the first decade of the twentieth century the report of the Royal Commission in 1906 suggested that the only solution of liturgical problems lay in a revision of the Prayer Book services and rubrics. But the results of such revision would be presented to Parliament for legal enactment; and the successive parliaments from 1906 to 1914 were directed by a series of Liberal ministries, whose programme included a measure for the disestablishment of the Welsh Church. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that the political situation before the outbreak of the Great War suggested that the days of the establishment of the English Church were numbered.

With the coming of a European War the perspective of domestic disputes was altered greatly. From the standpoint of the Church an opportunity was afforded of considering the ques-

tion of the conditions of establishment in a more detached atm
phere, and the report of the Archbishops' Committee on Chu
and State, appointed in 1916, indicated the line of future
velopments. During the period of reconstruction after the w
the Parliament in 1919 adopted a project of reform drawn up
the Representative Church Council and sent forward by
Convocations in an address to the Crown, and the Church
England Assembly (Powers) Act received the assent of
King. It is not necessary to mention the details of the measu
It is sufficient to observe: that the entire personnel of the t
houses of both Provincial Convocations were incorporated i
the Church Assembly, together with a House of Laity, rep
senting by an indirect process of election the laity whose nam
were enrolled on the parochial registers of qualified chu
members; and that the principle of the necessity of parliame
tary assent to legislation affecting ecclesiastical affairs w
accepted unreservedly. The subsequent history of the Assemb
is well known, and the *impasse* created by the rejection in 19
and 1928 by the Commons of the proposals for Prayer Bo
revision.

VII.

From the survey or the legal and constitutional factors whi
have governed the relations of Church and State since the si
teenth century, it is possible to attempt an interpretation of the
influence upon the religious and ecclesiastical tradition fashion
in the Reformed English Church, and their meaning in relati
to the contemporary position in England. It is a commonpla
to say that the Reformation settlement stamped upon th
Ecclesia Anglicana the impress of national idiosyncrasy; b
the ascription of a national character to the Church implies f
more than the assertion of insular independence of foreig
domination. Apologists have made us familiar with the caref
preservation of the continuity of episcopal succession which
a distinguishing characteristic of the English Church among
the Reformed Churches of Europe; but it is equally importa
for the understanding of its genius to observe that the Reforma
tion settlement represented an emphatic assertion of the right c
the temporalty to an active share in the determination of eccles
astical affairs. Historically the prelude to the Reformation too
the form of a Petition of the Commons of 1542, provoked b

'the extreme and uncharitable behaviour and dealing of divers ordinaries, their commissaries and substitutes,' and directed against various ecclesiastical abuses, first of which was named the independent power of Convocation to 'make many divers fashions of laws, constitutions, and ordinances, without the king's knowledge or royal assent, and the assent and consent of any of his lay subjects.' Again in 1559, at the accession of Elizabeth, when the Convocations under the guidance of the Marian bishops had pronounced emphatically in favour of the papal supremacy, and had denied the competence of laymen to deal with matters of faith, doctrine and worship, the temporalty in parliament restored the royal supremacy and the English Liturgy despite the resolution of Convocation and the determined resistance of the bishops in the House of Lords. The disinclination of the Tudor Commons to commit even the administration of the Reformed Church to an unrestrained prelacy, whether *divino jure* or not, was manifested further in the spirited outburst of Peter Wentworth in reply to the plea of Archbishop Parker that the Commons should refer themselves wholly to the bishops in theological matters:

> 'No . . . we will pass nothing before we understand what it is; for that were but to make you popes. Make you popes who list, for we will make you none.'

This jealousy of clerical privilege on the part of the laity led to an opposition to the Crown also, when the royal supremacy was used to shelter the episcopate from criticism in parliament of their ecclesiastical policy; and the process by which the victorious Commons converted the royal supremacy over the Church into a parliamentary, has been described already.

From 1689 to 1919 the form of the parliamentary control of legislation concerning Church affairs remained unchanged; but meanwhile the progressive alteration in the composition and religious sympathies of the House of Commons rendered the debate of details of ecclesiastical administration irksome and unwelcome. Accordingly the provisions of the Church of England Assembly (Powers) Act of 1919 constituted a House of Laity within the Assembly possessed not only of powers of deliberation, but of a right of final veto on resolutions accepted by the Houses of Bishops and Clergy. In the wide delegation of authority granted by this statute to the Church Assembly, it would not,

I think, be unjust to interpret the action of parliament as moti
by the confidence that the House of Laity would be of such c
nity and status as to relieve the parliament of the responsibi
of detailed scrutiny and debate of ecclesiastical measures. I
the House of Laity supplies the liaison between the tempora
in Parliament and the spiritualty in Convocation; and, wh
retaining for itself the right of final veto, though not of ame
ment, upon measures submitted by the Church Assembly,
Parliament did entrust to the House of Laity the responsibi
of representing adequately the voice of the nation in the c
cussion of projects of church reform.

The question therefore of the composition, personnel a
representative character of this House has become of paramo
importance. Not only does it represent a twentieth cent
attempt to express through a new organ that principle of the ri
of the laity to a share in ecclesiastical matters which was fun
mental in the Reformation settlement; but also, if the Par
ment should be asked in the future to consent to any furt
delegation of its legislative power in church matters, I think
will require first to be convinced that the House of Laity is tr
representative of its constituents, and of sufficient authority a
status within the Assembly to uphold the rights of the tempora
in the National Church.

I have dwelt at some length upon this commixture of Ep
copalianism and Erastianism in the English Church because
seems to me to be a characteristic feature of the Reformat
tradition. In truth it is impossible to maintain with consisten
the contention of Gibson that 'England is governed by two c
tinct administrations, the one spiritual for matters of a spiritu
nature, and the other temporal for matters of a temporal natur
For on the one hand, the temporal legislature, to which he
signs political affairs, includes the bishops of the Establish
Church sitting as spiritual peers, whose votes are of equal val
ity with those of temporal lords upon concerns of a purely te
poral nature: and on the other, from the outset of the Reform
tion the temporalty, as represented by the upper and low
house of Parliament, have insisted upon their authority to p
ticipate in ecclesiastical measures, such as the Acts of Uniform
and others. This circumstance is the underlying explanation
the quiet suppression of the Convocations from 1664 to 16

and from 1717 to the middle of the nineteenth century. For the hopes of a parity betwixt the Convocation and the Parliament had been quenched by the result of the Civil War, as has been suggested before: whilst the presence of the bishops in the House of Lords was regarded as sufficient guarantee of the proper representation of the spiritual interest in debates upon ecclesiastical measures.

There remain, however, two further characteristics of the National Church which deserve mention as illustrating the delicate balance of temporal and ecclesiastical interests established in the Reformation settlement: namely, the procedure for the nomination of bishops and the tradition of liturgical and theological comprehensiveness enjoyed by the clergy. Modern prime ministers have seen in the power of nomination to bishoprics a useful means of bringing many problems of ecclesiastical policy under the indirect control of the laity by determining the theological complexion of the Bench; whilst the constant debate concerning the propriety of the method of episcopal appointments from the side of both clergy and statesmen indicates likewise the consensus of opinion that it represents an integral part of the Reformation settlement of the relations of Church and State. The best illustration of this during the post-Reformation period of English Church history belongs to 1734, when there was a severely contested nomination to the see of Gloucester. The influence of Lord Chancellor Talbot with the king had secured the promise of that see for his friend Dr. Thomas Rundle, whose promotion thereto was announced in the *Gentleman's Magazine* of January 1734. The project was opposed by Walpole's episcopal adviser, Gibson of London, who carried his stiffness so far as to intimate that he would refuse to act in the commission to consecrate, which would be transmitted to him by Archbishop Wake, who was prevented by illness from officiating himself. Despite much pressure Walpole, after prolonging the vacancy for a twelvemonth in order to ensure a peaceful atmosphere for the General Election of 1734, decided not to provoke a clerical storm by the promotion of a person obnoxious to the orthodox. The jealousy of the laity of this pretence at defiance on the part of the Bishop of London found expression in several pointed comments. Viscount Percival reported that 'it was said by some that the Bishop of London had it in view to get rid one

day of the praemunire which is over the heads of bishops in ca
they refuse to consecrate such bishops as the king nominat
and so to take the nomination out of the Crown and restore
as it was in the early times, to the bishops and clergy.[3] Strong
sentiments were voiced by Sir Thomas Robinson, M.P., in
letter to the Earl of Carlisle: 'Surely this must be melancho
reflection to those who are naturally jealous of the power of t
church; for this step shows that they expect at least a *nolum*
to any man the king shall think fit to promote to the purple .
I think, if this doctrine of the Bench be allowed as an establish
maxim, 'twill be adding an ecclesiastical independent power
the State, which might prove more dangerous to liberty th
even a miltary one; as of all tyranny, that practised by those
black has in all ages and nations been most destructive of liber
commerce, and everything to make society agreeable to life
On the other side, the incident, though hardly presaging t
establishment of a clerical tyranny in the robust eighteenth ce
tury, had emphasized unexpectedly the right of the archbisho
albeit sparingly exercised, to refuse consecration to an impro
nominee of the Crown. It had justified also the contention
Swift, characteristically stated, that 'As the supreme power c
certainly do ten thousand things more than it ought, so there a
several things which some people may think it can do althou
it really cannot . . . Put the case that walking on the slack ro
were the only talent required by act of parliament for making
man a bishop; no doubt, when a man had done his feat of acti
ity in form, he might sit in the House of Lords, put on his rob
and rochet, go down to his palace, receive and spend his ren
but it requireth very little Christianity to believe this tumbler
be one whit more a bishop that he was before; because the l
of God hath otherwise decreed; which law, though a nation m
refuse to receive it, cannot alter in its own nature.'[5]

Finally, it should not be forgotten that the theological a
liturgical comprehensiveness of the English Church is due
large measure to the Erastian character of the Reformati

[3] Egmont MSS. (Diary of Viscount Percival), Hist. MSS. Commissi
ii, 171.

[4] Carlisle MSS. Hist. MSS. Comm., 15th Report. Appendix. Pt.
p. 131.

[5] Swift: *Op. cit.*, p. 90.

settlement. Leaders of the successive religious revivals in the Church, alike evangelical, catholic and broad church, have found shelter and protection from episcopal and clerical persecution in the circumstances of State establishment. Thus Queen Caroline was the defender at once of Bishops Butler, Sherlock and Hoadley; the attempt of Bishop Marsh of Peterborough to close the entrance to the Anglican ministry to the Simeonite evangelicals was defeated largely by the legal basis of the parson's freehold; and the same protection saved Keble himself from the consequences of the unsympathetic attitude of Bishop Sumner of Winchester. In a parallel sphere the acute theological and ceremonial disputes of the last century would have resulted probably in the expulsion of many Anglican clergy from the communion of their Church, if the determination of the limits of interpretation of official formulae had been vested otherwise than in the lay tribunal of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. The maintenance of the comprehensive character of the English Church and the assurance of its sympathetic correspondence with the best contemporary lay and secular culture, has been due historically to the authority exercised by the temporalty in ecclesiastical affairs. Thus the Church of England has continued its threefold tradition as Catholic, Protestant, and Reformed; to preserve each and all of which elements is its peculiar vocation and privilege, since the vindication of its character as a National Church lies precisely in this combination of diverse tendencies. And as of its heritage it has no occasion to be ashamed, so of its future it has no need to be afraid; provided only that there may be restored that understanding and confidence in its Anglican tradition which inspired the praise of its most illustrious apologist, Hooker:

> 'We do rather glorify and bless God for the fruit we daily behold reaped by such ordinances as His gracious Spirit maketh the ripe wisdom of this national church to bring forth, than vainly boast of our own peculiar and private intentions, as if the skill of profitable regiment had left her public habitation to dwell in retired manner with some few men of one livery; we make not our childish appeal sometimes from our own to foreign churches, sometimes from both unto churches ancienter than both are, in effect always from all others unto our own selves, but as becometh them that follow in all humility the ways of peace, we honour, reverence and obey in the very next degree unto the voice of God the voice of the Church of God wherein we live.'[6]

[6] Hooker: *Ecclesiastical Polity*, V, lxxi, 7.

ESTABLISHMENT AND ALTERNATIVE

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I.

THE Church of England is 'by law established,' but tha Establishment, like the British Constitution, does not ac mit of precise definition. It is possible to indicate certain of i positive and negative implications, but it is not possible to sta its meaning in a few concise sentences which would enable an one with no experience of the actuality correctly to anticipat its significance or operation. The Church of England is 'estab lished' by the law of the State, but that does not mean that sh was either founded or fashioned, either in respect of doctrine o order, by the State. Her liberties, her organization, and varyin degrees of independence of the domination of Rome, hav always been protected by the law of the realm, and the State mus needs to some extent limit and control the activities of all othe societies existing within its domain. The Establishment by law means that to the Church's formulations of belief, of worshi and of law, the State has added its sanction, thereby ratifyin and confirming, not as true but as the conditions of Establish ment, what was done by the Church. In the conditions of to-day this has come to mean that one among the several Christian de nominations possesses large revenues derived from ancient en dowments of a Church formerly co-extensive with the nation and enjoys, by the grace and the law of the State, a privilege position as a national institution, recognized by the State as th national organ and expression of religion. The State thus ad mits the national ideal to be submission to the Divine Will a made known in Christ, recognizes officially the spiritual side o life, and connects certain national activities with the worship o God conducted according to the order and by the officials of the Church. The King is a spiritual person, supreme governor o the Church of which he is necessarily a member, and the de fender of her faith, liberties and privileges; the proceedings o his Lords spiritual and temporal and Commons in Parliament

assembled open with prayer for Divine guidance, while the Church prays that their deliberations may be for the good of the Church as well as for the safety, honour and welfare of the Sovereign and his dominions.

The Establishment thus adds the dignity of religion to the sovereign activities of the State. It clearly involves the Church in peculiar duties to the nation. These duties are the more obvious, though not the more pressing, because to-day, a Church which in actual membership comprises but a small fraction of the nation, uses for its work heavy endowments and other instruments originally granted to a Church nation-wide in membership. It is this privilege which alone enables the maintenance of the parochial system for which, considered as a denomination with responsibilities only to its own members, the Church to-day has no need, and could not support. The parochial clergyman exists in circumstances and enjoys privileges to which, as a denominational minister, he has no right. The Church of England as Established exists primarily, under Christ her Divine Head, for the general welfare of the whole people of England. Her first duties are to the English nation; she exists for all who need her; her task is the moral and religious education of the English people, to bring Christianity effectively into their lives, and to minister to every citizen who desires her ministrations in sickness of body or soul. This does not mean that it is her duty to develop a national religion, but that it is her duty to commend the universal Gospel to a particular nation and to give expression to the religious convictions of the whole people so far as may be consistent with the religion of Christ which she exists to maintain. She is pledged not to seek her own glory, but to be among the people of this land, like her Master, as one that serveth.

The State necessarily has the right to determine whether a particular Church shall be 'established' or not. Of the existing Establishment there are certain conditions which appear as limitations of the Church's autonomy as a self-governing and self-ordering society. The most important are these:

1. The Church's formularies of faith, worship and order, drawn up by her Convocations, were accepted by Parliament as the basis of Establishment. They cannot lawfully be modified or changed without the consent of Parliament.

2. The Convocations do not possess an unrestricted right of me ing, but are summoned by royal writ. They have, however, an anci right of direct access to the Throne.

3. The Enabling Act of 1919 recognised a Representative Assem of the Church of England, and conferred upon it extensive powe This Assembly can prepare legislative measures concerning all matt of the Church's life, except doctrine,[1] for submission to Parliame Parliament reserves the right of veto on all such measures and, thou it has abandoned its right to amend them, its positive sanction is s necessary to give them legal authority.

4. Ecclesiastical law, though applicable only to certain perso and causes, is part of the law of the Realm. It is administered ecclesiastical courts which are part of the Judicature of the Real The judgments of these courts may be enforced by the civil powe They deal with questions of doctrine, worship and ritual, and t ecclesiastical obligations of the clergy, but to anyone aggrieved on t ground that justice has not been done in these courts, there lies Final Appeal to the Crown, actually to the Judicial Committee of t Privy Council. This Crown Court does not construct creeds, regul tions of worship, or new ecclesiastical law, but it does finally deci disputes about all such matters by interpreting the accepted formulari according to the legal construction of them. This means that t sense of all documents and of Acts of Parliament affecting the Chur is ultimately determinable by a Crown Court composed of lay Judg who need not be Christians.

5. The appointment to all Bishoprics in England, and to certa other of the higher offices of the Church, is in the hands of the King who acts upon the advice of the Prime Minister of the day.

These five are the main points which indicate the measure of con trol by the State involved in the existing Establishment.

II.

It is impossible to lay down that any definite measure o State control is involved in the recognition of a particular Churc as representative of national religion. It may be widely variable and must necessarily depend on and vary with the character o the State which 'establishes' the Church, and the extent t which the Church, apart from such establishment, is actuall representative of national religion. The Church is a Divin society, but there can be no *a priori* reason why she should no submit to varying degrees of control by the State. The onl question of principle is this: What measure of State control i compatible with the Church's absolute duty of loyalty to th Headship of Christ? Other freedom she does not need and ma find it to be illusory, but that measure of freedom she must at al costs claim. With this exception, the measure of State contro

[1] This is the business of Convocation.

to which she should submit is no longer a question of principle, but one of expediency. It should be decided by practical considerations.

When we consider the Church of England as she actually is, it becomes difficult to suppose that any smaller measure of State control than now exists is compatible with her establishment as representative of national religion. Indeed, we must recognize that a relatively small demand for disestablishment would make the continuance of present relations impossibly difficult to defend. The difficulty is not that the Church does not represent the wishes of all Christians in the nation : that would scarcely be a serious argument against Establishment in days when the State Government is in the hands of the representatives of a minority of the nation. Nor can we approve the reasoning that the Enabling Act must logically lead to Disestablishment, for that Act maintains the State veto, and the necessity of State sanction, for all ecclesiastical legislation. The real difficulty is that the actual working of the Enabling Act, and the qualifications of the Church electorate constituted under it, have revealed the *extreme* denominational weakness of the Church. All but a fraction of English citizens, and about half the Christians of the country, have been deprived of any voice whatever in the conduct of parochial affairs. The Electoral Rolls include about one-tenth of the population, while the number of Anglican communicants is about a million less than the number of the electors. Further, the House of Laity of the Church Assembly does not in any way directly represent the parochial electors and, so long as the present method of election continues, it can hardly be otherwise. The parochial electors elect the parochial Church Council; this Council elects the lay members of the Diocesan Conference, and these in turn elect the House of Laity. In such a system, there can be but the faintest guarantee that those finally elected to the Assembly are at all representative of the parochial electors, the mass of whom probably do not know even the names, still less the opinions, of those who represent them; nor would they have any direct control over them if they did. The majority even of Church Councillors are in like case. It is still more serious that the development of the Oxford Movement has involved not only an increasing insistence on the theoretical

independence of the Church, and a great weakening of i national character, but certain of the clergy appear to main tain that the Church of England, apart from Rome, has n authority in matters of faith. They maintain a pitiful and inverte brate attitude towards another Church which denies their statu and repudiates their claim. The appeal is to 'Catholic traditio and practice' as the ideal to which the clergy owe obedience This is no actual existing Church or ecclesiastical authorit which can exercise any restrictive jurisdiction over them: i practice it justifies anything which is taught or tolerated in th Church of Rome, and in effect denies the right of the Church c England to decide, forbid or regulate anything pertaining t faith, morals or worship. To such a Church, denominationall weak, very imperfectly representative even of the fraction c Englishment who constitute her elective body, and internall divided to the extent of including within her formal organizatio the conflicting principles which divide other Churches one fron another, no Parliament could rightly delegate more extensiv functions than those conferred by the Enabling Act, or agree t any serious modification of the historic procedure by which th Supreme Court of the Crown must on appeal decide whethe the courts ecclesiastical have administered justice in accordanc with the accepted formularies and regulations. Nor, so long a such a Church remains in possession of the ancient and larg endowments, and enjoys a position greatly out of proportion t her membership, could the State surrender the right to select fron the priests of the Church those officers into whose hands so mucl administration and patronage is concentrated, and who sit in th House of Lords and vote on all matters temporal as well a spiritual.

III.

The obvious alternative to the existing relations of the Church to the State is their severance known as Disestablish ment. It is true that various schemes of 'reform,' inspired in the main by the idea that clerical supremacy is equivalent to spiritua independence, have been put forward. By these it is suggested that the State should exercise its existing ecclesiastical power subject to the approval of the Church, and that thus 'the in herent spiritual rights' of the Church may be secured and the

Establishment maintained. We must needs agree with the Bishop of Durham that these suggestions are impracticable, and that if 'the legislative control of Parliament is to be abolished, the Royal Supremacy in the region of ecclesiastical law reduced to a shadow, and the Crown patronage conditioned in its exercise by the approval of the Church,' this constitutes a policy of Disestablishment without Disendowment. It has no connection with the world of realities.

What does the alternative of Disestablishment involve? We need not trouble to repel the suggestion that it would imply the repudiation of Christianity on the part of the State. At the same time, in view of the past history of England and the age-long intimate connection between Church and State, the breach would be so represented by the Church's enemies. It would certainly encourage the prevailing idea that religion is of small account in practical affairs, and in the present grave unsettlement in religious belief and moral sanctions, secularism and agnosticism would be encouraged. It would also become almost impossible to secure the corporate expression of the national and civic aspects of religion. The disaster of so grave a reduction of material resources as Disendowment would necessarily involve cannot be contemplated without dismay. The precedents of Ireland and Wales suggest that a large part, if not all, of the ancient endowments would be confiscated. Even now, financial resources are wretchedly inadequate to the Church's task. In hundreds of parishes, Disendowment would mean that the Church could no longer support herself, and it is more than doubtful whether the Cathedrals and ancient parish churches would remain in the possession of the Church at all. Disestablishment would cede the first place to the Church of Rome.

I do not think that Disestablishment would involve either the extirpation or the repression of liberal thought in the Church. Prayer Book Revision showed that neither Bishops nor even the unrepresentative Assembly are hostile to liberalism in religion. If the changes in the direction of liberalism were meagre, it should be borne in mind that larger ones could only have been secured by corresponding concessions to medievalism. Nor would the Romanizing section of Anglo-Catholics triumph in a disestablished Church. Despite their criticisms of

Bishops as enslaved to a secularist State, they do not want D
establishment. The headway which any extreme form of Angl
Catholicism has made among the laity is much exaggerated, a
has been made at the cost of turning many away. Even so *T*
Church Times frequently laments the sparseness of men
Anglo-Catholic congregations; while after eighty years of se
sacrificing toil the appeal of extreme Anglo-Catholicism to t
mass of Englishmen is negligible. With the loss of the endo
ments, the Church's work could be maintained only in increasi
dependence upon lay financial support. The clergy would b
come largely dependent on their congregations. This would i
evitably mean a great increase in the authoritative participati
of laymen in all Church affairs. The really dominant House
the Church Assembly would be the laymen. They would ha
little sympathy with those who had forced on Disestablishme
from within: the party responsible would not be strong. Neith
the teaching nor the methods of the Romanizers could withstan
these conditions; the medieval idea of the spiritual incompe
ence of the laity, and the consequent belief that they have n
rights whatever in the determination of doctrine, discipline
Church services, would disappear before the inexorable facts o
finance. The Bishop of Durham is right in thinking that Di
establishment would restore discipline. Everything would b
come much more definite.

It is, however, a very rash assumption that the State contr
of the disestablished Church would be less irksome than it
now: it would change rather in form than in principle. Th
Church could not carry on without property. The State ha
concern for the moral and general welfare of the nation, and th
nation has recently clearly shown a lack of confidence in th
Church. It is, then, extremely probable that in determining th
conditions of the ownership, uses and obligations of any existin
Church property, the State would have regard to its own est
mate of the value of the doctrine and practice of the Church
and that Parliamentary consent would still be necessary for an
serious changes in doctrine or practice subsequent to the settle
ment made at the time of Disestablishment. It is obvious tha
evils, worse than any now existing, might easily result if th
Church became a corporation legalized by law, with its building

and other instruments of its work tied up by a Trust Deed to a particular system of doctrine and practice. Any inherent right of self-development might then be much more difficult than now. Questions relating to the observance of laws about doctrine, ritual, or anything else involving the use of a building or any other temporal rights would not be within the final jurisdiction of ecclesiastical courts, but would probably come, at an earlier stage than now, within the jurisdiction of the ordinary State Courts. In matters affecting the temporal rights of her members, the position of the disestablished Church would be that of the Nonconformist Churches. It is most important to observe that although those Churches possess a greater independence than the Church of England under existing conditions, this freedom is rather inherent in their constitutions and doctrinal bases, than in any difference of principle in relation of these to the State. If the doctrines of any Free Church are included in its Trust Deed they are, in principle, in the same position as our Prayer Book and Articles.

IV.

It appears inevitable that if, in her present condition, the Church were disestablished, the certain and immediate consequences would be disastrous. The existing position, with the possible sole exception of discipline, would be altered for the worse. However, there is no likelihood that the issue of Disestablishment will be immediately raised by the State. The Labour Party is conscious of no great debt to the Church, but if the work of the Church is so conducted as primarily to promote the spiritual and moral welfare of the nation, there is no reason to think that party will be hostile to the Church. At present, all political parties feel the need of internal consolidation, and will not be anxious to raise issues which will necessarily cut across party loyalty. Nor are modern Nonconformists eager to see such a weakening of the forces of religion as would follow Disestablishment. At the same time it is useless to ignore the fact that failure to secure legal authority for the revised Prayer Book has in fact raised anew the issue of the relations of Church and State. Is, then, this drastic alternative of Disestablishment inevitable unless the Church's absolute duty of loyalty to the Headship of Christ is to be sacrificed?

Doubtless all Liberal Churchmen would agree with the f
lowing words of Archbishop Lord Davidson in which he e
pressed the mind of the Bishops:

> 'It is a fundamental principle that the Church, that is, the Bisho
> together with the clergy and laity, must in the last resort, when
> mind has been fully ascertained, retain its inalienable right, in loya
> to our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, to formulate its faith in Hi
> and to arrange the expression of that holy faith in its forms
> worship.'

The statement is characteristic of its venerable author. It
obvious that there is great difficulty in knowing when the mir
of the Church has been fully ascertained. The autonomy of a
unrepresentative ecclesiastical assembly would not secure a
adequate reflection of the mind of the Church. Spiritual ind
pendence is an inalienable right so long as it is a means
spiritual efficiency: its assertion at all times is not necessari
loyalty to Christ. Anything said by Christ falls far short of th
idea that submission to the majority of an executive judicatu
and legislative assembly of the Church was to be the essenti
element in loyalty to Himself. Present conditions may be mo
Christian in mind, and more conducive to the true ends of th
Church, than a more autonomous Church would be. Spiritua
independence is not to be confused with the legal independenc
of ecclesiastical assemblies.

V.

Acceptance of the late Archbishop's declaration renders
dispassionate consideration of recent events the more necessar
before we decide that they constitute an outrage of the Church'
spiritual independence, such as to make the demand for Dises
tablishment essential in loyalty to Christ.

I will but mention and pass over the fact that as recently a
1919 the Church freely conceded the right of Parliament to d
as it has done. The voting in the Church Assembly in the fina
debate on the Book of 1928 showed that among the clergy, anc
still more among the laity, there was far from being that mora
unanimity without which, in a Christian community, importan
changes affecting the life of the nation ought not to be made
That Book did not represent the united wish of the Church, no
was there any real enthusiasm for it. Sympathy with the Bishop
in their administrative difficulties is the main reason why many

regret its rejection. Nor is it denied that the Commons' vote reflected the religious sense and the spiritual judgment of a large majority of Church people whose convictions could find more direct expression in Parliament than in either Convocation or the Church Assembly. The vote did not judge of the Book as scriptural or otherwise, but merely that, in the interests of the nation, it should not be given legal authority as an alternative to the existing Book. Nor did this judgment refer to the Book as a whole, but to the two matters whereon there was the greatest divergence of opinion in the Church, and one of which—Reservation—is recognized to be peculiarly liable to the dangers of superstition even by those who desired it. The Bishop of Durham's statement that the issues at stake affected the *doctrine* of the Church[2] cannot be brought forward after the vote when before it the Archbishops again and again asserted that there was no question of any change in the doctrine of the Church of England. Whatever be the reality of the matter, by the reiterated confession of the Church, Parliament dealt with no fundamental doctrine of Christianity or any doctrine of the Church; the issue concerned no more than the mode of expressing a particular aspect of existing doctrine.[3] To jeopardize the age-long intimate relations of Church and State and to court the disasters of Disestablishment, in order to secure the right to introduce a few archaisms into the Communion Office and to reserve a portion of the consecrated Bread and Wine for the sick rather than give them the benefit of a private Celebration, would argue such a confusion of values on the part of a Church which approved this course as both to explain and to justify her small influence upon the nation.

But if we cannot regard the Commons' decision as an unwarrantable interference with the spiritual liberties of the Church, neither is it a balanced judgment to regard the subsequent action

[2] See *Disestablishment*, p. 98.

[3] It is difficult to attach meaning to Dr. Henson's statement that Prayer Book Revision was a challenge to the State to face the Church's claim to possess spiritual authority over her own members (*ibid.* 47). The State has never ignored it, and a powerful argument in the Commons' debates was that the Bishops had never seriously tried to assert it. When the same prelate writes, 'By forbidding the Church to disallow what it desired to disallow, the House of Commons did in effect order it to allow what it disapproved' (*ibid.* 98), it is hard to recognize that this is the judgment of calm reason.

of the Bishops, even if we regret it, as a defiance of Parliamen
The recent directions of the Archbishop of Canterbury are ca
ful to omit the alternative Communion Office and the provisi
for Reservation from those deviations from the Book of 16
for which, with the consent of the Parochial Church Counc
his general permission is given. Practically this means that the
is to be no change in the policy of the past eighty years. T
State has never attempted to compel the Church to observe t
letter, or even the spirit, of such measures as The Church Di
cipline Act (1840), The Public Worship Regulation Act (187
or The Clergy Discipline Act (1892). These measures gave
the Bishops a veto to forbid prosecutions brought under t
Acts. Though the Bishop's veto was never extensively exe
cised, it was long ago recognized by Bishops that prosecutio
promoted by Christians to coerce the consciences of other Chri
tians was a procedure both wrong in itself and self-defeatin
Consequently those Acts of Parliament have remained practi
ally inoperative. To-day the Bishops propose concerted actic
and to allow as a body what most of them have tacitly allowe
individually, with the important limitation that practices co
sistent neither with the Book of 1662 nor with that of 1928 sha
be made to cease. In other words, they propose to do precisel
as they might have done, with an even greater measure of genera
approval than to-day, at any time during the past sixty years
It may well prove to be in the best interests of the Church tha
order and discipline should be restored on the Church's ow
authority rather than by resort to legal processes which, in th
existing circumstances, is hardly possible. If order could be re
stored on lines acceptable to church-people generally, it is ver
unlikely that Parliament would refuse to recognize an accom
plished fact by removing a legal anomaly.

VI.

I must forbear to draw up alternative measures of State con
trol such as conceivably might, in theory, be involved in th
recognition of a particular Church as representative of nationa
religion. It is not practical to suggest that the conditions pre
vailing in the various Churches of the Dominions are, in Eng
land, possible alternatives to the existing Establishment. I

those Churches, the conditions which produced the Establishment have never fully operated, and there is no real parallel between the position of such Churches, and the disestablishment of an ancient Church hitherto closely bound up with the history of the English nation. It must suffice to remark that these Churches, even though more homogeneous than the Church of England and enjoying greater, though varying, degrees of freedom from State control, have not thereby been enabled to develop in any way which inspires emulation. They do not commend Christianity more effectively than does the Church of England, or attract better men to their ministries, or secure greater intellectual freedom, or better Bishops, or wiser judicial decisions.

VII.

The Bishop of Gloucester has recently suggested that the repeal of the Act of Uniformity would do all that is necessary to give the Church the necessary freedom in the present circumstances. In itself this is a reasonable proposal, but Parliament having refused to legalize the provisions of the 1928 Book directly would hardly do so at present indirectly. There remains for consideration the alternative presented by the position of the National Presbyterian Church of Scotland. By an Act of 1921 this Church secured a complete measure of autonomy and remains established. This alternative is attractive to many English Churchmen. The Church of Scotland, as a national Church representative of the Christian faith of the Scottish people is, by the Act of 1921, charged to bring the ordinances of religion to the people in every parish in Scotland. The Act declares that the Church receives from Christ 'the right and power, subject to no civil authority to legislate and to adjudicate finally in all matters of doctrine, worship, government and discipline in the Church, including the right to determine all questions concerning membership and office in the Church, the constitution and membership of its Courts, and the mode of the election of its office-bearers.' The State recognizes the Church's independence, but this 'does not give to the civil authority any right of interference with the proceedings and judgments of the Church within the sphere of its spiritual government and jurisdiction.' Its doctrinal basis is the Westminster Confession approved by

the General Assembly of 1647, but, by the Act of 1921, th Church is free to declare the sense in which it understands i Confession of Faith, to modify the forces of expression therei or to formulate other doctrinal statements, the Church being th sole judge of their agreement with the word of God. For an amendment of this doctrinal basis a two-thirds majority of th whole of the presbyteries is necessary, and if this is not secure the proposed change may not again he brought forward for period of five years. The Scottish Church thus established r tains her endowments.

Why is this scheme not applicable to the Church of En land? The answer is that the whole history of the Scotti Church from the Reformation onward, as well as its intern condition to-day, offers little resemblance, but rather great co trasts, to those of the Church of England. In Scotland the R formation was a popular movement which the Government coul but recognize. It did not merely reconstruct the mediev Church system, but created another. In Scotland the gener assumption has been the distinctness of Church and State, an the measure of State control has been historically small. Th Scottish Church has no serious internal divisions, and knows n such fundamental theological differences as those which exist i our own Church. In Scotland democratic self-government the Church is an old tradition; there is a full recognition of th laity in all councils of the Church; patronage rests with th people. Moreover the Act of 1921 declares explicitly that th Church adheres to the Scottish Reformation, and the full inde pendence granted by that Act is stated to be 'with a view t facilitate the union of other Churches with the Church of Sco land.' In all these points it is painfully clear that the conditio and outlook of the one Church is not comparable to the conditio and outlook of the other, and the independence granted to th Scottish Church could not, consistently with the maintenance c the Establishment, be rightly or wisely accorded to the Churc of England in her present condition.

VIII.

There remains, however, the fact that recent events hav raised anew the question of the relations of Church and State

and that some attempts to readjust those relations will probably be made. In these circumstances a merely obstructionist attitude is useless and will fail. Something more positive is needed. We can but recognize the immensely greater difficulties in the maintenance of the Establishment inherent in the fact that the State, though not hostile to religion, is actually outside any particular form of religion. If the issue is raised at all, the State may most reasonably feel that absolute impartiality between Churches is the only attitude it can possibly maintain. Those who claim greater independence for the Church are actuated by principles. In our judgment they are impossibly narrow principles, and in no way fundamental to Christianity; but energetic propaganda may secure their victory, at the cost of a general loss to the Church. Wisdom lies in the realization of the true facts and existing advantages. The true nature of a system is not to be understood by exclusive attention to the theory of it, apart from consideration of its actual operation. Theoretically it may appear anomalous that the final Court of Appeal in ecclesiastical causes should be composed of lay Judges not necessarily Christian. But the fact is that even in expelling her own members the Church affects the rights and reputations of men who are also citizens, and these the State must and will protect. And further, to substitute for the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council a tribunal appointed by the Church in which the Bishops or their nominees were the Judges would be to create a possible menace to liberty. The record of ecclesiastical courts is a bad one. In present circumstances partizan ecclesiastical feeling would replace judicial impartiality. The judges themselves would be too involved in the controversy to bring to the judgment seat either the learning, leisure or temperament which are vitally necessary. Moreover the demand for the 'reform' or abolition of the present Final Court of Appeal comes most strongly from those who would not accept the decision of a majority of the Episcopate unless, in their own judgment, it was in harmony with 'Catholic doctrine and practice'; while history shows that, but for the existing Court, obscurantism, bigotry and intolerance would have prevailed not once nor twice. Its judgments have been more charitable to all parties in the Church than have those of the ecclesiastical courts. Nor is

there any reason why the Judicial Committee should be less co petent to deal with appeals in ecclesiastical causes than it is deal with the manifold matters which come before it in the cou of its business. Nowadays we can hardly take seriously the ic that the acceptance of certain beliefs and the possession of ecclesiastical office constitute a man 'a spiritual person' a endow him with divine assistance in giving judgment on matte of fact.

Again, the present method of appointing Bishops may theory be anomalous and difficult to defend. In practice t things are certain. Those who have studied Synodical electio to Bishoprics are almost unanimous in regarding them as failure, while an equal unanimity agrees that the existing meth secures the best Bishops. The Prime Minister has no narr outlook, and can easily get the fullest and most accurate i formation. He does but select from those whom the Chur commissions as priests. His nominees may be unacceptable this or that party in the Church: they are practically never to the Church as a whole. The Bishop of Chichester recent pointed out that the present power of the Chapter to refu election, or of the Archbishop to refuse consecration, are n empty forms, while the readiness to accept the severe penalti for conscientious refusal to elect or to consecrate would in the days render the unpopular appointment practically impossibl There would be no sense in removing the ancient penalties f refusing to elect, if the King could still nominate the unpopul person. The plain fact is that Bishops in the Established Churc by reason of the dignity and importance of their historic offi may so greatly influence the social and moral life of the count that the State cannot surrender the control of their appointmen

IX.

The wisest task for the immediate future would be to co centrate efforts in a great movement for so widening the bas of the Church of England as to make it effectively represent tive of Christianity in England. We must repudiate the id that a National Church exercising jurisdiction over its ow members is in any way inconsistent with Christianity as an un versal Gospel. To-day human relationships are tending to b

come international, and this tendency will do much to eliminate the terrible dangers of a narrow nationalism. But a League of Factions could do little to eliminate these dangers: a League of Nations may do much. Nations and nationality will remain. That national Churches should have real existence and real rights is no more inconsistent with the Divine Will than that there should be individual persons with real existence and real rights. As Bishop Creighton wrote, 'nations with their diversities of temperament, institutions and customs are part of that divine order which is revealed in the facts of human history.' The dangers and limitations of insularity are not to be avoided by attempting to ignore the fact of nationality: to-day the old barriers between nations have largely been removed, not by the Church, but by the nations themselves, by the development of rapid communications and the increasing interdependence of nations one upon another. Nationality cannot be either ignored or suppressed, but it can be Christianized and made a truly spiritual thing. If this be done, it can be recognized by the Church as a constitution limiting the proved dangers of a centralized ecclesiastical bureaucracy. By its essence religion is not fitted to exercise that type of dominance: it is the real evil of Rome. It broke down at the Reformation, and its restoration, if it were possible, would recreate the old evils again. A national Church may have its dangers, but there is no practical choice between it and something wider, but only between it and something narrower. We need a great organization of that mass of Christian opinion which really desires the Church of England to represent Christianity in England. It is impossible and undesirable to go back behind the Enabling Act, but the franchise constituted under it might be amended so as to include all baptized Christians who wish to exercise their membership in the national Church without obliging them to declare that they are members of no other Church. Determined efforts should be made to overcome the admitted difficulties in making the Lay House of Church Assembly directly representative of the parochial electors. Further, the Nonconformist Churches are great agencies of Christianity in England; they make a full contribution to all sides of religious, moral and intellectual life. If reunion with them within the bounds of the national Church

could be accomplished, Parliament would not withhold its sanction, and such a national Church would easily secure from the State the right to determine its own doctrine, worship and ritual without those disasters which must attend the demand for greater independence which, in existing conditions, the State would not and could not rightly grant.

Meanwhile the conditions of Establishment do not at any point interfere with anything fundamental in the religion of Christ. As the Bishop of Durham wrote long ago, if the nation's mind is set on objects inconsistent with Christianity, then the hour for Disestablishment has struck, but until that is the case the conduct of worship ought to reflect the national mind. When the same Bishop writes to-day:

> 'The State has become effectively secularized and now, under the fiction of neutrality, undermines the indispensable postulates of the Christian Religion.'[4]

we can only suppose that we have one more example of the vehemence of expression which the Bishop realizes has sometimes misled people as to the real content of his mind. Happily in the same book, finding it necessary to repel the idea that Disestablishment would imply national apostasy, he flatly contradicts himself, and writes what we believe to be true:

> 'No just or candid critic of Parliament can maintain that its conduct of business has become less determined by the principles of Christianity since it became secularized than it was before.'[5]

So long as that is true, the wisest answer to attempts to interfere with the existing conditions of Establishment can be expressed in the words of the late Archbishop of Canterbury spoken at the time of the Enabling Act:

> 'I would rather go on as we are than diminish in any practical or real way the national character or comprehensive activity of the Church of England.'

[4] *Disestablishment*, p. 81.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 56. By 'secularized' Dr. Henson means that no religious tests are required for membership of Parliament.

THE SACRED AND THE SECULAR

By the Rev. G. F. Allen, M.A., Chaplain of Ripon Hall, Oxford.

'FOR man of the primitive pattern there are two worlds, a workaday and a sacred. Whenever he needs help in the one, he resorts to the other. The threshold between the two is clearly marked. He crosses it always in a ceremonial way, with nice attention to the details of behaviour; and his ceremonies enhance, as they certainly reflect, the mood in which he draws near to the unseen source of his spiritual comfort. It matters not at all whether we classify as magic or religion the practices that result, so long as we recognize that all genuine rites involve one and the same fundamental mood and attitude, a drawing near in awe.' Thus writes Dr. Marett, as he ends his book, *The Threshold of Religion*.[1]

It is natural to look to the primitive for the first guidance as to the division of the sacred and the secular. The sacred bears with it an aroma of primitive tabu, and of a dawning fear of the unknown. I shall not pause long at the threshold of religion, if only because I lack the necessary knowledge for a discourse on primitive anthropology. It will however serve the more interesting enquiry, as to the present significance of the dualism, if just for a moment we rest, and consider the early origin whence the sense of the sacred is to us bequeathed.

All manner of objects were set apart as sacred. A special place or a special season, the ruler of a tribe, the animal which was the totem of a tribe, a rock or a spring or a tree, each might be set apart from the workaday world and hedged off with a sense of awe. One of the most familiar of sacred objects, the standing stone, with which we meet in the Old Testament, shall serve as an example of the primitive attitude towards the sacred. Dr. Frazer writes:

> 'Sacred stones or monoliths were regular features of Canaanite or Hebrew sanctuaries in days of old; many of them have been discovered in their original positions by the excavators who have laid bare the high places in modern times. Even the prophet Hosea appears to have regarded a standing stone as an indispensable adjunct of a holy place, dedicated to the worship of Jahweh. It was only in later times

[1] p. 219.

that the progressive spirit of Israelitish religion condemned these ru stone monuments as heathenish, decreed their destruction, and fo bade their erection. Originally the deity seems to have been conceiv as actually resident in the stones; it was his awful presence whi conferred on them their sanctity. . . . The idea of a stone tenanted b a god or other powerful spirit was not peculiar to ancient Israel; has been shared by many people in many lands.' [2]

Many problems are raised if we would have a clear unde standing of the sacred. Is there first a belief in spiritual being met with in dream or trance; and is it then that material objec are held to be the dwelling-place of such spirits? Is animis rather a later stage of development; is the awe of the savag first excited by that which in nature is mysterious and unaccoun able, and does he then proceed to a theory of a spiritual powe manifesting itself in the mysterious? How is it that the sacre comes to have a double meaning of friendly and hostile? I there in every place of awe, before the sacred, a prior belief i one supreme Power or Being; or is this naïve monotheism late development from belief in a multiplicity of spiritua powers? Such questions cannot here be more than raised. Prob ably if a clear-cut answer were given, that answer by very reaso of its clarity would be untrue. To quote the nice metaphor wit which Dr. Marett deprecates over-precision, [3] 'all tight wrap pings and swaddling clothes cannot but prove pernicious to a infant science, alive and kicking, though they may be all ver suitable for a mummy.' We should not do justice to the primi tive attitude towards the sacred if we attempted to force it int the exact framework of a later logic.

Two points may be noticed in the primitive conception o the sacred, as bearing more particularly on the later study of th word. First, it is the attitude of the observer which is importan rather than the object which is observed as sacred. The poin to notice in the sacred is rather the subjective attitude of aw than any clearly framed theory of the awful. Dr. Oman use the word 'holy' for the direct sense or feeling of the super natural, and the word 'sacred' for the valuation of the super natural as of absolute worth. He writes that [4] 'the sense of th holy has its own peculiar quality as feeling, being a direct res

[2] *Folk Lore in the Old Testament*, p. 231.
[3] *Op. cit.*, p. xxx.
[4] *Science, Religion and Reality*, p. 289.

ponse to a special kind of environment'; and that 'this sense goes inseparably with the valuation of this environment as sacred.' So long as it is merely sacred objects which are considered, the secret of primitive religion will not have been won. The student must manage, if he can, to see these objects subjectively from within, as they appeared to primitive man himself; only if he recaptures the awe before the sacred will he understand the meaning of sacred.

The second point of interest is that the sacred, in its primitive form, is not without some connection with the subject of this conference, Spiritual Authority. From the world of sacred things there is expected to come, chiefly perhaps power, but also at times guidance. Sacred places or people or things have the power of oracle, of enunciating truths with a certainty not achieved by other normal means. [6] Saul and David question the oracle of the ephod; the Urim and Thummim are probably a sacred lot with which they receive reply. Authoritative edict is at this early stage taken to be a property of the sacred sphere.

Is this primitive dualism of sacred and secular a characteristic of all religion, or is it a feature of lower religion which is progressively removed as religion advances? Let us now lay down and examine the thesis that progress in religion consists just in this, the resolving of the distinction and the abolition of the dualism of sacred and secular. Other marks of progress of course there are. It might be taken as a main mark of progress that the awe before the sacred is attached less and less to physical objects and more and more to ethical or aesthetic qualities. Dr. Oman makes the interesting suggestion that [7] 'we might regard it as at least one mark of progress, that while the more primitive the life, the more the feelings determine the value; the more advanced the development, the more the values determine the feelings.' In primitive religion the view of an object as sacred is the result of the prior sense of awe in the presence of this particular object; in higher religion there is first a rational judgment as to what objects are of sacred value, and then such objects are regarded as vested with sanctity. For the moment let us ask whether there is not a more radical mark of progress

[6] *Cf. I Sam.*, xiv, 41 and xxx, 7.
[7] *Op. cit.*, p. 290.

in the progressive abolition of the dualism of sacred and secular. In part, objects once regarded as sacred are freed from narrow, superstitious reverence, and are set on the same plan with other objects of their class; compared with the majesty and holiness of the Creator, all created things are secular; to regard with awe any thing created is idolatry, incurring the protest of the prophets. In another sense all things are sacred, in that the world and everything in it should be regarded as consecrated to the service of God, and intended to fulfil His will.

The resolution of the dualism of sacred and secular can be clearly illustrated from the attitude of the Jewish people to sacred places. At first there are peculiar places where Jahwe chose to reveal himself, and these are distinguished from the rest of space. Any place, where the awe before the holy has once been felt, may again become a place of revelation, and is therefore regarded as sacred. [8] Elijah in special need of divine comfort visits again the mount of revelation. The Israelites in Palestine take over the high places of the local nature cults. In general the saying of Robertson Smith holds, that [9] 'all that is necessary to constitute a Semitic sanctuary is a precedent.' First the Ark and then the Temple are regarded as the special dwelling-place of God. A time came however — probably after the Deuteronomic reform, and perhaps during the Exile — when there dawned a vision of God who was not thus limited in space. The historian of the reign of Solomon then makes Solomon say with regard to the Jerusalem Temple, [10] 'Will God in very deed dwell on the earth? Behold the heaven of heavens cannot contain Thee; and how much less this house that I have builded!' This wider vision has been prepared by the universalism of the prophet Isaiah, who in his vision exclaims, [11] 'Holy, Holy, Holy is the Lord of Hosts; the whole earth is full of his glory.' It is echoed in the song of the Psalmist, [12] 'The earth is the Lord's and the fulness thereof; the world and they that dwell therein.' Examples might be multiplied from Jewish literature of this later period. Here there is no division of sacred and secular. The religious genius of Israel is stretching out to a vision of

[8] *I Kings*, xix, 8.

[9] *Religion of the Semites*, p. 115.

[10] *I Kings*, viii, 27. [11] vi, 3. [12] xxiv, 1.

God, who transcends the whole world of space, yet with whom at any point of space or time man may come into contact. The view that special places are sacred is condemned as superstitious; the whole world is regarded as sacred to the Lord. This taking up of the secular into the sacred reaches its climax and fulfilment in the Fourth Gospel: [13] 'Woman, believe me, the hour cometh when neither in this mountain, nor in Jerusalem, shall ye worship the Father. The hour cometh and now is, when the true worshippers shall worship the Father in spirit and in truth.'

Christianity knows no sphere of the secular exempt from the reign of God. If God is to reign at all His reign must be absolute. The individual, in so far as he is truly Christ-like, will regard the whole of life and of conduct as subordinated to the will of the Father; objectively, everything in the world will be regarded as sacred, set apart to be used for the purposes of God. It is said that David Livingstone wrote in his journal, [15] 'I will place no value on anything I have or may possess, except in relation to the kingdom of Christ.'

God must be all in all; each of His children must acknowledge His reign; all space and all time, and everything in space and time, must be regarded as sacred in His service. Yes, but this taking up of the secular into the sacred is not a present reality, but rather the promised goal of slow achievement. Thus there arises in higher religion, after the prophetic protest, the counterpart to the sacred in a system of sacraments. Either of deliberate purpose, or as the unconscious product of a need, the sacramental is introduced, as an aid towards the taking up of the secular into the sacred. Dr. Marett, as he discusses the sacred, foreshadows this need, and at the same time endorses for us, if it needs endorsing, this parallel of the sacred and the sacramental. Speaking of the sacred in primitive religion, he writes: [16] 'Of course, if it were to turn out that such sacramental observances, as they may fairly be termed, answer to some permanent need of the human spirit, we should have established a point that could scarcely fail to influence the final evaluation of the philosopher and the theologian.'

[13] *John*, iv, 21.

[15] Quoted by W. R. Bowie, *The Master*, p. 122. [16] *Op. cit.*, p. 194.

In its simplest form the sacramental does, of set purpose what the sacred does as the result of a prior spontaneous sense of awe. The sacrament creates again the division of sacred and secular. It separates off from one field or class of objects some one particular object, which is henceforth taken as sacred. It does this, in the light of the prophetic universalism, with the deliberate aim of showing that the whole class of objects is sacred, or at least should be so regarded.

Canon Quick's definition of the sacrament in his recent book will help to bring out the analogy, and to show how the sacramental principle creates again, as it were for educational purposes, the dualism of sacred and secular. He writes:

> 'A sacrament is any spatio-temporal reality which by its occupation of space or time expresses to us God's will and purpose, and enables us the better to co-operate with them. . . . But such a definition is evidently too general to be of practical service. And a distinguishing feature of those realities which we may more properly call sacramental seems to be this: that in them the outward consists of one member of a class or part of a whole, which is severed and differentiated from the other members or parts, in order both to represent the true relation of the whole to God, and to be the means whereby this relation is more effectively realised.'[17]

This definition, and the analogy with the sacred, may be illustrated with examples, chosen for ourselves, though not without Canon Quick's guidance. Certain times are set apart for deliberate prayer, not because at these times only we should be in communion with God, but so that we may learn how the whole of life should be a continuous performance of the divine will. Certain buildings are set apart, as they are also in primitive religion, as the dwelling-place of God; but this is done, not as a result of the sense of awe in this one place, but of set purpose to show that in all places the Spirit of God should reign. The sacramental principle would seem to provide a rationale for setting apart one collection of literature as of peculiar sanctity with the intention of teaching men that all writing may and should be an expression in some form of the goodness and beauty and truth of God. One meal is set apart and vested with a special sanctity so that there men may learn to make every meal a gathering in love of the children of God. The community sets apart certain individuals as ordained priests, not because they are specially holy, nor even because they are res-

[17] *The Christian Sacraments*, pp. 104, 5.

ponsible to God in any special degree, or in a way in which men of other professions are not, but as a sign that every man is the child of God, born into the world to learn and do His will.

It may be noted that whereas in the primitive sacred the response of awe is spontaneous and prior to the recognition of the object as sacred, in the sacrament, because the object is artificially chosen, therefore it must subsequently be artificially vested with a dignity which will evoke the response of awe. The ritual, by means of which the sacramental object is differentiated, must not be so elaborate as to conceal the connection of the object with its class. It is the purpose of the sacrament to teach men that imaginative genius with which Christ saw parables of God in the simple objects of daily life, and with which He saw all objects as tools for the service of God. This purpose is lost when the Church, lacking the simplicity of her Master, thinks it necessary to vest ordinary things with an elaborate ritual before they can appear as sacred.

In the sacrament, as in the sacred, the subjective attitude of the individual is all important, all the more so as that attitude is in this case derivative, not immediate. The reverence of the observer and the sacred value of the sacramental object are each necessary to the other, and the sacramental object in itself is nothing. Very close at the door of sacramental religion stands the danger of formalism, with its two children, hypocrisy and pride. Wherever religion finds, as it must, outward expression, hypocrisy steps in, as men find that it is easy to play the part of observance of the outward form of the sacrament without the spirit. Pride then follows hypocrisy, taking stock of its meticulous observance of the outward form of religious practice. St. Paul at least, if he knew the value of sacramental religion, knew also its danger. [18] 'By grace are ye saved, through faith, not of works lest any man should boast.' This was said to a Christian community; and it still needs saying to those who think that there is any saving grace in the sacrament as such. The sacrament only fulfils its purpose if it has its counterpart in the subjective reverence of each individual.

The sacramental, like the sacred, has, too, its claim to authority, with what justice we will enquire in a moment. The

[18] *Eph.* ii, 7, 8.

sacred book is still in popular religion supposed to have monopoly of inspiration, and to speak with a divine infallibilit such as had previously the sacred lot. The Roman Churc maintains, with some difficulty, the infallibility of the head c the priesthood. With not less difficulty some would still have u look for an infallible voice in the Anglican priesthood.

The cure for all the dangers of a narrow sacramentalism lie in a return to the thesis that ideally the sacred and the secula are one. The sacrament is essentially representative. If this i remembered, it will be impossible to lapse into any primitiv view of the magical efficacy of the sacraments. The sacramenta object is never sacred of any inner necessity. The sacramen exists simply to teach men the truth, foreshadowed in the pro phets and fulfilled in Christ, that the world and everything i it exists for the glory of God.

Let me claim again the authority of Canon Quick. The foll lowing sentences, though disconnected in his book, give I thin a fair representation of his view :

> 'Historically speaking the most common aberration has been to los sight of the representation of the universal in every sacrament. An in consequence the most common accusation brought against th sacramental doctrine of the Church is the allegation that its source i magic. . . . When it is supposed that the outward sign of the sacra ment is the only means whereby a spiritual relation can be realized, i is easy to suppose also that wherever the outward sign is performed the spiritual relation accompanies it by a sort of mechanical necessity Now this binding of the divine action to the performance of a certain ritual is the common characteristic of magic all the world over. Catholi orthodoxy has on the whole repudiated it . . . The exclusion of magi cal notions by Catholic theology has not in practice been complete Surely the most thorough-going reply to any charge of magic is not in any way to minimise either the solemnity or the efficacy of the sacra ments, but rather to insist upon their representative character.' [19]

The importance of the representative character is obvious it we apply it to the simpler forms of sacrament. Sunday is a holy day, not exclusively, but as a sign that all the week is holy. The man who does not rise from his time of prayer taking more of the divine character of love into the routine of his life, has missed the point of special times of prayer. [20] 'We maintain,' wrote Bradley, 'that neither church-going, meditation, nor prayer, except so far as it reacts on practice and subserves that, is religious at all.'

[19] *Op. cit.*, pp. 110 and 111. [20] *Ethical Studies*, 1927, p. 337.

This ideal of identification of religion and life is the theme of every popular sermon. Would the prophet be as popular if he applied the principle of the representative character of the sacrament to other sacramental objects? The Bible is not in any exclusive sense inspired or authoritative. To separate the Bible as sacred, from other literature as profane, is bibliolatry, which is just one form of idolatry which incurred the prophetic protest. The Bible is sacramental of the fact that wherever men have written in sincerity and truth, there men should recognize the voice of the divine Spirit of Truth. Just because the Bible is in this way sacramental, I should say that it was possible, and highly advisable, that later ages should not regard our present Bible as sacrosanct, but should from time to time frame afresh, as a new sacrament, a new canon of such literature as shall best show forth the character of God.

Let us apply this principle of the representative character of the sacrament to a theme, which is more controversial, and closer to the central subject of this conference, namely, the authority of the Christian ministry. The priesthood is sacramental of the ideal that all men are priests of God. Believing in one God, we believe that in the hearts of all men the one voice of truth and goodness speaks, and that wherever men speak in sincerity some word of the voice of God will be heard. Obviously in the actual world, in some men that voice is heard and finds expression more clearly and in some less clearly. The priesthood is representative and educational; it exists that by all men the voice of God may be heard, and that in all men the voice of God may be respected. Obviously in the actual world the Church will choose as priests those who seem most clearly to know and in loyalty to speak the will of God. If it be supposed that the priesthood have any monopoly of divine knowledge, or that by the fact of ordination they have any peculiar avenue leading to divine certainty, then we shall have abandoned the representative character of the sacrament, and fallen back into a religion of magic. Any man, priest or layman, may in utter sincerity know and declare the purpose of God. Any man, layman or priest, may echo the voice of convention, or force his private opinion with a merely arrogant claim to authority.

According to Lightfoot, this view of the real priesthood
all believers is the view of the Church, when Christianity sprin
in unpolluted freshness from its source in Christ. Lightfo
writes in his essay on the Christian Ministry,[21]

> 'This then is the Christian ideal, a holy season extending the whc
> year round, a temple confined only by the limits of the habitable worl
> a priesthood co-extensive with the human race. For communicati
> instruction and for preserving public order, for conducting religio
> worship and for dispensing social charities it became necessary to a
> point special officers. But the priestly functions and privileges of t
> Christian people are never regarded as transferred or even delegat
> to these officers. They are called stewards or messengers of God, se
> vants or ministers of the Church, and the like; but the sacerdotal tit
> is never once conferred on them.'

He quotes St. Paul's two references to an ordered ministr
and concludes:

> 'Again in both these passages it will be seen that great stress
> laid on the work of the Spirit. The faculty of governing not less tha
> the utterance of prophecy, the gift of healing not less than the gift
> tongues, is an inspiration of the Holy Ghost. But on the other han
> in both alike there is an entire silence about priestly functions; f
> the most exalted office in the Church, the highest gift of the Spi
> conveyed no sacerdotal right which was not enjoyed by the humble
> member of the Christian community.'

In one sense none are sacred, since to none is owed that reve
ence which each man owes alone to the Creator. In anothe
sense all are sacred, since all are made in the image of God, an
any may in reverence learn and declare the will of God.

This principle of the representative character of the ministr
appears yet more strongly in the Reformation doctrine of th
Priesthood of Believers. Let me quote from Beard's accou
of this doctrine in Luther, for it seems to me that it is an a
important doctrine of the Reformation, and one which we are i
grave danger of neglecting.

> 'The doctrine of the priesthood of every Christian believer is,' say
> Beard, 'the central point of Luther's opposition to the Catholic syste
> Whatever Church says and means "priest" is on the Catholic side
> the great controversy of Christianity; whatever Church says an
> means "minister," in that act proclaims itself Protestant. The one i
> effect declared its belief that Divine grace and help can descend upo
> human nature only by certain fixed channels, of which a supernaturall
> endowed class of men have control; the other asserts that the inte
> course between the Eternal and the human spirit is absolutely free, an
> that all its conditions are fulfilled in Infinite Love on the one hand, an
> on the other in awful aspiration and the passionate desire of holiness
> Neither can free itself from the necessity of defining the visible Churc
> but in one case it is simply the assembly of the faithful, united by com

[21] *Dissertations on the Apostolic Age*, p. 140-141.

> mon beliefs, hopes, purposes; in the other it is a mystic communion, inheriting authority from the past, wielding supernatural powers by organized instruments, and standing permanently between the soul and God. It was from one of these entrenched heights of Christian theory to the other that Luther made the irrevocable transition.'[22]

The logic of facts unfortunately compels one to question the word 'irrevocable.'

The priesthood is sacramental, representative of the spiritual authority of all believers. It is sometimes supposed that the sacramental, like the sacred, has an exclusive possession of spiritual authority; this claim is false, and is a lapse from a prophetic, spiritual religion into primitive magic. Let us apply this more closely to present controversy. I have heard it suggested that the Bishops could not suffer a measure approved by themselves and by the Church Assembly to be rejected by Parliament, without thereby acknowledging the failure of the Church. At one time, if I remember right, I heard of prayer for a wise decision in Parliament, as though it were possible that God might speak through the minds of His children there assembled; when, however, their decision differed from the opinion of the Bishops and the Church Assembly, I have heard it said that it was intolerable to suppose that the Spirit should have guided Parliament, and should therefore be shown not to have guided the Church. The sacred, it seems, must be right and the secular wrong; the priestly office is in itself a guarantee of priestly wisdom. Perhaps; yet to me it seems that such a statement is a return to the crude dualism of sacred and secular, and a denial of the exalted universalism alike of the prophets, of the New Testament, and of the Reformers. To me it seems that when all is said, a priest or a bishop is but one man in the family of God's children. The episcopal Bench has not failed, if the considered judgment of the nation differs from their opinion, for the episcopal office is representative of the fact that in the hearts of all men the voice of God is speaking. Christian worship should be an expression of the aspirations of Christian people; the priest is one man amongst others, and has no supernatural insight, wherewith he may dictate to men how they ought to worship. The voice of Parliament seems to me the expression of the faith of the nation that the religious needs of the nation

[22] *The Reformation,* Hibbert Lectures, p. 133 fol.

were not met by the sacramental compromises of the Bishops and by the growing ecclesiasticism of the Church. We need to learn again in the Church that the voice of those members of God's family outside ecclesiastical circles is worthy of respect that the office of priest is sacramental of the priesthood of believers. If we fail to learn this, the Church will become, what it has indeed to a large extent already become, an ecclesiastical sect, with which the true Christian life of the nation has no concern.

We have looked at sacred objects, and have suggested that all objects are sacred to the purposes of God; we have suggested that the higher dualism of sacramental and secular serves the educational purpose of teaching men to regard the world and everything in it as sacred. In each case it was suggested that the true importance lay, on the subjective side, in the attitude of the individual. Let us now look more closely at the subjective side. Let us ask whether there may not be a higher dualism of religious and secular, and whether or not there is in this dualism a clue to the true nature of spiritual authority. At this point let me seek illustration and guidance from present movements in German theology, from Otto, Karl Heim and Karl Barth, who are distinguishing again on a new level 'two worlds, a workaday and a sacred.'

Otto treats of this distinction of religion from life from the point of view of the emotional accompaniment of religion. He stresses, as is well known, the sense of awe before the Holy as before a *mysterium tremendum fascinans*. He appears at times to stand for a revival in advanced religion of the characteristics of primitive religion, but I am sure this is not his intention. He is stressing what is a fact of all religion, that there are times when the soul is lifted from the conventional drab monotony of workaday things, and finds, it may be amid workaday things, a sudden glimpse of the infinite nearness of the infinitely remote power of God. The soul is no longer at home with the material, and a stranger to the spiritual. The soul in one flash of insight is caught up into the realm of the spiritual, and sees material things transfigured in the flash of light. When this happens, there is on the human side the characteristic which Otto studies, the sense of awe in the presence of the realm of

spirit. There is also the sense of union with the spirit of God, which Otto calls 'divination,' or 'intuitive apprehension.'

Heim develops a similar distinction of religion from normal life, in a book which ought to be translated, *Glaubensgewissheit*. I believe that he has subsequently modified and developed his views in a later book, *Glaube und Leben*, which I have not read. In the first book he distinguishes the certainty of trust between two who love, from the doubtfulness of those who do not love. It is characteristic of this certainty that it has no shadow of doubt, no shadow of a qualifying 'if.' If the lover once desires to test or prove the trustworthiness of another, he has left the realm of faith, and no amount of research along the path of experiment will restore this certainty of faith. Heim proceeds to apply this distinction of trust or suspicion, drawn from the realm of personal relationships, to the relation between man and God. Religion is this unquestioning confidence in God. The certainty of religious faith is possible, just because the soul of man and God are akin. This certainty is not to be won by any striving, for here as in love, to strive for certainty is merely to acknowledge that we lack certainty. It is not to be discovered in reflection, for it is born in the inmost soul of man; its home is the subject which has experience, but which can never become an object of experience. It is not to be rediscovered in memory, but lives only in the moment in which it is born. Nevertheless there is this distinction between religion and life. The empirical study of evidence, and deductive reasoning give at their very highest extreme probability; there is always a lurking 'if.' All normal propositions turn out on close examination to be hypothetical. In religion, man enters into communion with God, and achieves certain confidence both in the purpose of God, and in His power to achieve His purpose.

Karl Barth emphasizes the dualism of religion and life from the point of view of the ineffability of God. The nature of the realm of spirit can never be described; we can only deny that normal categories are here applicable. Everything within the spatio-temporal world is at its very highest only '*Hinweis*,' only a pointer to the invisible presence of God. God can never be known as one object amongst other objects. The God who is the product of our thought or the goal of our idealism is no God,

but is just another name for self. Before the true God we ca but bow in utter abasement. When we acknowledge with fea before God, that in the judgment of God we can but be con demned, we and all that we are and all that we have, even a our religion, then we are in a position to know the love of Goc and to receive the grace of God made known in Christ. Jus in the moment that we die utterly to self, the self is reborn a child of God. In general Barth suggests that in this world w can never do more than stand on the threshold of this rebirth The minute we become conscious of self, and claim this com munion with God as our achievement, we are back on this sid of the border, where God is not to be seen. Nevertheless would seem that this rebirth is possible in this world. Comment ing on the verse, 'Through him we have access by faith to thi Grace,' Barth writes :

> 'Paul after his conversion finds himself in the extraordinary pos tion of being compelled to speak truths which no man can speak . . While he was waiting on God he became a possessor, a possessor c peace . . . Now he is what he is, an ambassador of him before whor man is but dust and ashes; and this means that he is what he is not he knows what he cannot know, he does what he cannot do.'[23]

These three are in different ways distinguishing in a nev form a moment of the sacred from the secular. It seems to m that in different ways they are each saying the same thing Superficially they are allied, in that their philosophy marks revival after a century of misunderstanding of the Kantia dualism of the phenomenal space-time world, and of the un known world of God and the subject self. Superficially too the are allied in that they all represent a movement of reactio against the humanitarian rationalism of German Protestantism of the Harnack type. More fundamentally they are probabl allied, in that they are all feeling after different characteristic of the one experience. They are unwilling to rest content wit a religion which is in fact no more than a theoretical theisti sanction for the ideals of truth and goodness. They see i Christianity, in it true form, an intercourse with God, clearly differentiated from the drab and powerless humanitarianism o the workaday world. This intercourse is to Otto *tremendum fas cinans*; perhaps the former epithet is more true of the theology

[23] *Der Romerbrief*, p. 129.

of Barth, the latter of that of Heim. Heim too makes the sacred moment of utter confidence in God a possible ideal for all men. Barth, more impressed with the failure of men in fact to attain this confidence, sees infinite and finite meet only in Christ, and for the rest prefers to dwell on the necessary abasement of man as separated from God.

This new dualism of the sacred and the secular bears again the characteristics which have been noticed on the earlier levels. It would be untrue to say without qualification that it is subjective, for religion is for these writers through and through theocentric. They are not primarily concerned with religious experience; for Barth, compared with the majesty of God, even the heights of religious experience can give man no claim to pre-eminence. Granted however this prior dependence on God, the emphasis lies again on the subjective attitude towards the universe, rather than on any objective theory of the universe. Otto shows the kinship of the religious attitude with the sense of awe in more primitive forms of religion. More profoundly, as it seems to me, Heim and Barth show that it is an experience so essentially personal as to be beyond the touch of any objective examination. Religion is a subject subject relationship of man to God. So long as Christianity remains the goal of deliberate effort, we are not yet truly Christian. So long as God is one object amongst others in our world, we do not yet know the true God. The goal of religion is an immediate spontaneous harmony of man with God. The Christian ideally would not strive to live according to the Sermon on the Mount; he would abandon all thought of self before God, so that Love Divine would be reborn in his heart, and he would do by nature what the Sermon on the Mount pescribes. He would not strive to bring his desires and aspirations into harmony with the Lord's Prayer; he would rather so desire the reign of God as to pray spontaneously in such words. If we manage to envisage the ideal, we shall confess, like Barth, that it is a threshold never crossed in this world.

In this new form as on the other levels the sacred claims authority. There is in religion the possibility of a complete certainty, a certainty without any shadow of doubt, a certainty in which God speaks, and the individual has merely the confidence, that it is the voice of God which is through him speaking.

Here a very important note of caution must be made. This certainty of faith is not the same as reason, but it is never in conflict with reason. It is supra-rational, but never irrational. I do not think that those who put forward this combination of Kantian agnosticism with the certainty of faith intend there to be any conflict between their position, and the most extreme rationalism. Discursive reason can and must be pushed to its furthest limits; the argument is that even so reason will but acknowledge its impotence, and cannot reach the goal of certainty. Reality is a relation between persons, made known through confidence or trust or faith; it is not in the last resort a system of ideas made known by discursive reason. The lesser followers of this new agnosticism do and will use the names of its prophets as authority for every type of intellectual and practical superstition. From saying, 'God in His ultimate Being must be loved and trusted. He can never be known as one object in my world of objects,' it is an easy step to saying, 'All is necessarily myth, and this myth which the Church holds is the one true myth.' From saying, 'Worship is the unreflective act of the soul in communion with God,' it is an easy step to saying, 'This system of ritual is the one system, which, when it becomes reflective, the soul will use.' This step is a false deduction, and a regression into pure superstition. The ineffability of religious experience cannot be claimed as an argument for any one expression of religious experience. This false deduction must be resisted with might and main by those who hold, and rightly hold, the supremacy of reason within the sphere of reason. It is, however, a false deduction. Let those who are loyal to reason not neglect the truth of this new dualism, that there is a love which is never false, yet which is more excellent than truth. A Christ-like faith in God combines a knowledge of His trustworthiness, with a certainty such as secular knowledge does not and cannot understand.

The certainty of faith is immediate and spontaneous, and lives only in the moment in which it is born. It cannot be recaptured in memory, and it cannot be received on authority from the experience of others. So long as we look for it, we can but acknowledge like Barth that we lack it; everything that can be seen is transient; the eternal God is a God that hideth Himself.

In each man there is an 'I' that is no true 'I,' but is merely the mirror of convention, and the imitator of other men's opinions. In each man there is an 'I' which, sometimes deferential, sometimes arrogant, voices 'My' desires, and 'My' opinions; this 'I' of private pleasure wanders disconsolately through our secular workaday life; this 'I' can but earn the judgment of the infinite God, and can but die so that perchance the presence of God may live. In each man there is the possibility of an 'I,' which, turning in trust to God, out of the infinite Grace of God, speaks with assurant certainty of communion with God, and proclaims with the certainty of faith the will of God. At times, catching a glimpse of the meaning of this utter confidence in God, we may understand why some, like Luther, have said that faith is the very meaning of salvation; why some, like Calvin, stress to the point of fatalism the dependence of man on the Grace of God for the possession of this faith; and why some, like Barth, say that man never reaches more than the threshold of that world of faith, which is beyond anything that we can know in this world. Those who could speak with this complete certainty of harmony with the mind of God would have the only true authority, the authority of conviction and absolute sincerity, the authority of saying things whose truth flies on its own unaided wings, recognized by all that have ears to hear.

I started on the threshold of Religion; I draw near to the final threshold, the authority of Christ, which is the theme of the next paper. To me it seems the clue to Christianity that Jesus possessed this assurance of complete union with the Father. He speaks with the 'I' of inmost sincerity, and inmost loyalty to the Father; and just for this reason He speaks truths which are present in the hearts of other men, but which for the most part lie hidden, deep buried beneath a crust of convention and private pleasure. He proclaims, 'Ye have heard of old time, but I say'; and this defiant egotism has in Him no note of arrogance, for He is speaking, not of Himself, but out of the certainty of communion with God. He speaks with authority, not as the scribes. Other men cannot receive what He says on authority, for the certainty can never be received at second-hand. If others would know with like certainty the truths which He knew, they themselves, like Him, must have a like certainty

of trust in God. Jesus had constantly, but not continually, this certainty of confidence. At one time at least a doubt came, and the Tempter suggested an 'if,' with which He might prove to Himself and to others the power of faith and the truth of His message. Jesus saw that to make trial of faith was merely to acknowledge that faith had departed. Repudiating, as unworthy of trust in God, the lurking 'if' of the Tempter, He recaptured the certainty of faith. Other men live constantly without this confidence in God, in a secular world of doubt and distrust. As Jesus was truly human, and knew also the possibility of doubt, so other men are in a measure divine and may know occasionally the certainty of faith.

We have maintained that the dualism of sacred and secular in the world exists only to be transcended. In part progress in religion consists in the taking up of the secular into the sacred, so that every object shall be regarded as sacred to the purposes of God. It is with this purpose, of aiding men to view the secular as sacred, or to make it sacred, that the sacramentall creates a new similar dualism. In part the truth seems rather that all objects are secular. Judged by the infinite Being of God, all created things stand on one plane, in a class apart from God. We have now suggested a further dualism, where man, acknowledging the impotence of himself and all created things, is reborn to a newer and higher self, hid with Christ in God, and comes to the threshold of the certainty of communion with God. Is this last dualism to be resolved in a taking up of the secular into the sacred, so that all men always shall have this Christ-like certainty of communion with the Father? Ultimately, yes. This is the far-off goal of religion; this is the purpose of the Church. It is not the task of the Church to impose on men from without a scheme of thought or conduct; the true goal of faith in God and man can only come to each man born from within his own heart. It is not the task of the Church to ask men to accept teaching on her authority, nor even on the authority of Christ; the only true authority is the certainty of truth, which each man must have for himself. Seeking a certain easy level of religious belief and ethical behaviour, the Church marshalls men's minds and dictates their conduct, and achieves a considerable measure of success in her purpose. Seeking to win in

men a spontaneous love for God and man, Jesus loved them, trusted them, left them free, and as a result failed unto death, knowing that only by daring and facing failure could His purpose be achieved. Showing to men a love so sure of itself that it dare face even failure, He taught men, for a moment at least, the same confidence in the Love of God; He awoke in them new powers, evoked by this certain confidence. It is the task of the Church, like Jesus, to show a complete faith in man, even if that faith be abused, that so she may win men for faith in God. The Church will know that the only authority is the authority of faith, which each man learns for himself by trust in God. She will seek that her members shall be able to say, each for themselves to-day, 'It hath been said of old time, but I say.' Claiming no merit, not even for the peaks of religious achievement, the Church will teach men that the world and everything in it is secular, as contrasted with the infinite majesty of the Grace of God. Trusting God with a Christ-like trust, the Church will learn herself, and teach to others, that in the eyes of the Father of Love all are sacred, heirs of His love, heirs of the certainty of communion with Him, heirs of the Spirit of God and joint heirs with Christ.

THE SPIRIT OF CHRIST AND THE SPIRIT OF MAN

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THE title of this paper suggests both a likeness and a diff ence, and, in so doing, it raises a problem. In what sen are the spirit of Christ and the spirit of Man to be contraste And what is the nature of the relation between them? I am n however, concerned with this problem as a whole, but only in far as it bears upon the problem of the nature of spiritual auth ity. Accordingly, I shall enquire in what sense the spirit Christ is an authority for the spirit of Man, and what is t nature of this authority. But I must begin with a more gene discussion of the principles which will underlie the enquiry.

Ultimately, the only standard in matters of goodness is t standard intrinsic in goodness itself; and in matters of truth t only standard is that intrinsic in truth itself. This does not me that a claim to goodness, or to truth, is insusceptible of defen or confirmation, and must be either admitted simply or simp rejected. It means that the goodness or truth of anything can defended or supported only by an appeal to more of its own kin *i.e.* to its consistency with other good things, or with other truth Moreover, no action of mine is good, in the full sense, unle seen by me to be so and done on that account; and no judgme of mine is true, in the full sense, unless I have seen its truth a made it for that reason.

It follows (to advance rapidly) that no authority is moral rational that is based otherwise than upon its own intrinsic goo ness or truth. And an authority which is based upon any oth sanction has, whatever its power, no spiritual claim to my alleg ance. The term authority may indeed be used more wide (though such a use is perhaps unnatural) to include any law power which exacts obedience. But, if the law or power h itself no moral or rational quality, its authority is without mor or rational significance. It becomes mere force or prescriptio And I cannot accept and render obedience to an authority, in way which is moral or rational, except in so far as I see it to

in itself good or true. Until I have recognized its basis in goodness or truth, it must come to me, either as meaningless, or with some merely external sanction, such as force, or fear, or blind custom. I may indeed accept it and submit; but I do not recognize that what I submit to has, in its own nature, any claim upon my loyalty or obedience. Its authority is not, for me, rational or moral. Wherever an authority has for me a rational or a moral significance, it is because what is enjoined is recognized by me as in its own nature (though not necessarily apart from the context in which it comes to me) true or good, and as binding upon me for that sole reason.

This principle holds universally; but there are often complications which more or less conceal it. It is not possible to consider these complications in detail here, but two examples may be given. When a child is told to do this or that, he does not always see fully or at once that what he is told to do is in itself good. Yet, even so, to obey may be morally binding upon him: indeed, to do as he is told may perhaps be to him a chief meaning of goodness. Again, it may often be a duty to obey some law or custom, even though it is not clearly and directly seen to embody any moral or rational principle. I may have failed to see its justification in reason or goodness, and may yet know it to be a duty to obey it. But such cases as these form no real exceptions to what has been said, as reflection will show. In the former example, the moral character of the authority is due, not to the mere fact that the child is told, but to the fact that he is told by those whose will he respects. And, in the latter example, the custom or law is morally binding, not merely because it is law or has force behind it, but because it is recognized as embodying, more or less perfectly, the will of a society having great moral significance. If the will of the parent, or the society, is not respected as being in itself good, the authority loses all moral significance for those to whom the command is issued, and is equivalent to mere compulsion or the force of circumstance. It is true that, even to the end, there may be failure to see in detail the moral character or basis of what is prescribed; nevertheless, when taken in its context, that basis is recognized, and each detail acquires moral character from the system to which it belongs or from the will of those who prescribe it. The

same principle holds everywhere. An authority is either n moral or rational at all (and then it is no duty to recognize it), it is so because of the intrinsic value of what it enjoins. And f it to have this significance for me, I must in some degree ha recognized that value.

Thus, it may be stated generally that no judgment or de sion is for me true or good except in so far as I see it to be so a make it on that account, and, further, that no authority is moral or rational significance for me except in so far as I see to be founded in goodness or reason. And it follows from th that in spiritual matters there can be no appeal to an author independently of a judgment that it is in itself good or true. can only accept it as a spiritual authority on the basis of my ov insight and judgment that it is true or good. There cannot, the nature of the case, be any escape from the burden and th peril of forming my own judgment by my own insight and up my own responsibility. Directly I attempt to deliver myself ov to an authority, accepted otherwise than by my own judgme that it is true or my own insight that it is good, or endeavour use its directions as a substitute for my personal decisions, th authority ceases to have for me moral or spiritual significanc And not only must I see by my own insight that what I acce as authority is good or true, I must also, in all my obedience it, continue to recognize it in that character. I cannot judge so once and for all, and then surrender to it my further respons bility, and follow it blindly. Each act of obedience must be personal decision, based upon personal insight. If it is not s it has lost all spiritual quality.

It would, of course, be a most serious error to conclude fro this that there can be no authority in spiritual matters, or th judgments of goodness and truth are not open to training or co rection. However, two conclusions do follow inevitably. In th first place, it is never possible to appeal to a spiritual authorit whether it be a church, or a law, or a revelation, or even th example of Christ, in such a way as to make that authority supe sede personal responsibility or to substitute its injunctions fo personal decisions reached through personal insight. Thes authorities—and such they may be—are never a substitute fo personal decision through personal insight. On the contrar

they are assistances to it or means to its truer exercise; or, rather, they constitute the sphere in which—and in which alone—personal decision and insight can attain their fullest development and their truest use. If these authorities are used otherwise, they are no longer spiritual authorities at all: they may, indeed, one and all be turned into the enemies of goodness and truth. In the second place, my personal judgment is always in some measure fallible; and, in consequence, every authority, no matter what it may be in itself, must in my use in a measure be fallible too. And I think that, so long as it is understood that truth and goodness can only have to us a meaning as they come to us through our own insight and as possessing their own authority, the impossibility of infallible guidance will in no way distress us. Those who desire above all things infallibility have commonly little desire for truth, and little understanding of its meaning. It must, however, be emphasized that finality and infallibility are beyond us only because to attain to them otherwise than by our own insight is meaningless, and we are always in some degree limited and fallible. God Himself cannot reveal to us an infallible guide, or force us to follow it; not because there is no standard, or because He is powerless, but because the conception itself is self-contradictory and meaningless.

But it does not follow that, because in matters of truth and of goodness we can never escape the necessity and the limitations of a personal judgment based on personal insight, we are left with a mere 'relativism.' That is far from being the truth. Where we are fallible, we are not, for that reason, without a standard; and where there is no guide to whom we can surrender our responsibility, we are not, for that reason, left without guidance. It is necessary to show briefly why this is so. The main principle can be expressed quite simply. The antithesis of the merely relative and the universally valid is not to be identified with that of what is contained within my own judgment and what falls wholly outside it. The fundamental antithesis is always that of what is merely mine and what, though still mine, is also more than mine merely. The moral advance, and similarly the advance in truth, consists always in so extending and correcting my personal judgment that, whilst never ceasing to be my own personal judgment, it comes progressively to appropriate and

embody the standard which is universal: a standard valid fo
me and for others alike. To advance in goodness means gradu
ally to conform my own will and character to what is wider an
higher than the desires or preferences of my merely immediat
or present self—to the demands of a cause, to the will of
society, or to the will of God. Similarly, to advance in truth
means gradually to extend and order my own judgment to con
tain or embody what is far more than mine merely—the syster
of knowledge or of truth itself. In neither case does it cease t
be my personal judgment, based upon personal insight; indeed
it becomes more truly personal as my self becomes fuller an
wider, embracing a life truer and higher than what is mine in a
exclusive sense. It is a process never finally completed, ye
gradually and progressively moving towards completion. An
it involves, throughout, the surrender and sacrifice of much tha
is mine as I now am, and perhaps of much that is dear to me now
for the sake of what shall be mine when I am what I ought to be
the sacrifice of the 'merely mine,' for what, though still 'mine,'
is no longer 'mine merely.' Thus, whilst obedience to a mora
or rational authority is never, on the one side, mere surrende
or submission, it is never, on the other side, the following of my
merely personal desires: it is an obedience through which I win
my own truer freedom and life, and a submission which is at the
same time my own spiritual achievement. Acceptance of and
obedience to the authority is the expansion and deepening of my
own life; and it is so because the authority, being a spiritua
authority, is not alien to myself, but is reverenced as containing
and embodying a standard at once mine and above me. More-
over, in this spiritual achievement, which is at the same time
loyalty to authority, though I am never relieved of my own re-
sponsibility, I can no longer be said to depend merely upon my
own resources. The standard is revealed to me in all that I can
understand and reverence: revealed to me, not apart from my
own effort and insight, but through them; and yet revealed,
because not my own invention or fabrication. My judgment and
understanding of truth and goodness is reality's revelation to
me of its own true nature. If, apart from my own insight, that
reality can be nothing to me; yet, apart from that reality, I could
never be anything at all. To suppose, therefore, that because

can never escape the burden and the peril of my own judgment, or find a spiritual guide except through my own insight into its quality, I am left without guidance or thrown merely upon my own resources, is a conclusion both erroneous and ruinous. On the contrary, my own freedom and achievement increase proportionately with my dependence upon the worlds of goodness and truth.

From these introductory remarks, the length of which must be justified by their importance for the subject, I turn to the more immediate problem of this paper. In what sense is Christ —His words, His deeds, and His whole self—an authority in spiritual and religious matters? That in some sense He is an authority, and an authority without parallel for those who directly or indirectly have come under His influence, is of course not to be questioned. But what is the nature of His authority? The question is not merely of theoretical interest, but also of great practical importance; for, if answered wrongly, His support will be claimed for what, though done in His name, is not done in His spirit. It will be convenient to consider two possible answers. They will be found to raise most of the issues which are important. (1) He speaks to us with the voice of God, and His authority is divine. (2) He speaks to us with the voice of the expert in spiritual discernment, and that is the ground of His authority. These answers are not antagonistic; but they may be considered separately, beginning with the second.

(1) What does it mean, to accept something on the testimony of an expert? In principle, the answer is contained in what has already been said. In the end, my own judgment is always ultimate for me, and I can never escape it. Moreover, though never without a standard, it is always in some degree limited and fallible. The testimony of the expert, therefore, is always accepted upon the basis of my own judgment and my own insight. No alternative is possible. But it is important to understand clearly what this means; for confusion is easy. To decide 'on my own judgment' may mean either of two different things. It may mean that I choose to take such knowledge and evidence as I happen to have at once available, and to decide on that basis, without looking further for advice or for more information. I

have then decided 'by myself,' or 'on my own judgment'; ar probably I have decided wrongly, because I have acted in ignc ance or from prejudice. But the meaning may be very differer Instead of deciding off-hand, on such evidence as I happen have, I may look further and collect all the evidence I can. An then it is obvious that in most cases (ultimately in all cases) m evidence will consist very largely in the verdict and testimon of others. My own knowledge in every department is derive largely from the work and discovery of others. Were I to l dependent only on what I had discovered independently o others, I should know (and be) almost nothing at all. Have still decided 'on my own judgment'? Most certainly; that what 'decision' means, and anything else is senseless. But th ground of my judgment is now no longer peculiar to me. I hav extended my knowledge through the knowledge of others. It still mine, but not mine merely; for it is extended to embody wider truth, which, being valid for all, is not peculiar to any. I is just this universal character which we mean by truth. More over, why do I go to the expert, instead of depending on myse or my neighbour? It is because he knows; and, further, becaus I know him to do so. When I accept the testimony of the exper my judgment is of the form: I believe this to be true, becaus he, who knows and is trustworthy, says it is so. I extend m knowledge through his, working on the ground that I know it t go beyond mine and yet to be consistent with it. My knowledg is probably still incomplete: I continue to know less than th expert; for it is impossible to accept, except in so far as I under stand. But to suggest that, because it is still my own judgment I could as well have done without assistance, would obviousl be absurd. The same principle holds where the judgment, in stead of being concerned with truth, is concerned with goodness The expert, his insight and goodness being what they are, ha accepted something as good; and I, whether or not I see all tha he saw, accept it for that reason, *i.e.* on the basis of my own insight as extended by my knowledge of him. I have not escaped my own responsibility; rather, I have used it rightly. And the expert's judgment has not superseded my own, but has provided the sphere in which—and in which alone—its true exercise was possible.

(2) 'He speaks to us with the voice of God, and His authority is therefore divine.' That this is true I am very far from disputing. But my task here is not to assert it, but to enquire what it means. And the problem at once arises: What is meant by the voice of God, how do men hear it, and how do they recognize that it is His? At this point there arises a difficulty which I cannot discuss. I have spoken, so far, of insight into truth and goodness, and argued upon that basis. It may perhaps be maintained that religious insight, knowledge of *God*, is in some respects different. It is concerned, it may be held, not with truth and goodness, as such, but with the sacred, which is different. Now I should certainly not admit that the sacred, as experienced in religion, can be separated from the moral. This seems contrary to fact. And (I may note in passing) those who hope to defend religion by arguing for this separation, are dealing, it appears to me, with a view more dangerous to their purpose than they perhaps suppose. But, since I could not offer a solution of this problem here even if I had one to offer, I shall simply assert that with insight into the sacred it is the same as with insight into truth or goodness: only in so far as I of my own insight see it to be sacred can it possess for me the authority which that character involves. There is no way of hearing God, except by means of my own highest capacities, and only through them can He speak to me. An immediate revelation, coming without my co-operation—a revelation which is not at the same time a discovery and a personal achievement—is nothing, or a delusion. To receive a revelation from God, is to win an insight into His nature, and also, since religion is always, even if not only, a practical attitude, to endeavour to carry out in my life what I have seen, and to live in accordance with it. And it is important to understand the full meaning of this. The two sides—my personal achievement and God's grace or revelation—are not mutually exclusive; nor is one present only in so far as the other is absent. It is not that God acts in so far as I do not, or that I act in so far as He withholds His hand. It is in my complete dependence upon Him that I attain to my fullest personal achievement. This truth became apparent before in a somewhat different connexion. I judge rightly of truth or of goodness in so far as I incorporate in my judgment a standard which is universal; and

the more truly my judgment is dependent upon the nature of t reality therein revealed, the more truly does it become mine a independent. And if for goodness and truth we say the sacre the principle at all events is the same. As I see more fully in its nature and embody it increasingly in my life, I become ali more truly myself and more fully dependent upon God.

Thus, to say that Christ is authority, in either of the sens suggested (and they do not differ in principle), means that H enables us to see in Himself, and through Him elsewhere, th which, whether as goodness or truth or the sacred, we recogni as in its own nature binding upon us and coming with its ov sanction. We do as He says and prize what He prizes, becaus with His help, we see it, directly or indirectly, to be itself go or true—what we must follow *for its own sake*. And He is f us the supreme authority in so far as He does this for supremely. To be guided by His authority and to act in obec ence to Him, so long as His authority is used as a spiritu authority, is the same as to be guided by our own insight and win our own achievement. We have not escaped our own r sponsibility or passed beyond our own insight: were we to d so, it would not mean that we had attained some standard mo 'absolute' than our own, but only that we had surrendered a that was 'spiritual.' But not for a moment is this to be unde stood to mean that we can dispense with Him or His guidanc for, without Him, we should never have seen what, with Hir we can see, or known what, in Him, we can know. It is He wh makes possible our insight and achievement. To follow H guidance and to obey Him is, nevertheless, the way to our pe sonal freedom. Complete obedience would be complete ind pendence, because complete attainment of His insight; for H command is not primarily 'Do' or 'Believe,' but rather 'Loc in sincerity and you will see.' Freedom or autonomy, and gui ance by Him, are not incompatible, but in the end are one ar the same. And this is true of all authorities which are bo spiritual in themselves and accepted by us in that character.

That Christ is an authority in this sense, I shall not attem to prove. That He is so, is surely not open to doubt. And m task is to enquire into the nature of His authority, not to prov

ts existence. But there are two further points which must be mentioned.

(*a*) The authority of Christ is not different in kind from other spiritual authorities; for the nature of spiritual authority is everywhere fundamentally the same. By this, however, I do not mean that His authority is not greater than others. I mean only that, if greater, it is so because in Him we see more fully and adequately what in a measure we see in all that is spiritual—using the term to include the intellectual and moral as well as the more specifically religious. Nothing is authoritative, in a spiritual sense, except in so far as it exhibits what in Him we see most fully expressed. It may perhaps be objected that this, if true, is at least insufficient. For in Christ, it may be held, the nature of God is fully and perfectly embodied; and consequently His authority, and His alone, is final and absolute. If by this is meant that He is the highest that we know or can conceive, and that therefore for us His authority is supreme, I naturally wish to raise no objection. And if even more than this is meant, I cannot deny it; though I cannot see how we can really assert it. To say that we know that Christ embodies perfectly and fully the nature of God can only mean that we have seen that He does so; and I do not understand how, with our present capacities, we could see that. And, if that is true, to ask for finality is to desire certainty more earnestly than truth. I may add that I cannot understand how it is possible that the whole fulness of God could be embodied in a human life (and such, of course, was His), nor why the belief that it can should be thought in any way necessary to Christianity.

(*b*) Moreover, if we appeal to Christ as the supreme spiritual authority, we must do so in a way consistent with His spirit. Turn His sayings into rules, instead of reverencing them as revelations of truth; act as He said on any other ground—the only ground He would recognize—than that to do so is seen, directly or indirectly, to have intrinsic merit or worth; and we are no longer appealing to him as a *spiritual* authority. He is, indeed, an example to follow; but not in the sense that He supplies a pattern which it is virtue exactly to copy. To follow His ex-

ample means to become ourselves 'Christlike,' *i.e.* to gain wi
His help and so far as in us lies, His insight, with which, lik
Him, we may act in our own freedom, meeting in His spirit eac
situation as it arises. To fall back upon His example in anothe
sense than this is, or tends to be, to fall below His spirit. W
cannot rightly use His words as a substitute for our own insigh
or to relieve us of our own responsibility for decision. Nor ca
we 'apply the teaching of Christ' except by acting in our ow
circumstances with the measure of insight and freedom we hav
been able to learn from Him. But of course this does not mea
that we may not at times achieve this best by imagining Hi
present with us, advising or helping. And it must never b
forgotten that, as has been emphasized more than once, the tru
freedom and independence are only to be found through utte
devotion to and dependence upon those purposes and values i
comparison with which our private interests and preferences ar
as nothing at all. We become truly free as we come to live fo
those ends which are no longer merely ours.

TRUTH AND RIGHTEOUSNESS*

'But the word is very nigh unto thee, in thy mouth, and in thy heart, that thou mayest do it.'—Deut., xxx, 14.

S. Paul quotes these word in Romans X and applies them to the Gospel. But in the Old Testament itself we can trace a development from the tables of stone, from the ark, the temple and the Holy City, to the fleshy tables of the heart and to the belief that God is Spirit, present everywhere—in a word, a development from law to conscience. We find that Deuteronomy speaks with the voice of Jeremiah: 'I will put my law in their inward parts, and in their heart will I write it,' &c.

Such is the new covenant which received the authority of our Lord Himself, and that authority is above all things self-authenticating, unlike that of the Scribes, appealing to reason and conscience, so that the ideal Christian is like Aristotle's ideal gentleman, 'a kind of law to himself.' He has God's word very nigh him, in his mouth and in his heart.

Old moralists used to distinguish between positive and moral commands. A positive command is right because God commands it: a moral command is God's command because it is right. In other words, a moral command is something for which we can see the reason, something which we feel to be naturally and immutably right. Positive commands come from some external authority, whether parent or teacher, Church or State: moral commands are written not with ink but with the Spirit of the living God. Conscience proclaims them right.

And when positive and moral commands conflict, as sometimes they do, the moral command must be put first. We see this in our Lord's teaching and practice, for instance, when He was attacked for healing on the Sabbath and for eating with publicans and sinners. He replies in the words of the Old Testament: 'I will have mercy and not sacrifice.' The prophet's command to do justly and to love mercy and to walk humbly with thy God is one of those which are 'very nigh thee, in thy mouth and thy heart,' and that is the kind of religion which our Lord came to republish with His own authority.

But, in the words of Bishop Butler, 'Mankind have in all ages been greatly prone to place their religion in peculiar positive rites, by way of equivalent for obedience to moral precepts' . . . and again, 'mankind are for placing the stress of their religion anywhere rather than upon virtue.' This 'prevalent folly' he pronounces to be utterly subversive of true religion and contrary to the whole general tenor of Scripture.

The temptation to get our religion done for us by machinery is still with us. Good Churchmanship is so much easier than character-forming. It may be wise to abstain from using the phrase, 'sacramental magic,' but I do not think we need disguise the fact that there is such a thing, that it is widely taught in our Church, and that we are right in opposing it, with the authority not merely of science or philosophy, but with that of many of our greatest divines, from Hooker to Westcott.

It has been well said that the saints do not contradict one another. That is indeed true when they tell of the Real Presence of Christ, the power of the Spirit, the joy that no man taketh from them, and the differ-

* A Sermon preached in St. Botolph's Church, Cambridge, before the Modern Churchmen's Conference, on Sunday, September 29th, by the Rev. T. F. Royds, B.D., Rector of Haughton, Staffordshire.

ence that it makes to their lives. They are spiritual experts, and we mus give full weight to their authority when they speak of the heavenly visior But the saint as such cannot take the place of the scholar, the critic an the historian. Such doctrines — I prefer to call them superstitions — a those of the so-called Real Objective Presence, of the expiation of sin b a sacrifice which is not self-sacrifice, of the invalidity of non-episcopa ministries and sacraments—will perhaps be kept alive for another generatio or two by authority, but it is the wrong kind of authority. They will g on losing ground in educated Europe, for they have the taint of paganisr with its visible and tangible God. And they cannot pass the test c verification by experience, which is the greatest test of all.

The authority of the Bible and the Church must ultimately rest on th authority of the Spirit bearing witness with our spirit. Luther and Calvi saw this, but it has often been obscured by later Protestantism. Ther is a fine passage in the Westminster Confession about the belief tha Scripture is the word of God: 'Yet, notwithstanding, our full persuasio and assurance of the infallible truth and divine authority thereof is fron the inward work of the Holy Spirit, bearing witness by and with th Word in our hearts.'

'The word is very nigh thee, in thy mouth and in thy heart.' An that inner voice must always be our chief authority. By it we test th teaching of the Bible, which has in itself, as Calvin said, the faculty o showing its truth, as things white or black of showing their colour, an things bitter or sweet of showing their flavour. But that does not apply t all of it alike, and for us as Modern Churchmen, it seems to me that all authority falls under one of two heads, the authority of the scholar and th authority of the saint. I am not now concerned with the legislative authorit of the Church, for that really rests on the other two.

The authority of the scholar means in practice the duty of searching for truth, and the authority of the saint means the duty of doing justly loving mercy and walking humbly with God. And these are distinct end in themselves. We must not seek truth only so far as it seems to be o the side of righteousness, nor must we conclude that anything which seem to help people to be religious must therefore be true.

Now a word about the search for truth. We stand for freedom i research. The scholar must not work in fetters. In the often-quote words of Archbishop Temple, 'To tell a man to study, and yet bid him under heavy penalties come to the same conclusions with those who have not studied, is to mock him. If the conclusions are prescribed, the study is precluded.' For instance, if he applies himself to such problems as the precise mode of our Lord's entry into and departure from this world—His Birth and Resurrection—he must not begin by asking what effect his conclusions may have upon the Church or himself. He must study with a single-minded desire to discover the truth, in the faith that all truth is God's truth, and that whatever conclusion he comes to, it will, if true, help and not hinder the advance of God's kingdom on earth.

It is vain to appeal simply to the authority of the past. The only valid appeal is to greater learning. 'The greatest enemy of knowledge,' says Sir Thomas Browne, 'is the Goliath of Authority and received opinion, or the inbred feeling that the older a statement is, the nearer it approaches to the fountain of truth.'

We are certainly not bound to blurt out all that we think or know in season and out of season. We may withhold truth for a time from children and those who are not ready for it, and, according to the Fourth Gospel,

we have our Lord's own authority for doing so. 'I have many things to say unto you, but ye cannot bear them now.' We must not state the lesser truths in such a way as to obscure the greater truths, and we must always, as S. Paul puts it, speak the truth in love, giving no needless offence to anyone, that our ministry be not blamed. But it will make all the difference whether we put truth in the first or in the second place.

To put truth in the second place means sooner or later to be dishonest, and dishonesty brings its own penalty. There are beliefs like belief in the inerrancy of Holy Scripture which could once be held honestly, but cannot now, because they can only be held by closing the mind to easily accessible knowledge. And traditionalism in its baser form, obscurantism, leads to carelessness about truth in ordinary life. It is morally debasing: it encourages lack of straightness in other things, and the keeping of religion and daily life in separate compartments, which is fatal to both.

And this is not surprising, for religion can easily be used, as the Old Testament prophets knew only too well, not as an aid to the virtuous life, but as a substitute for it. Its effect, or absence of effect, on character, needs watching carefully.

And this brings me to my second chief heading—the authority of the saint. Under this heading I would place conscience, the Holy Spirit, and all authority of a moral and spiritual kind. 'On ethical grounds alone,' says Dr. Rashdall in his *Theory of Good and Evil,* 'the doctrine of the Son requires the doctrine of the Spirit.' For it seems clear that our Lord made no attempt to legislate for the Church of the future or leave exact rules for our guidance now. And so there is constant need for studying the historical Christ afresh and re-applying his teaching. He left us free to do this—'The truth shall make you free.' But that freedom which we prize so much is not licence to do or think what we like: it is freedom from sin and error, that is, power to know and speak the truth and to be at our best.

And in that free fellowship of believers which we call the Church the freedom of the individual must always be limited to some extent by that of the whole body. This applies even more to the moral than to the intellectual side of religion.

Let me take two illustrations of this—Suicide and offences against the sanctity of Christian Marriage. The authority that condemns these is that of accumulated Christian sentiment and practice, and it is obviously undesirable that young people should argue that where the Bible and other external authorities are not decisive, there everyone has a right to experiment, or at least to publish his opinions. It has been said of Sabatier's well-known book, *Religions of Authority and the Religion of the Spirit,* that the real antithesis is between Religions of Authority and Religions of Autonomy, but too much autonomy in morals leads to moral anarchy.

On moral questions the safest authority is certainly not the popular novelist, but the instructed Christian conscience—that is, an authority which has given due weight to Christian experience and the guidance of the Spirit in the past. 'I had almost said even as they, but lo! then I should have condemned the generation of thy children.'

When we are brought up against the doubts of 'the natural man who receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God, for they are foolishness unto him,' let us remember that he often receives his doubts on authority—it may be that of a mere journalist—and not as the result of careful and prayerful thought and study. He has despised 'the generation of God's

children,' that is, those who strive to regulate their lives by the exampl and teaching of our Lord and Master, Jesus Christ.

And that brings me to my last point, that all authorities centre for u in Jesus Christ. It is a commonplace to say that the strongest ethica influence is personal influence; and it is true, I believe, that no ethica teacher before or after Christ has ever made *himself* the basis of hi teaching. 'His word was with power,' or, as the Revised Version trans lates it, 'with authority,' not only because, unlike that of the Scribes, i possessed the self-authenticating authority of truth over falsehood an right over wrong, but because of what He was Himself.

It is worth while pointing out, perhaps, not only that the New Testa ment has the same word for authority and power (it occurs about a hundre times), but that the Latin word *auctoritas* from which we get the Englis word 'authority' is commonly translated 'influence.'

Attempts are made from time to time to discredit the personal influenc of Christ, and to maintain that Christian ethics can survive withou Christian doctrine. That they sometimes do in individuals is undeniable but it must not be forgotten that these individuals are usually themselves the product of a Christian heredity and environment. That they ever car in a nation is, I think, impossible. We have an example in Russia to-day of Christian teaching and Christian morality being rejected together. In the New Testament there is no suggestion of any Christian life apart from Christ.

It is only in Him, under His influence, by His Spirit, that our old men can safely dream dreams and our young men see visions of the Church as He meant it to be. Are you ever tempted to wonder whether life is worth living, or whether God has any definite purpose for you in life? Then think of these two things, the authority of truth over falsehood, and of right over wrong; the authority of the scholar and the authority of the saint. Has not God called you to contend for Truth and Righteousness? The command to do this 'is not too hard for thee, neither is it far off. But the word is very nigh thee, in thy mouth and in thy heart, that thou mayest do it.'

You may not be called on to devote your life to truth in the sense that a great Cambridge scholar, Dr. Hort, meant when he described it as 'a life of vanities abased and ambitions forsworn.' But if the scholar's life is only for the few, we are all alike called to a task of profound difficulty, that of educating conscience so that it speaks as the voice of God within us. 'If the light within thee be darkness, how great is that darkness.' Evil is never done so thoroughly, as Pascal says, as when it is done conscientiously. There is constant need to re-apply the Spirit and teaching of Christ to the problems of modern life, in the light of the best knowledge of the day, and there is the daily task of forming a character in accordance with the mind of Christ, and of trying to think and speak and act in such a way as He would approve. That ideal was worth dying for once, and it is worth living for now. And so we pray: 'Remember, O Lord, what Thou hast wrought in us, and not what we deserve: and as Thou hast called us to Thy service, make us worthy of our calling.'

VISION AND AUTHORITY*

Speak, Lord; for thy servant heareth. I *Sam.*, iii, 9.

In Dr. Oman's striking book, *Vision and Authority* (recently, I am glad to say, re-published), he has a chapter entitled 'the Essential Attitude.' The attitude essential to the apprehension of the things of the Spirit is described by our Lord as that of a little child. 'Verily I say unto you, Whosoever shall not receive the kingdom of God as a little child, he shall in no wise enter therein' (*Mk.* x, 15): or in the words of the gospel for the day, 'Verily I say unto you, Except ye turn, and become as little children, ye shall in no wise enter into the kingdom of heaven' (*Mt.* xviii, 3).

The sixteenth Conference of Modern Churchmen has listened to a most interesting series of papers on an important subject, the consideration of which has become imperative at the present time. Each paper has been a part of a well-worked out scheme, the whole of which we shall happily soon have before us in the report, and we shall be able to study it at our leisure.

Underlying the whole inquiry is the belief in the validity of human experience at its highest and best, that is, in the validity of the Spiritual Life. Physicists like Professor Eddington have recently been reminding us that our knowledge of the aether and the electron to which Physics finally reduces the whole of the so-called material world is symbolic knowledge. If we ask the Physicist what he has made out the aether or the electron to be, the answer will not be in terms of billiard balls or fly-wheels or anything concrete; he will point instead to a number of symbols and a set of mathematical equations which they satisfy. These give us real knowledge about aether and electron, but knowledge expressed in symbols, symbols we cannot get behind.

Our knowledge of ourselves is on no worse a footing than that, and conceivably on a much better. Professor Eddington maintains that we have 'a real and not merely a symbolic knowledge of our own nature,' and that is why our nature seems so mysterious. However that may be, when we come, as we all do come, to try to express what we know about our own spirits in language in which symbolism plays a large part, it is well to remember that lack of concreteness does not invalidate the description or condemn the spiritual aspects of our nature as illusory. It is true to say, it is as near absolute truth as we can get to say, that we belong to a spiritual world where our spirits are *en rapport* with the Spirit of God. As for the outward order of things, the world which now is, it seems designed as a field where spirits may be developed and personalities may be produced.

For such development the element of freedom is indispensable. 'Though freedom is not a good thing in itself and absolutely,' says Dr. Charles Bigg (*Wayside Sketches*, p. 179), 'it is yet the indispensable condition of all human excellence.'

It is worth noticing that the postulate that the future is predetermined is being given up even in Physics. There are no more exciting pages in Professor Eddington's entrancing book, *The Nature of the Physical World*, than those in which he expands the *principle of Indeterminacy*. In its simplest terms this states that we cannot know accurately both the

* A Sermon preached before the Modern Churchmen's Conference in All Saints' Church, Cambridge, by the Ven. J. W. Hunkin, B.D., M.C., Archdeacon of Coventry, on the Feast of St. Michael and All Angels, 1929.

velocity and the position of a particle at the present instant. Thus t
future of the particle is indeterminate. The physicist can be wise after t
event, but not before it. The principle of Indeterminacy therefore reig
even in the physical world. The postulate that the future is predetermin
does not hold even in its original home, the home from which it invad
Psychology and Philosophy. It was because men thought the future pr
determined in the physical universe, that they argued that the future w
pre-determined in the mental and spiritual world as well. The very bas
of such an argument has now disappeared, and the old notion that mind
subject to deterministic law simply drops out.

Further, the whole history and experience of the human race shows th
real progress is from compulsion to freedom—from a kingdom of physic
laws to a kingdom of holiness and love. The best help the human pare
gives the child is the help not of force or dictation, but of participation
And the help God gives the human soul is the succour (I quote Dr. Oma
'which has nothing of the might which constrains, but is all of the migh
which persuades, nothing of the easy proclamation of power, but is all
the difficult participation of love.' It is this divine method of succour whic
finds its supreme exhibition in the Cross of Christ.

The ideal, the final, order, then, cannot be established by the mo
effective organizing authority. It demands the permeation of the whole b
a regulative love. In the meantime it is part of the essential discipline an
training of our life that we should think, and come to decisions for ou
selves. To hand over our responsibility of judging is to evade an exercis
absolutely necessary for the development of our very selves. Our attitud
is to be not that of a slave, but that of a child: direct, simple, unsophist
cated, unaffected, open-eyed, inquring, adventurous.

As children we gladly acknowledge authority of various kinds and d
grees. The only absolute authority is God, and God has appointed n
plenipotentiary. His authority breaks through into our life in fragments
Such are the authority of the specially gifted individual, and the authorit
of the society whether that exercised by the State or by the Church.

First there is the authority of the poet, the artist, the prophet: hig
authority, the authority of specialist and expert. Yet we do well to heed th
warning of the late Lord Salisbury. 'No lesson seems to be so deeply in
culcated by the experience of life as that you should never trust experts
If you believe the doctors, nothing is wholesome: if you believe the theo
logians, nothing is innocent: if you believe the soldiers, nothing is safe
They all require to have their strong wine diluted by a very large admixtur
of insipid common-sense.'

Then there is the authority of the State, the State being an organ o
the national society—the nation—through which it acts for certain impor
tant functions of its life. The authority of the State, in cases of dispute an
difficulty, must be considered in relation to the authority, the experience
the general will, of the national society at large. It is certainly an authorit
which the individual should take seriously into account and should recko
high in his scale.

Then again, there is the authority of the Church. And by the Church i
is constantly necessary to remind ourselves that we do not mean merely th
ministers of the Church. The ministry, if we may adopt, as Lightfoot does
Maurice's distinction, is *representative* and not *vicarial*. If the minister i
a priest 'he is a priest as the mouthpiece, the delegate, of a priestly race
His acts are not his own, but the acts of the congregation.'

[1] *op. cit.*, p. 117.

If a statement or a custom or a rule is really an expression of the common mind of the great company of faithful people, then, with so vast a weight of experience behind it, it is of course highly authoritative: but even so, not beyond scrutiny, examination, test. Nothing that comes to us with the label, 'To be accepted without examination,' can be genuinely and fully Christian. St. Paul knew better. He said, 'Prove all things'—*all* things—'hold fast that which is good.'

Moreover, many persons in the past have presumed to speak in the name of the Church who have had no right to do so. On many questions the Church is not in such a hurry to foreclose an issue as those who arrogate to themselves the position of judges and dividers over their brethren appear to be. In the *Oxford Diocesan Magazine* for this month Dr. Strong gives a brief survey of three occasions during the last seventy years on which the Church has been confronted with teaching which to a number of Churchmen has seemed heretical, and incompatible with the exercise of the ministry. He refers to the case of *Essays and Reviews*[1] in 1861, Lux Mundi in 1891, and the Report of the Modern Churchmen's Conference in 1922. In connexion with the second of these cases, Dr. Strong reminds us, there was a debate in the Lower House of Canterbury in the course of which Canon Gregory, well-known and still remembered for the rigidity of his orthodoxy, gave utterance to a memorable sentence which showed that he understood the real mind of the Church at such a juncture. 'What was wanted,' he said, 'what was wanted now, was argument and not authority.'

And further, on many questions 'the mind' of the Church is seriously divided. What are we to think of Church assemblies where the voting is almost evenly balanced? The refusal of the Church to grant its blessing to the 'innocent' divorced person (as Dr. Hensley Henson reminds us in his pamphlet on *Reunion and Intercommunion*[2]) was only carried by eighty-seven votes to eighty-four. How much authority is to be attached to that narrow majority?

Once more, we cannot and must not forget that sometimes those who have been widely accepted as responsible and duly accredited Church Officials have been demonstrably wrong: as when the Pope condemned Galileo, and when (in 1863) the Bishop of Cape Town formally deposed and excommunicated Bishop Colenso. In the latter case it was the authority of the State which intervened in the interest of Truth and good sense and confirmed the courageous Bishop in possession of his see (1866).

It is clear, therefore, that none of these authorities—the authority of the Specialist, the authority of the State, the authority of the Church, can be regarded as so final or decisive as to relieve the individual of the responsibility of weighing and considering and making decisions for himself. It is for him to assess each authority as well as he can, add up the total, and reach a result. In doing this he must use the simplicity, the directness, the courage of the child. He must be ready, not only to learn, but to unlearn, to acknowledge past mistakes and to correct past errors.

Huxley describes the attitude required in that famous passage in his letter to Charles Kingsley dated 23rd September, 1860:

> 'Science seems to me to teach in the highest and strongest manner the great truth which is embodied in the Christian conception of entire surrender to the will of God. Sit down before fact as a little child, be

[1] The strength of the feeling aroused at the time is curiously illustrated by one of the figures at the base of the font in Coventry Cathedral. The figure represents Error or Heresy and holds open a book on which are inscribed the words 'Essays and Reviews.'

[2] 1909, p. 8.

prepared to give up every preconceived notion, follow humbly whereve
and to whatever abysses nature leads, or you shall learn nothing.
have only begun to learn content and peace of mind since I hav
resolved at all risks to do this.'

We may add that the right attitude towards the vast, immense, un
charted, spiritual world is the attitude not merely of a child, a child b
himself, in isolation, but of a child trusting in a Father. 'Speak, Lord
for Thy servant heareth,' the child whispers, and the Father hears an
answers. He answers by strengthening our powers, purging our gross
ness, giving us insight, balance, discrimination—leaving us, expecting us
to do our very best. 'Thou, O God, dost sell us all things,' said Leonardo
de Vinci, 'at the price of labour.' What we discover is what He reveals
The book of His revelation is not closed. The activities and operations o
His spirit have not ceased; and it is with the present that we are chiefly
and most immediately concerned.

'The times in which we live,' as Benjamin Whichcote used to say, 'are
more to us than any else: and if we may learn much by the writings of good
men in former ages, we may learn more by the actings of the Divine Spirit
in the minds of the good men' we ourselves have met and known. This is
why we are not afraid of the word 'Modern.' The word is derived, of course,
through the late Latin *modernus* from *modo, now, just now*. We are
modern Churchmen because we believe that God speaks *now, just now*.
And the Book of Common Prayer sounds the clarion of true Modernism
every Sunday morning in the ninety-fifth Psalm: '*To-day*, if ye will hear
his voice, harden not your hearts.'

Our faces are turned forward and not backward. God has still things to
say unto us which hitherto we have not been able to bear. We have not
been able, partly because the new revelation would have meant more ac-
knowledgment of old error, more correction of old mistakes, than we have
yet been prepared to make. For every advance in knowledge must neces-
sarily involve revision, re-orientation, re-adjustment of what we knew
before; the shaking of the things that can be shaken that the things which
cannot be shaken may remain. The Spirit of God is still guiding—not driv-
ing or forcing—guiding into *all the truth* (*Jn.* xvi, 13).

By Thine unerring Spirit led,
We shall not in the desert stray;
We shall not full direction need,
Nor miss our providential way;
As far from danger as from fear,
While love, almighty love, is near.